University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1995

Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate SelfRegulation
William W. Bratton
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Joseph A. McCahery Prof
Tilburg University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Agency Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons,
Business Organizations Law Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Economic Theory Commons,
Finance Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons,
and the Securities Law Commons

Repository Citation
Bratton, William W. and McCahery, Joseph A. Prof, "Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and
Corporate Self-Regulation" (1995). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1365.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1365

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

REGULATORY COMPETITION,
RtGU LATORY CAPTURE, AND CORPORATE
SELF-REGULATION
WILLI AM

W. BR ATTO Nt
AND

JosEPH A. McCA HERY

77

In this Article, Professors Bratton and McCahery explore,
in the larger framework of corporate governance, the positioning
of legal barriers to shareholder action regarding corporate charters.
The authors first trace the problems inherent in the managementshareholder agency relationship and clarify the arguments
supporting and criticizing the two prevailing "deterrent" strategies
for regulating corporate management-fiduciary control and
market control.
The authors adopt the view that a third
strategy-enforced self-regulation through institutional shareholder
participation-can be more effective, but stress economic
limitations on the class of situations in which shareholder initiative
can be expected to yield concrete governance benefits. The Article
contends that, given these limitations, the present allocation of state
and federal authority over corporate governance should be
adjusted in order fully to realize the potential benefits of
institutional shareholder participation. In the authors' view,
regulatory competition among the states causes state law unduly to
constrain the field of action for shareholder initiative in much the
same way that it already impairs the operation of the fiduciary and
market deterrents. To support this view, the Article offers a
public-choice analysis of the charter competition system. Under
this, the system operates to embed the capture of state political
decisionmakers by corporate managers and only intermittently
promotes innovation and assures legal responsiveness to the
preferences of investors. This analysis leads the authors to
propose a federally mandated privilege of shareholder access to
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state corporate charters to approve amendments on matters of
process and structure. They argue that this proposal is well-suited
to the background of incentives that determine the level and
character of institutional shareholder participation, and that its
enactment would not impede the operation of charter competition
systems in its beneficial aspect.
I NT ROD UCTIO N

Corporate law currently faces the problem of effectuating
contractual governance in an agency system that insulates agents from
market constraints. 1 This governance discussion focuses on possibilities for strengthening the shareholders' role in the ongoing
negotiation of incomplete corporate contracts.
Proponents of
institutional shareholder participation have taken the lead by mapping
out shareholder-driven strategies for monitoring and compensation
systems that will more effectively control the costs of management
influence activities within the firm. 2
These strategies force
proponents to confront long-standing economic and legal barriers to
shareholder action.
In this Article, we carry this legal confrontation to subject matter
so far largely exempted from the discussion-state corporate law and
the system of incentives that forms it. More particularly, we
recommend partial federal preemption of state law's allocation to
management of agenda control over corporate charter amendments.
We argue that this intervention will ameliorate some of the cost and
incentive barriers that impede shareholder action.
This recommendation requires us to confront the theory of
regulatory competition that legitimates the state system. We base our
challenge to this theory on a reinspection-conducted without the use
of a general equilibrium lens 3-of the internal negotiating structure
that forms corporate law. This reinspection reveals that charter
competition results in state laws that inhibit the negotiation of
contract terms that could both alleviate problems of informational

1. Cf Jason Scott Johnston , The Influence of TH E NATURE OF THE FIRM on the
Th eory of Co rporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213,241-44 (1993) (noting that contractarian firm
theories tha t rely on market constraints provide no account of the mechani sms that will
lead to long-run efficiencies) (citing PAU L MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOM ICS , ORGANI ZATI ON AND MANAGEMENT 192-94, 277-79 (1992)).
2. See Pa ul Milgram & John Roberts , An Economic Approach to Influence Activities
in Organization, 94 AM. J. Soc. S154, S156 (Supp. 1988).
3. Th at is, we do not assume that competition among the states in the production of
corporate law, taken alone, over time wi ll ass ure th e evolution of an optimal lega l regim e.
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asymmetry between managers and monitors and help to realign
incentives to reduce the costs of management influ ence .~ 1l1is Article
depicts a self-regulatory system, composed of firms and state
lawmaking institutions, in which competition among the states ensures
the system's capture by corporate management influence. It then
draws on political theory to provide a guide for deai ing with the
problem. This learning from the field of public regulation highlights
the formative role that process and structure rules pl ay in capture's
amelioration. We adapt it to the private corporate governance
situation and conclude that removing some of the states' mandatory
process rules would create opportunities for shareholder participation
in contract negotiation and for shareholder influence on the formation
of state law.
Part I provides an overview of our proposal for agenda access for
shareholder-proposed amendments to the firm's contract.
This
examines
the
objectives
and
strategies
of
the
shareholder
discussion
participation movement in the context of corporate law's historic
debates over governance strategies and state lawmaking systems.
Part II critically reviews the market-based justification of the
charter competition system and the historic alternative of fiduciarybased blanket federal preemption.
It asserts that the market
perspective is infirm in two respects. First, it understates the effects
of regulatory capture because it fails to recognize that the system does
not provide shareholders with either an effective exit route, or, in the
alternative, an adequate opportunity to register political demands.
4. c;: Paul Milgram & John Roberts, Bargaining Cos1s, Influ ence Cos/5, and rhe
Organizalion of Economic Activily, in P ERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL EC ONOMY
57, 82 (Jam es A. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) (noting the role of distorted
information in the decision-making process of central authorities). Under Milgram and
Roberts's "influence cost " model of the firm, th e firm must confront problems of
informational asymmetry if it is to make and support efficient choices. The probl e m is that
decision-makers must obtain and rely upon information ge nerated by others. Employees
and other players, by virtue of their place within th e organization, possess inform a tion that
could have a significant impact on decisions mad e by principals. Absent s uffici e nt
incentives to release these information rents, the agents will use this information to
influence the decisions of those above them in the hi e rarchy. According to Mil gram and
Roberts, the problem for an actor higher in the hierarchy attempting to monitor these
agents is this asymmetric information-the asymmetry ·'prevents e asy determination of
whether a particular observed action or outcome corresponds to desirable behavior and
thus renders the problem nontrivial." Milgram & Roberts, supra note 2, at 156.
Shareholder participation strategies seek to alleviate the asymmetric information
problem in the public corporation with devices such as process reforms (which take the
initiative in the design of internal incentive schemes away from management) and direct
placement of independent monitors in the boardroom. See infra not es 148-241 and
accompanying text.
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Second, the market perspective offers an overly simplistic picture of
the incentives that determine the beh avior in Delaware, the leading
chartering state. In the capture mod el presented here, state-federal
politica l instability emerges as a positive fo rce that occasionally forces
D elaware to confront conflicting demands of managers and
sb.areholders and effect a somewh at rr1cre eve n- handed m ediation
between the two grou ps. The mo 1cl ah o suggests caution in the
selection of a legal correc:tive to the ca pture problem: D iscre te
federa l intervention to fa cili ta te sharehol der pa rticipatio n in corporate
contracting emerges as preferable to blanket preem ption. In our
view, federal preemption that instit.u tio nalizes an opportunity to
register conflicting demands on state lawmakers would not sacrifice
the relational advantages that flow from corporate law production in
a small, market-sensitive jurisdiction.
Part III examines th e theori es, accomplishments, and open
agenda items of the institutional shareholder movement.
The
discussion describes and evaluates three participatory modes: discrete
issue-based voting contests, coalition-base d votin g for board seats, and
relational investment in large share blocks. Only the first mode
clearly passes the tests of cost-benefit feasibility and insusceptibility
to management capture. In practice, discrete voting contests have
occurred because they require low out-of-pocket costs and serve as
vehicles for reputational gain by a narrow segment of institutional
agents. These agents' reputationa l interests make them unlikely
candidates for capture. A t the same time, reputational interests
re nde r managers vulnerable to the institutions' dialogic activities and ,
therefore, prone to make concessions. Contractual modifications have
resulted. The second participatory mode, coalition-based board
voting, holds out the promise of high-intensity monitoring with little
chance of capture due to absence of capital investment by, and
rep utational profiles of, the hypothesized monitors. H owever, federal
regulation impedes experimentation , and there are substantial cost
and incentive barriers. Toe third mode, relational investing, solves
the problems of coalition-building by making the volunteer monitor
a substantial equity investor. In theory, this volunteer recoups its
costs as its equity block increases in va lue due to its input into the
firm 's governance. Also in theory, this volunteer 's public-regarding 5
profile renders it impervious to the free ride taken by the rest of the
shareholders. Practical fea sibility prese nts no problem in the sense

5. T hat is, activated by th e inte res ts of th e share holders as a gro up.
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that large block investments and attendant governance engagements
have long occurred in practice. However, a practical prob lem does
follow from the magnitude of the actor's investment. Large financial
stakes make sustained public-regarding relational engagements
unstable. Both capture by managem ent in exchange for sep arately
nego ti ated rents and defection int o the ca mp of a host ile offeror
rema in structural possibilities.
Pa rt IV asserts that practical barriers to exper imentation \'>'ith th e
second and third mod es of shareholder participation make it
worthwhile to recommend federal intervention against state -m andated
agenda control. This discussion details the restrictive effects of state
law's agenda mandate, describes the central role of charter competition in the mandate 's evolution , and prop oses limited fe deral
intervention to ensure a shareholder privilege to initiate charter
amendments. We recognize that shareholder initiative could lead to
rent-seeking and the emergence of voting cycles. To ameliorate the
rent-see king problem, the proposal limits access to matters of process
and structure. To cut off the cycling activity, the proposal includes a
set of ancillary process rules.
I.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES AND
STATE CORPORATION LAW

A. Deterrent Governance Strategies and State Charter Comp etition
An unsatisfactory organizational incentive scheme hampers the
performance of large corporations. Opportunistic managers often
exert excessive influence over their governance mechanisms,
exp loiting a collective action barrier to effective monitoring by
dispersed equity owners.
Solving this management-shareholder
agency problem is corporate law's long-standing, unperformed
assignment. Historically, debate over the appropriate solution has
centered on two competing deterrent strategies. The first, the
"fiduciary" strategy, is the corporate version of command and control
regulation. It follows from assertions by Berte and Means that
shareholders lack any effective means to monitor the firm themselves,
that no adjustment of shareholder incentives will cure the problem ,
and that therefore the state must intervene to pick up the slack by
imposing mandatory rules. 6 U nder the strict regime envisioned,

6. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDIN E R C. M EANS, THE MODERN CORPORAT IO N AND
PRIVATE PROPE RTY 219-21 , 241-52 (Harcourt, Brace & World , Inc. 1968) (1932).
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process rules that provide entrepreneurial lawyers with financial
incentives to enforce fiduciary norms address the shareholders '
collective action problem. The competing approach, the "market"
strategy, seeks to deter management shirking by clearing the field for
the operation of markets for products, management employment, and
co rp ora te control. According to this view, economic actors in fre e
m <1rke ts can be relied upon to protect themse lves, and ov.::r tim e
col lect ive ac tion problems solve themselves as fit competitors survive
in ::1 compe titive environment. Here a different sort ot entrepreneur,
the hostile tender offeror or proxy contestant, plays the critical
enforce ment role. 7
lv1ost observers agree that an effective legal model must draw on
both modes of deterrence, but proponents of the two strateg ies
dispute the appropriate weighting of the legal mix. Proponents of
fiduciary control question the market 's effectiveness in protecting
shareholders from management opportunism and see mandatory
fairness norms as necessary supports for systemic confidence. Market
proponents see fiduciary regulation as a barrier to the market's
operation in some cases, and otherwise as an unnecessary deadwe ight
cost, except where intervention proves necessary to facilitate the
operation of free transfers of corporate control.
This debate repeats itself when attention turns to the po litical
structure of corporate lawmaking. The federal system 8 leaves matters
of corporate organizational structure and fiduciary standards to th e
states; corporations remain free to choose their states of incorporation.9 Since corporate charters produce re nts for the states, the
states compete to attract charters. Proponents of fiduciary regulation
see this regulatory competition as a "race to th e bottom": Since the
managers have captured the governance mechanisms of the states'
corporate customers, competition for charters by the states devolves
on the provision of special benefits to managers, weakening the

7. Compa re Frank H . Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisc hel, Corporate Control
Transacrions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 passim (1982) (applying mark et stra tegy to sales of control)
with Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corpora1e Distribwions and
Reorganization, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072 passim (1983) (applying fiduciary strategy to sa les
of control).
8. American corporate Jaw has evolved with th e national government assuming
responsibility only for regulation of information flow in the secur iti es markets; it imposes
a mandatory disclosure regime on public corporations with a combination of administrative
and entre preneurial enforcement techniques.
9. American conflict of laws rules respect the law of a corporation's nomi nal
domicile. See RESTATEME NT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L AWS§ 302 (1971).
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fiduciary regime. Tnerefore, a preemptive, fiduciary-based federal
corporate law regime is the recommended remedy. 10
Market
proponents counter that market controls ensure that efficient
governance structures result as the states respond to the managers'
demands. Tnis "race to the top" obviates any need for federal
intervention. 11

B. Insriwtional lnvesrur Parriciparion and a Strategy of Enforced SelfRegulation
These de bates over deter rent strategies and charter com petition
have been complicated in practice by two developments. one negative
and the other positive. First, the negative: During the 1980s, state
lawmakers took an active role in impairing the mark et deterrent,
contributing to the collapse of takeover activity. This prompted
reappraisal of the race to the top and race to the bottom views of
charter competition and the emergence of an intermediate view
recognizing that competition has both positive and negative effects.
Next , the positive development: The collapse of the takeover market
coincided with the advent of active institutional investor participation
in corporate governance. 12 This prompted the articulation of a third
strategy for dealing with the agency problem:
enforced selfregulation.1 3 Under this third strategy, shareholders can avoid the

10. The most prominent advocate of this view was William Cary. See William L. Cary.
Federalism and Corporare Law: Reflecriorzs Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663. 696-705
(1974).
11. The mos t prominent advocate of this view is Ralph Winter. See Ralph W. Winter.
Scare Lmv, Shareholder Protecriorz, and rhe Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
251 passim (1 977).
12. These eve nts had profo und implications for corporate legal th eory. lt became
apparent that the theoretical reso urces of neoclassical economic analysis of Jaw co uld not
adequately describ e the events taking pl ace . The result was a renewed inte res t in both the
politics of domestic corpo rate law and the comparison of foreign in stitution s. For
discussion of th e bre ak and the shortcomings of the comparative inquiry. see Richard M.
Buxbaum. Compararive A spects of Institutional Investment and Corpora1e Governance, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTO RS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 passim (Theodor Baums
et al. eds., 1994).
13. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TR ANSCEN DING
THE DER EGULATION DEBATE 101-04 (1992). Ayres and Braithwaite distinguish between
"enforced self-regulation" and "coregulation" in administrative law. !d. at 102. Und e r the
former, th e state and the reg ulated firm negotiate over standards tailored to th e firm . The
latter, which prevails in the U.S. securities industry , involves self-regulation by an industry
association with some oversight or ratification by the government. Ayres and Braithwaite
explore possib iliti es for enforced self-regulation on the theory that th e subcontracting of
the reg ulatory function to private actors under ultimate government supervision could le ad
to greater fl ex ibility in the formulation of the terms of regulation and effectiveness of
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need to rely on legal and market deterrents to the extent that they
effectively negotiate the corporate contract themselves and monitor
its performance.
Self- regulatory strategies are not new to corporate governance.
Indeed, self-regulation by means of a legally mandated shareholder
vote for the board of directors is the syste m's historic base point.
Commentators have debated plans to improve this se lf-regulatory
structure 's performance for decades.
'"owever, since those ear lier
proposals all followed from the Berle and i\11eans ass umptions, no one
expected that independent internal monitors could be imposed on
managem ent by unilateral shareholder directive.
Instead, the
proponents sought voluntary acceptance by management of oversight
by independent directors and pursued a dialogic implementation
strategy. The proponents advocated a norm of majority independent
board membership and attempted to have such a requirement inserted
into the canon of proper business practices. 14 Success was achieved
in form but not in substance: The norm found its way into the canon
only to be subverted in practice by management influence. By the

enforcement. !d. a t 102-32.
We think the concept usefully describes the mode of corporate governance e nvisioned
by proponents of pa rticipation by institutional investors. The context is different , of
course. Here the e nforcing actor is not a governme nt agency but the firm's shareholders;
no immedi ate ly available sove reign mand ate skews bargaining positions when the parti es
negotiate over governance tenns. Thus we do not empl oy the se lf-regulation concept to
import a "pub lic" colorati on into a "p ri vate " contractual ma tter. Howeve r, we do tak e th e
position th at state ma ndates are already in ex tricab ly bound up in the dete rmin a tion of th e
potential scope of enfo rced se lf-regu lati on by shareholders and that their rea djustm e nt is
an app ropr iate subject matt er for corporate Jaw refo nn .
14. Manda tory independent board structure was proposed in the first draft of the
Am erica n Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, but was cut back to precatory
status in late r versions a t the insistence of management representatives. Compare
PRINCrPALS OF CORPORATE GOVE RNANCE AND STRUCTURE: R ESTATEM ENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS§ 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982) (proposing ma ndatory maj orit y
of indepen de nt directors) with 1 PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANA LYS IS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) (recomm ending majority of ind e pend ent
directors as practice suggestion) ; see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG , TH E STRUCTURE OF
TH E CORPORATION: A LEGA L ANALYSIS 170-85 (1976) (recommending mandate). For
a review of the politics of the AU Corporate Governance Project proce edings, see
Jon athan R. Macey , The Transformarion of che American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1212 passim (1993).
Propon ents of both fiduciary and market deterrence strategies took a dim view of
mandatory independent boa rds. Compare Victo r Brudne y, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 609-12 (1 982) (emphasizing that the directors' dut y of vigilance would be constrained by their need to
interact with other direct ors) with Daniel R. Fischel, Th e Corporate Governan ce
Movemenr, 35 V AND. L. REV. 1259, 1280-86 (1982) (arguing that use of ind epend ent
directors is detrimental to profit max imi za tion ).
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end of the 1980s, almost three-quarters of A merican directors were
outsiders; management nevertheless retained control of the selection
process, and sixty- three perce nt of the outside dire ctors selected were
chief executive offi cers of ot he r public companies. 15
Ins titutional investor participation ch a nges this picture, holding
out a pros pect of se lf-r:::g.ulation enfo rced by th e sha :-ei-: olders
th emseives. rf11e th eorv no s its that co ncen trated institu ti o nal eauity
l
. .
1 l .
. n cost e,rec::tlve.
f"
.
17
o\vn ershr. p '' li m;.L<:es
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t s •rn .re.1
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shareho lders have us ed the ir voting power to get results. Successful
pub licity and issue-based proxy campaigns against unde rpe rforming
com panies have prompted management concessions on governance
provisions, and in the most drama tic cases, boardroom shakeups. 1s
rTheorists, however, ask for more thoroughgoing engagemen ts than
these discrete an d relatively inexpe nsive exercises can provide. They
have mapped strategies for sustain ed rela ti onships between managers
and institutional monitors, looking to the use of institutional votes to
nominate and elect expert outside monitors, and the placement of
substantial blocks of shares with public-regarding institutional owners.
These more ambitious and costly proposals have not yet been tes ted
in practice.
Shareholder participation strategies are an attractive altern ative
to the two deterrent strategies. The payoff for costly action by
shareholder vol unteers comes from improved inves tment policy and
day-to-day management. Thi s expands on th e payoff of the fi duciary
deterrent and promises governance beneflts former ly in the market's
e xcl usive preserve. Corpora te law 's dut y of loyalty focus es on a
limited class of moral hazard 1'J problems; its duty of care avoids
,.1

.I

_l.

·-- - - - -·----- - - -15. J AY W . LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER , PAWNS OR POTENTATES: T HE
REA LITY OF AMER ICA'S CORPO RATE BOA RDS 17-18 (1989).
16. T his proportion passe d 50% du ring the 1980s. See CENTER FOR LAW & ECON.
STUD IES, fnsrirwi onal Investors and Cap ital Ma rkers:
1991 Upda te , CO LUi'vt.
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJEcr, at Table 19 (199 1).
17. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying tex t. For an exce ll ent review of the
proposa ls on the tabl e, see Al e ta G. Estre icher, Beyond Agency Costs: !Vlanaging the
Corporation for th e L ong Term, 45 RUTG ERS L. REV . 513. 593-612 (1993).
18. See infra notes 162-80 and acco mpa nying tex t.
19. Milgrom and Ro berts defin e moral hazard in tenn s of "postcomraclllal
opportunism that arises when act ions required or desired under th e con tract are not fr ee ly
observable ." See MILG ROM & ROBERTS, supra note I, at 167; see also Ian Ayres & Peter
Cramton, Relational In vesting an d Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L. REV . 1033, 1044 (1994)
(suggesting tha t moral hazard "ste ms fr om the agent's 'hidd e n action'"). T hi s framework
can be used to describe corporate law's gard en vari e ty conflict of interest transaction: A
board with insufficient in fo rma tion respect ing incentives is more li ke ly to approve on e-
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mqmry into the adverse selection 20 problems that lead to unsuccessfu l business plans. This limited scope follows from limited
enforcement resources: Judges intervening ex post can untangle
conflict-of-interest transactions and structure remedies, but information al complexities put investments and operations outside their
com p<:: tence. 2 1 The takeover, in con trast, addresses all of these
a ge
p roblerns and, at least in theory, creates value for shareholders
throug h their elimination. However. it s widespread employment
cl urin z th e 1980s gave rise to a perceived problem of perverse effects.
It ap peared that prospects for short-term gain could induce the
takeover of a well-managed firm, thereby chilling productive longterm investment.
It also appeared that readily available debt
financing could lead to speculative overbidding and subsequent
bankruptcy costs.
Shareholder participation strategies promise to avoid these
p rob lems. They seek a competency payoff by placing effective
monitors inside the firm. There, with access to the full set of
information, the monitors will effect necessary changes through

sided deals; rationally apathetic shareholders will take no action in response.
20. Mi!grom and Roberts define adverse selection in terms of the
kind of pos/contracwal opportunism that arises when one party to a bargain has
private information about something that affects the other 's net benefit from the
contract and when only those whose private information implies that the contract
will be especially disadvantageous for the other party to agree to the contract.
l\:!ILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 595. In this context, adverse selection stems from
the age nt's hidden infom1ation. A board with inad e quate information cannot fully
e valuate the agent's capabilities and performance, making it difficult to ensure the
selecti on of the most able agents. See Ayres & Cramton. supra note 19, at 1044.
iV!ore generally, fiduciary law is ill-suited to the control of managers' influence
activiti es th a t have negative consequences for the firm. In the Milgrom and Roberts
model, influence activity is the time and effort spent by rational, self-interested actors in
firms to influ e nce decisions. Some of this activity may be nefit the firm, but it also results
in questionable pay increases, unnecessarily large budgets, acceptance of suboptimal
projects and proposals , and rejection of worthwhile proposals. See Milgrom & Roberts,
supra note 2, at S155-56.
21. This limitation of scope, embodied in the business judgment rule, stems from a
recognition of informational constraints on the process of judicial enforcement. The riskreturn calculations prevailing at the time of initial investment cannot be reconstructed ex
pos1; the fact of failure invites the ascription of incompetence to conduct better described
as considered risk-taking. Aggressive fiduciary inquiry into investment policy would overdeter risky investment. The corporate duty of care, accordingly, strikes only at extreme
cases of incompetence. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 , 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1 924). The Delaware
S upreme Court has created an exception by strictly scrutinizing the process employed in
the boa rdroom of the acquired firm in a friendly merger. See Cede & Co . v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom. 488 A.2d 858,893 (Del. 1985).
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cooperation and persuasion. The deterrent strategies, in contrast, lead
to punishment payoffs. The more widespread their use, the more a
management subculture of resistance to outside regulation becomes
entren ched. 22
This picture of productive relational engagement by shareholders
is still largel y as piratio na l. So far, institutional victories in discrete
engagements have followed from the efforts of agents of public
pension funds. These actors take the role of political en tre prene urs
an d act fro m motivations more reputational than financi al. A lth ough
agents of private pension funds, mutual funds, banks, and insurance
companies control the overwhelming portion of institutional equity
holdings, they have not emerged as leading players in the game. 23
It remains unclear wheth er concrete cash payoffs can be rea lized from
the loose cost-benefit projections that support the relational strategies.
A number of sticking points impede testing of the relational
models. First, no one has devised an incentive scheme th at integrates
investment in governance participation with the range of agency
arrangements that obtain in the different investment institutions. 24
Second, substantial legal impediments to shareholder collective action
remain on the books. Early pressure for reform has resulted in some
significant changes-paternalistic barriers to coordinated institutional
action in issue contests have been removed from the federal proxy
rules, but full-scale testing of relational models of shareholder
participation awaits the implementation of a broader program to
curtail the scope of the federal securities laws. 25 1l1ird, a nascent
incentive problem lies unresolved in the interplay between self-

22. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 19-20. The part ici pat ion strategy
also looks reasonable in a loose comparative cost survey. The instituti ona l volunteers do,
of course, in cur the up-front costs of campaigning, coalition building, or direct investment.
That inves tm ent does not occur, however, absent the prospect of a greater performance
payoff, and that payoff ultimately benefits the shareholders as a group. Meanwhile,
significant costs attending the deterrent strategies are avoided. Fiduciary la w carries the
de adwe ight cost of corporate subsidy of hostile, labor-intensive judicial processes even in
the meritorious case , and additional costs from nonmeritorious cases stemming from the
unso lved problem of process incentives to plaintiffs' lawyers to hold up firms for quick
se ttlem ents. T akeovers, although said to create shareholder value overall, see, e.g.,
Roberta Romano, A Guide 10 Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regularion , 9 YALE J.
ON REG . 119, 152-54 (1992) , do not necessarily benefit the sharehold ers of the acquiring
firm, see, e.g., Be rnardS . Black, Bidder Overpaymenr in Takeovers , 41 STAN. L. REV. 597,
614-15 (1989); Richard Roll , The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporare Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197
passim (1 986) , and entail enormous transaction costs.
23. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
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regulation by shareholders and market deterrence by takeover. The
institutional participation movement has proceeded during a cyclical
low in m erger and acquisition activity. An upturn in the merger cycl e
and resurgence of hostil e activity 26 wou ld reweight the institutio ns '
payoff pattern away from patient engagement in favor of defection
and sh ort-term gain. That, in turn. would diminish manageme nt 's
in cent ive to coo perate.27

C.

A Federally 1\!Jandared Privilege of Shareholder Iniciative

R ece nt co mm entari es on shareh ol der participation focus on
barriers to the realization of the full relational models. This Article,
in contrast, examines the legal landscape that channels discret e
institutio nal interventions and explores possibilities for expanding th e
menu of contractual reforms attaina ble through shareholder initiative.
In so doing, it constructs a theoretical case for a reform proposal
made in passing many times in the past: 2R federal preemption of
state law's allocation to management of an exclusive privilege to
initiate corporate charter amendments. We revive this proposa l with
two consequences in mind. First, recent institutional accomplishments
suggest that levelling of the state law playing field could lead to

26. An upturn in the me rge r cycl e has occurred during the last two ye a rs, but hostil e
takeover activity remains spo ra dic. See infra note 236.
27. A t the sam e tim e, ne w ince ntives to defect to the managem ent sid e would ari se
in a case in whi ch the sharehold er volunteer holds a substantial block o f stock and state
fiduci ary law proves in ca pabl e of policing a sid e deal. See infra notes 23 2-40 and
accomp a nying text.
28. See, e.g .. Be rn ard S. Blac k, Is Corporate Lmv Trivial?: A Po litical and Econom ic
Analysis , 84 Nw. U . L. R EV . 542, 582 (1990) (pr opos ing a fed eral requirem ent for publi c
compani es that a maj ority of share holders el ect to be governed by ch anges in st ate Ja w
th at affect the divi sion of power betwee n man agement and share hold e rs); Ca ry. supra not e
10, at 701-03: John C. Coffe e. Jr .. Th e Fwure of Corporate Federalism: Stale Comp elilion
and the N ew Trend To ward De FaciO Federal Minimum S1andards , 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
759. 774- 77 (1987) (propos ing shareholder initiative by the use of proxy statement to opt
out of sta te rul es, amend the ch a rter and change the state of incorporation); see also SE C
Concept R elease on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, E xchan ge Act
Release No . 34-23486, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,096, 28,100-02 (1986) (suggesting self-gove rn ance
exempti ons to specific tend e r offer rules); SEC Advisory Commiuee Repo rt on Tend er
Offers , Fed . Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , Special Report No. 1028, at 37-41 (July 8. 1983)
(recomm endin g annual shareholder advisory votes on golden parachutes , stand still
agreements. and superm ajority and disenfranchising charter provisions); cf ROBE RTA
ROMANO, TH E G EN IUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 83-84 (1993) (herein aft er
ROM ANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAw) (proposing change of statutory defa ults fr om optout to opt -in at the sta te level) ; Jon athan R. Macey, Administrative Agency O bsolescen ce
and Interesl Gro up Formation: A Case Swdy of th e SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDO ZO L. R EV.
909, 944 (1994) (proposing that Congress should preempt state antit akeover sta tutes,
leaving share hold e rs to make decisions respecting takeover defenses).
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patterns of corporate contracting that begin to resemble those
resulting between actors at arms ' length. Second, the combination of
institutional leadership and shareholder access to the charter could
invigorate the charter market. Given a path for the effective
registration of shareholder demands, states would have an incentive
to take shareholder preferc::nces into account in th e construction of
coroorate lavv 's mandato rv
orov isions.
J
It is possible that rent-:sceki ng by sh<ueholder coalition-builders
could lead to perverse effects if an access mandate \Vere extended to
matters of investment and other business decisions. 29 Our goals are
modest, however, and the ir satisfaction does not require unlimited
shareholder access. Accordingly, we would limit the subject matter
scope of mand atory shareholder access to charter terms bearing on
governance process and structure. To prompt the reorientation of the
po litical calculations of state lawmakers, our operative concept of
permitted amendments wo uld extend to the decision as to state of
incorporation.
This proposal also has a theoretical goal. The program to
restructure corporate law to accommodate the economic possibility of
shareholder-enforced self-regulation implies the adjustment of
prevailing notions of corporate federalism. An inconsistency has
developed in the commentary. On the one hand, no one questions
that state law's grant of control of the corporate voting agenda to
management restricts share holder enforcement opportunities. 30 On
the other hand, the law reform movement tends to press against only
the federal side of a two-sided system, foregoing consideration of the
state law (and federalism) implications of shareholder participation
strategies.3 1 This imbalance is surprising given the consensus view
that the competition-driven state system imposed excessive constraints
on the operation of the ma rket deterrent durin g the 1980s.
Two explanations for the imbalance suggest themselves, one
practical, the other theoretical. First, proponents of shareholder
participation formulate their agenda with the urgency of activists,
1

1

29. On this point we follow Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice
and Game Theoreric Approach ro Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 376-81 (1991)
(hereinafter Gordon, Shareholder fniriative].
30. See, e.g, Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agenrs: Th e Promise of lnstitwionat
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 8 11, 825-26 (1992) (hereinafter Black, Agents] .
31. The exception is Gordon, Shareholder Iniriative, supra not e 29, at 357-59, which
concludes that the system confirms the prediction of the market efficiency story.
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either selecting immediately attainable improvements32 or confronting unavoidable barriers to full realization . Charter access for
process and structure amendments fits neither profile.
The
complicated politics of federal int erve ntion give it a lo·w rank on the
feasibi lity list,33 and, in any event, access promises increm ental rather
than fu ndamental improvement in th~ agency relationship. Second,
concept ua l barriers impede reapprais::il of the regulatory allocation
bet wee n nati onal and state governm en ts. The reform agenda reflects
the view that shareholder-enforced se lf-reg ula tion is perverse ly
im peded by federal regulations promul gated long ago by actors und er
the influence of Berle and Means.34 Historically, suggestions for
feder al preemption have followed from th e same, discredited 35 set of
assumptions. More recent arguments fo r fede ral preemption have
tak en steps to cure this infirmity by bringing to bear both a relational
contract perspective and the economic pres uppositions of the mark et
deterrent approach. 36 However, the cure is incomplete because these
new calls for preemption continue to include the Berle and Means
remedy of a state-mandated fiduciar y deterrent. 37 Still unaddressed
is the central federalism concern that fede ral intervention imports a
risk of blanket preemption that destroys the responsive benefits of
jurisdictional competition? 8 As a result, the market competition

32. See John C. Coffee, Jr.. Th e SEC and the In stirutional lnvesror: A Half- Time
Repo rt , IS CARDOZO L. R EV. 837,900-02 ( 1994) (herein aft er Coffee, Half-Tim e Repo n]
(sugges ting impl ementation by SEC rul emaking); Ronal d J. Gilson & Reini er K raakm an,
R.eirzve111ing !h e O utside Direelor: An Agenda fo r fnstiruri onal Inv esro rs, 43 STAN . L. REV.
863. 865 , 883-84 (1991) (here inafter Gilson & Kraakman , !n stinuional Agenda] (p roposin g
in st ituti onal board monitors by m ea ns of shareholder se lf- he lp); Josep h A. Grund fest, Jus!
Vote No: A Min imalist Strategy f or Dealing ~vith Barbarians In side th e Cates . 45 STAN. L.
REV. 85 7, 903-08 (1993) (recommending purely dialogic strategy).
33. See ROM ANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 50, 75-84.
34. Or , m ore generally, it follows from ea rl y twenti eth century populism. See, e.g.,
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Co rporate Financ e, 91 COLUM . L. REV. 10,
32-45 (1991).
35. Here we speak from the point of view of oth ers. In our view, the Berle and
Means description may or m ay not ca rry force in the future, depending on the success of
the shareholder participation movement.
36. See Luci an Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and th e Corpo ra/ion: The D esirable Limits
on S late Comp etition in Corporate Law, lOS H ARV. L. REv. 1435, 1458-67 (1992); David
Charny, Comp etition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate L aw Rules: An
American Perspective on th e "Race to !he Bouom" in !h e Eu ropean Communities , 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 423 , 442-53 (1991).
37. See B ebchuk, supra note 36, at 1500-07.
38. ROiv!ANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE L AW , sup ra note 28, at 82-83.
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model of state la-w still carries sufficient validating force to discourage
consideration of structural adjustments. 39
The federalism discussion should be disaggregated and the
benefits and burdens e valuated in light of the regulatory stra tegy that
informs a specific proposal for intervention. That step accomplished,
a powerf ul case em erges for minimal intervention to inc re ase the
men u of subjects fo r share holder initiative.
The recent,
un pre ceden ted success of th e shareh olde r activists invites
reexamin a tion of legai restrictions on share holder voice fo r Th e first
time since th e restrictions appeared in state law a century ago_-+o The
ch arter comp e tition system prevents states from undertaking this
review because it effects the capture of state lawmakers by
management interests. There is, of course, nothing intrinsically
unacceptable about a captured sovereign, as the political theory
undergirding the market justification of the system teaches. Nevertheless, nothing in that theory also dictates the conclusion that this
particular situation of capture enhances economic welfare. Previously,
that conclusion was reached only on two assumptions: market
constraints in any event cure the capture's negative effects; and statemandated agenda control is irrelevant because collective-action
constraints prevent shareholders from availing themselves of an
opportunity to voice preferences internally. Neither assumption is
safe today; state lawmakers undercut the first during the 1980s, and
institutional shareholders thereafter rendered the second obsolete.
Thus, the legal te rms that perpetuate the one-sided capture of
state law need no longer be accepted as the best availabl e, provided
that th e propos ed adjustment makes both the cap tured sovereign and
the regul ate d firm more responsive to the excluded shareholder
interest. H owever, any proposed federal adjustment also must leave
unimpair ed such benefits of responsiveness to the preferences of
actors in economic organizations as the state system does provide.
The minimal intervention suggested here me ets that burden. 4 1

39. Fo r a manifesta ti o n of thi s thinking in a fed e ral lawmaking context, see S . REP.
No. 265, 100th C o ng., 1st Sess. 46 (1987) (observing that state corporate la ws work well
and th at Congress has a lways d ecided against fed e ralization) .
40. See infra not es 275-83 a nd accompanying text.
41. T o kee p the discussi o n man ageable, we avoid mentioning th e problem of
constituency pa rticipation. We acknowledge, however, that this corporate governance
problem is close ly re late d to th a t of shareholder access and ultimat e ly must be confronted
as co rpor a te la w e vo lves to a ccommod a te institutiona l investor initiatives. Acco rdingly,
our fo cus on th e shareholder interest should not be taken to presuppose adhere nce to the
share ho ld e r primacy norm implicit in much of the governance litera ture . Richard M.
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More broadly, a strictly market-based theory of regulatory
competition provides an inadequate framework fo r ap praising the
law's role in facilitating effective organiza tional incentive sch emes. 42
The market-based model understates th e distortions that result from
th e interplay of mul ti ple sovereigns and interest gro u ps in the
r eso luti o n of corpo rate commitmen t. informa tio n , an d e n f orce m ·~n t
pro blern:\.
sove reiQn n13ndate bv one co ntra::ting grou·o and in Dart fr om the
abse nce of a contrac tua l ave nu e for rea lignment of the sovereign 's
incentives by the competing group. Tnis mixed problem of economics
and politics calls for a mixed political and economic solution. Iclealiy,
the political solution should be shaped to leave the ultimate resolution
of the corporate agency problems to the economic actors themselves,
and leave sovereign actors with incentives to make balanced responses
when their oreferences conflict. Federal intervention would facilitate
that result if it refrained from disp lacing the states' role in corporate
law creation and instead realigned the positions of the three parties
to th e corporate contract-management, shareholders, and state
government-to allocate shareholders a seat at the bargaining table.
..1

._!

._...

,_,.

1

l_
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II.

C ORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION AND THE PROBLE MS OF
REGULATORY CAPTURE AND REGULATORY RESPO N SIVEN ESS

This part of the A rticle reconsiders the deb ate between critics
and proponents of charter compe tition and proposes a mod ified
description of th e system. From the critics' perspective, the charter
market fa cilitates managerial capture of state iawmakers and prevents
the evolution of an effective fiduciary deterrent. The prop onen ts, in
contrast, applaud market impediments to the development of fi duciary
controls and describe a mechanism that assures state responsiveness
to th e preferences of economic actors. We assert that neither position
remains viable in the present environment. The critics tend to
overstate the problem: Capture, taken alone, does not de legitim a te

Bu xba um , ins1inaional Owners and Corporale Managers: A Comparative Perspec!ive, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 41 (1991 ), notes that institutionalized labor-management coo pe ration
along European lin es need not be a zero-sum gam e, and we agree. We also think that
Buxbaum , id. at 42-45, plausibly looks to governance innovations stemming from
institution ai initiatives as a potential beginning point in the evolution of American
analogues to codete rmination.
42. Such schemes allow opportunistic actors to overcome collective acti on problems
in pursuit of the gains of trade, promoting mutual compliance ex post and allowing for
credible commitments ex anre. See Terry M. Moe, Polilics and !he Theory of Organizmion,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG S. 106, 122 (Special Issue 1991).
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a regulatory regime. They also tend to overplay the solution: By
displacing Delaware courts from their position as corporate law's
leading center of dispute resolution, mandatory federal fiduciary
standards would impair and possibly terminate the operation of a
useful repository of inform ation and expertise. The proponents tend
to understate the problem: They describe a relational contract
witho ut fully exploring its pol iti ca l and process characteristics. ll1is
relational contract contains not only norm ative mandates, but also
process mandates that govern the alteration of default terms.
Furthermore, the capture of the mandating sovereign by one of the
parties has orevented the evo lution of both ootimal mandates and
effective ground rules for opting out. The proponents also tend to
avoid sustained co nsid eration of solutions: The federal mandate can
be directed to the process side, not only to level the playing field for
corporate contracting, but also to destabilize a structure that affords
the states the comfort of having to respond to th e demands of only
one affected interest group.
•

'

L

A. The Corrupt Sovereign Versus the Responsive Sovereign
The original case for federal intervention against state charter
competition combined a public interest theory of regulation with a
fiduciary strategy for improving corporate law. Professor William L.
Cary's leading article denounced Delaware, the leading corporate
domicile, 43 as a corrupt sovereign. He undertook a general review
of its courts' pronouncements and concluded that there appeared to
be "no public policy left in Delaware corporate law other than the
objective of raising revenue."~ To Cary, the "public policy" at stake
was the integrity of corporate managers, and the revenue objective
had led a single state to "grant management unilateral control
untrammeled by other interests,"~ 5 thereby sacrificing the national
interest. He looked to federal intervention to eliminate the firms '
incentives to incorporat e in Delaware. 46
4

43. Delaware is hom e to one-ha lf of the largest American corporations, and is the new
domicile of 80% of reincorporating firms. Roberta Romano , Law as a Produce: Some
Pieces of the lncorp oracion Pun/e. l J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 225, 244 (1985) [hereinafter
Romano, Law as Produo].
44. Cary, supra note 10, a t 684.
45. !d. at 698.
46. !d. at 702. His proposal included not only federal fiduciary standards, but
shareholder access to th e cha rt er and by-laws, the abolition of nonvoting shares, and
mandatory indemnification rules. !d.
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Cary assumed that regulation could and should pursue a notion
of th e general good. By the time he published his thesis in 1974,
however, that theory of regulation had already fall en from favor in
the social sciences~ 7 and was replaced by capture th eories of
regulation ... 8 Capture theories described regulation as an arena in
which sp ecial int eres ts compete to use govern men t power for
adva nt age. Th ey also debunked the pu blic interest sto ry of regulatory
motivation-now regulators should be expected l O behave no
differently than actors in private economic relation s.. \ 9 This sh ift in
political theory, coupled with the emerging market deterrent view of
corporate law, permitted Cary's race to the bottom to be reversed
into a race to the top. 50
The "race to the top " story drew on the centrai assertion of
regulatory competition theory-that jurisdictional competition
ameliorates the distortions that result as interest groups compete for,
and win, political favors.
Under this theory, competition for
domiciliaries leads to the matching of government policies wi th
diverse citizen preferences, and thus fosters innovation. 51 Citizens
signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when they
migrate from regime to regime. Their ability to exit disempowers
government actors, whose welfare diminishes as citizens depart, taking
with them votes and revenues. 52 Given competition, law production
goes forward without losing time on the task of reconciling competing
preferences. The theory also implies a preference fo r state over
national lawmaking. Since the revenue enhancement constraint on
the national government is less intense, 53 the national lawmaking

47. See ~,;lich ael E. Levin e & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regula tory Cap111 re, Pu blic Interest,
and 1he Public A genda: Toward a Symhesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 167, 167 (1990).
48. Mancur Olson attacked the optimistic public int erest orth odoxy of A merican
political sc ience as built on a misguid.o::l conception of th e log ic of group action. MANCUR
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND TH E THEORY OF
GROUPS 16-22, 117-31 (1965). Olson claimed that the lib eral view that groups form ed
o rga niza tions based on common goals ignored free riding by members of th e group. !d.
at 15-1 6. Since most of the gains from group formation could be ca ptured by all , there was
very littl e incentive for groups to organize. !d. at 14-16.
49. Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 168-69.
50. See Winter, supra note 11, at 254-62.
51. See ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 4-6.
52. See Ronald J. Dani els, Should Provinces Compere? The Case for a Compet irive
Corpora re Law Marker, 36 MCGILL L.J . 130, 142-43 (1991).
53. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW , supra note 28, at 4-6, 48-51.
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process will be slower, less responsive to productive concerns, and
more susceptible to the influence of organized interest groups. 5 •
Regulatory competition theory applies to corporate law on th e
assumption that state corporation codes may be viewed as products
consumed by corporations. 55 In the resulting description, competition fo r th e legal business of fi rm s forces the sta tes to adapt the
law to th e dvnamic conditions in which the firm s operate. 51i Stare
lawn1<!K iiH! e me rges as a trial and error process suited to the accurat e
idcntiflca ti on of optimal corporate arrangements. 57
Reincorporating firms are this market's marginal consumers.
They see k a predictable legal regime that reduces their costs.
Delaware provides this with comprehensive case law, well-specified
indem nifi ca tion rules, and an expert judiciary. 58 The firm s also seek
a guaranty that the new state of domicile will maintain the desira bility
of its code, because the reincorporating firm and the target jurisdiction enter into a relational contract that entails a risk of opportunistic
breach . Even as the firm invests to gain access to th e targe t's
favora ble legal regime, the target remains free to change its politics
and transform itself into an unresponsive jurisdiction. 59 Tne comJ

~'

'

~

54. !d. at 5. In a fed e ral system, the allocation of lawm aking power to the co mpet ing
states also protects individuals from th e power of th e nati onal gove rnm e nt: private
organizations provide an additional check by counterbalancing th e powe r of state
governme nts. Na tional reg ulation of corporations would impair thi s corpo ra te funct ion
and thus de tract from individu al liberty. See Roberta Rom ano. The Sra re Co mp eririon
Debare in Corpora/e La w , 8 CA RDOZO L. R EV. 709, 753 n.97 (1 987).
55 . ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW , mpra note 28, at 6.
56. Delaware, the leadi ng corporate law stat e, exce ls in thi s process . !d. at 9.
57. Romano's study of th e spread of inn ova tion in corporation codes found th ;lt
inn ova ti o ns sprea d rapidly in a pattern re se mblin g the S-sha ped diffusion curve of
technological inn ova tion s. Romano, Law as Product, su pra note 43 , at 234-35. Her study
of state res ponsiveness. id. at 237-40, found that the more responsive sta tes ga in more a nd
lose fewer incorpora tions, and that state responsiveness bears a significant posi ti ve
co rrelati on to th e propo rtion of state revenues derived from franchise taxes. id.
58. ROM ANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW , sup ra note 28 , at 32-40. Romano has
backed thi s cost-reduction assertion with a study of public corporation do micile changes
between 1960 and 1982. See Roman o, Law as Product, supra note 43 , a t 242. The st ud y
shows th at corporations tend to change domiciles in advance of either a public offe ring.
an acq uisiti ons program, or the promulgati on of antita keover measures. !d. at 250. They
incur substantial costs in so doing, including the one-time costs of th e move, th e possibi lit y
of app raisa l claims, and , in th e case of co rporations moving to Delaware. the present
nega ti ve va lu e of an additional la ye r of high franchi se taxes. RO MANO , G EN IUS OF
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 34-35. The benefits mostl y stem from the threa t of
liti gation-all three of the identified transacti onal occasions for changes of domicil e en tail
liti gation risks.
59. New Jersey did this early in the twentieth century, precipitating a mass movement
of corpora tions across the river to Delaware. Joel Se ligman, A Brief History of Delaware's
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petitive jurisdiction has to reduce this possibility by offering a credible
commitment. Delaware's commitment stems from its de pendence on
franch ise tax revenues.60 These revenues are an "intangib le asset "
that emerges from the combinati on of a large number of incorporations and a sma ll population . Delaware also invests in real assets
soecific to its in coro ora tion busi ness-its case law and its Ji udici al and
administrative e:·:oen ise. These, to gether \vith LJebware's co -~ e .
consti tu te repu w tiornl capit2l. Delaware protects this store house of
capital by impo::;ing in ternal process and structure rules th at deter
poli tical disrupti on .A1 TI1is store of capital bolsters th e state's market
pos ition. Other states cannot credibly precommit to offer superior
service, and thu s are de terred from incurring the necessary start-up
costs. A fi rst-mover advantage in De laware resul ts.li 2
As original ly articulated, this market-based race to the top
validation of state law bypassed the probl em of th e sharehol ders' lack
of influence over state lawmaking with a reference to the control
market deterrent. The assertion, in effect, was that the managers'
1

l

l

~

.

General Corporarion Law of 1899, 1 D EL. J. CO RP. L. 249, 265 -70 (1976).
60. ROMANO, G ENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, a t 38-39. Franchise taxes
amoun te d to 17.7% of De lawa re 's total tax revenue s in 1990. !d. at 10.
61. These includ e its directi on of corporate matters to a specia lized chancery co urt .
its practice of appointin g rath e r th an electing its jud ges and limitin g them to 12-yea r terms.
and its requirement of two-thirds majorities in bot h houses of its legislat ure for th e
approval of cor porati on code amend men ts. !d. at 38-42 .
62. !d. at 40-44. T he sto re of capita l also foste rs reciprocal depen dencies between
Del aware ancl its custllmers. The la wye rs who recommend reincorporation to client
corporations invest in Delawa re expertise, and th us have incentives to recommend it as a
destina tion. Th eir clients need to eco nomize on lega l cos ts, and thus tend to stay in place.
For compe ting exp lan atio ns. see RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, E CONOM ICS
OF CO RPORATI ON LAW AND SECUR ITI ES REG ULATION 11 1 ( 1980) (finding that large finn s
go to Delaware) ; Barry D. Bays in ge r & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corpo rare Law in
rhe Theory of rhe l--inn. 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 190 (1985) (findin g that firm s wi th
concentrated own ers hip do no t go to De laware).
The basic mod el of th e "first-m over advan tage'' is that of Michae l Spe nce. See
Michael A. Spence. Enrry, Cap aciry, lnvesrmenr and Oligopolisric Pricing, 8 BE LL J. ECON.
534, 534-44 (1977). Under it , an oligopo list mus t com mit resources to a certain level of
production ; a pote ntial entrant can observe this, and must decide whet he r to ente r and
produce a t a certa in leve l. !d. at 534. Spe nce's entry deterrence model ass umes a twostage game in whi ch one firm may enj oy a first-mover advantage if it can choose its
quanti ty first: Beca use firm one uses its excess capacity to de ter firm two's ent ry , quantity
has a commitm en t valu e. !d.; see also J EAN TIROLE , THE T HEORY OF INDUSTR IAL OR GANIZATION 317-22 (1988) (rev iewing the Spence-Dixit model an d interpreting it as a
double capaci ty ga me, with prod uc tion as the first capaci ty constraint and sel ling capacity
as the second); Avinash Dixit, A Model of Duopoly Suggesling a Theory of Enuy Barriers,
10 BELL J. ECON. 20, 20-32 (1979) (finding that "a great absolute advantage in demand
(or cost) for established firms ma kes entry hard er. but lower cross-price effect s with
pot ential en tran ts' products make en try easier").
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option of exit adequately disciplined the states, while the possibility
of shareholder exit by tender to a hostile offeror adequately disciplined the managers. This story lost its persuasiveness as managers
and state politicians collaborated 63 to hamper the market deterrent
with the antitakeover legislation of the 1980s. 64 This manifest case
of cha rter market failure 65 reinforced the opponents' assertion that
m anagement capture of the states leads to suboptimal lawmaking.
Following the le ad of Roberta Rom :mo ,nfi the market de terren t
schoo l moved to a mid d le ground position on charter competition. 01
From that perspective, they defend the state system, except to the
extent that it inhibits the control market.
Others, principally Lucian Bebchuk, returned to the attack. 63

63. Although this is interest group legislation, it did not result from the efforts of a
centrally-organized management lobbying effort. Romano's case study of the state
legislative process here suggested that th e statutes are initiated by threat ened managers
of local corporations and their assistants in th e local corporate bar rather than by broad
coalitions of business, labor , and community leade rs. See Roberta Romano, The Fwure
of Hostile Takeovers: Legisla1ion and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461 n.ll
(1988).
64. The statutes evolved in succeeding generations. The first generation submitted
tender offers to substantive review by state securities administrators; those statutes were
held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S . 624,
640 (1982). The second generation limited the subject matter scope to regula tion of
internal corporate affairs. These statutes tend eithe r to condition the voting right of
bidd ers on the approval of the share holders as a whole, impose fre eze periods on
combinations between bidde rs and targets, or require that an equal price be paid in th e
second stage of a two-tier acquisition. Some statutes combine these eleme nts. These
statute s survived constitutional challenge in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481
U.S. 69. 94 (1987). Another variety confirms the legitimacy of board consideration of the
cons tituents' interests other than shareholders in takeove r defense situations. For a
s ummary, see ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 53-57.
65. A large body of empirical work confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a
harmful effect on shareholder value. This empirical result emerges from a complex picture
that encompasses the negative price effects of contractual antitakeover provisions such as
poison pills. For a summary of this work, see ROMANO, GE NIUS OF CORPORATE LAW ,
supra note 28, at 60-75.
66. See Romano , Law as Product, supra note 43, at 281.
67. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMI C
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (concluding that the race to the top stands
as refuted, but the proposition that competition creates a "powerful tendency" to enact
share holder beneficial laws remains vital); Ralph K. Winter, Th e "Race for the Top "
Revisited: A Commen£ on Eisenberg, 89 COLUtvl. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989) (expressing
more confidence in the view that Cary was wrong than in the view that state competition
results in a race to the top) .
68. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1458-75; see also Charny, supra note 36, at 456
(promoting "hannonization," the promulgation of corporate rules by a central authority);
Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55,9196 (1991) (endorsing the promulgation of unifonn federal corporate law): Joel Seligman,
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Bebchuk argued that the middle ground 69 result stems from a
structural defect in the competitive system that disables the production of a maximizing legal regime. The market leads the competing
states to focu s on the variables that influence reincorporation
decisions. 70 T here follows from this a concern fo r management
prefe rences rather than shareholder value itself. A,ccord ingly, nothing
deters the states from pursuing policies of manage ment accomm oda tion \Vith regard to the fiduci ary and rn.arke t dete rren ts. 71
Bebchuk conclud ed that because of this oversight , fede ral fiduciary
standards should preempt most state takeover regulation. 72
The renewed debate on the desirability of federal intervention
continues among those occupying different middl e-ground views of
charter competition. At the found ation of this de bate lies the
allocation of the theoretical burden of proof for or against intervention , the assumption being that the side bearing the burden loses the
game.
Sevral points are sharply controverted.
Opponents of
interven tion point to a body of event studies showing that reincorporation in Delaware does not reduce shareholder value; proponents
argue that convergence among the states on the basic points of
corporate law denudes the results of persuasiveness. 73 Opponents

The Case for /vlininwm Corporate Law Standards, 49 Mo. L. REV. 947, 971-74 (1990)
(sam e): Joel Seligman, The New Corporare Law , 59 BROOK. L. RF.v. l, 60-63 (1993)
[h e r·~inafter Seli gman, New Corporare Law] (sam e).
69. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1440-41. Bebchuk began hi s analysis of th e problem
by sta ting his assumption that , absent reasons to th e contrary, sta te compet iti o n is more
lik e ly to prod uce a n efficient rule than federal regulation. !d.
70. !d. at 1452-54.
71. Bebchuk id ent ified a catego ry of "insignificantly redi str ibutive," man agementfav orab le rules that always escape the mark et constraint. !d. at 1462. Bebchuk
hypo thesized a tran saction undertaken by a $1 billion firm that reduces share holder value
by $1 million for the purpose of returning $200,000 to man age me nt. /d. at 1463. The
transac tion is too sma ll to excite a takeover, but as long as state law opens the door ,
management has every incentive to undertake it. Jd. In addition, com petition can cause
th e states to use th e ir lawmaking power to impair the strength of market disciplin e even
furth er, as the proliferation of antitakeover statutes demonstrates. !d. a t 1467-68; see also
Coffee, supra note 28, at 770-72 (discussing th e impac t of state anti takeove r legislat ion) ;
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller , Toward an !meres£ Croup Theory of Delaware
Corpor111e Law, 65 T EX. L. REV. 469, 471 (1987) (same).
72. Bebchuk, sup ra note 36, at 1494-95.
73. Roberta Romano conducted the leading event st udy showing that reincorporating
firm s experience an increase in value or no significant stock price decl ines. See Romano,
Law as Produc£ , supra note 43 , at 279-80. Proponen ts of inte rve ntion res pond with a
number of standard questions about the shareholder vote on which reincorporation is
conditioned. Even though Delawa re has value-d ecreas ing rules. the shareholders may
approve a move for seve ral reasons: because the move on the whole increases shareholder
value, the sharehold ers have inad equ ate information, or managem ent has ti ed the move
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draw on a contractual theory of the firm and point out that new
federally mandated fiduciary deterrents would retard the evolution of
contractual corporate arrangements; 74 proponents respond that the
consensus view on contracting out continues to favor fiduciary
mandates in view of the rational apathy that impedes share ho ld er
choi ce s of governance terms. 75 Oppon e nts argue th at the fe deral
political land sc2.p e remains as hostiie as that of the states, mal'-ing
De r v<:: rs c effe cts a likelv result of a fed era l law-reform movem e nt; 76
"'
pr op o ne nt s respond that the federal venue is marginall y more
hospit a b le and that centralized politics facilitate shareholder collective

.

action .7 ;

to another corporate action th ey desire . Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1471. These problems
limit th e normative force of the eve nt studies: Th e stock prices may rcf!t:ct the mark e t's
reaction to the deve lopments signa ll ed by th e reincorporation rather than th e reincorporation itse lf. and managers may systematically choose to reincorp orat e at moments wh en
such information exists. !d. at 1449-50; see also Coffe e, supra note 28, at 767-68 (offering
a critique of Romano's analysi s) ; Macey & Miller. supra note 71, at 482 (same); Romano,
Law as Producr, supra note 43, a t 267 (discussing the implications of rei ncorpo rat ion) .
Romano, who recogni zes the former possibi lit y, responds that it is improbable that
info rm ation ti ed to the move could swamp an otherwise nega tive stock price effect; rather,
if management were manipul ating the process, price-negative rather th an price-neutral
results should obtain for firms reincorporating for management-favo ra bl e purposes.
ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 18. Bebchuk, fo llowing others ,
a nticipates thi s point: Given convergence among the state codes , the absence of negative
returns may onl y mea n that th e lega l rules of th e original and destin ati on sta te are eq ually
h:nmful. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1449; see also Coffee, supra note 28. at 767-68
(d isc ussin g the logical inferences to be derived from "s tati st ical noise"'); Me lvin A.
Eise nb e rg. Tlze Srru cru re of Corpora rion Law, 89 COLUM. L. R EV. 1461, 1508 ( 1989):
Macey & Mi ller. supra note 71, at 482-83 (di scussing the market signals produced by
relocation to Delaware). Furthermore, th e fac t that reinc or poration do es not decrease
va lu e overall docs not prove that competition produces desirable results on all co rporate
issue s. Bcbchuk , supra note 36, at 1450.
Bcbchuk, in sum, argues that the event studies must be see n in temporal perspective.
!d. a t 1448-51. They do contradict Cary's picture of an ever-lowering race to the bottom
with Delawa re in th e lea d. Howeve r, once we accept that point and join Romano on the
middle ground , the probative force of the studi es diminish es. Th e race, in effect , bottomed
o ut before the studies we re undertaken. !d. The prospective question is whether
int e rvention ca n cause the numbers to improve. /d. at 1509-10.
ln Romano's view, acknowledging disproof of the race to the bottom decides the
debate ove r intervention. Given agreement on the beneficial effects of competition, she
sa id, the burden is on advocates of intervention to demonstrate "emp iri ca ll y which
particular code provisions harm shareholders and why national legislation wo uld be more
like ly to alleviate the probl em. " ROMA NO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW , supra note 28.
at 19.
74. ROMANO , GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 90-91.
75. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1496-99.
76. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 50, 75 -84.
77. William W. Bratton, Corporare Law 's Race 10 Nowhere in Parricular, 44 U .
TORONTO L. J. 40 1, 432 (1994).
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Charter Competition as Regulatory Capture

This middle ground discussion of federal intervention takes on
the binary quality of the old race to the top/race to the bottom
discussion as its participants iterate positions from the historic debate
over market and fiduciary deterrent strategies. However, as the
replay continues, each side has recognized possibilities for both
market succe:~s and market fai lure. This more open-ended theoretical
framework all ows nwre flexibility in the diagnosis of the problem, and
the stronger assertions of regulatory competition theory have dropped
out of the picture for the most part. The 1980s antitakeover alliance
between the states and the managers has dispelled the notion that
identification of a market phenomenon at a significant stage in the
lawmaking process, taken alone, assures the ideal result of legislation
based solely on the exogenous preferences of individuals. It has
become clear that imbalanced interest group influence in this marketdriven lawmaking process prevents that result, divesting regulatory
competition theory of a legitimating effect.
· Regulatory competition matches individual preferences and legal
results because actors have the opportunity to exit cheaply from an
unsatisfactory jurisdiction. The charter system, of course, does allow
for exit from an unsatisfactory jurisdiction, but, because the exit
privilege applies to firms rather than to shareholders, it does nothing
to ameliorate the agency problem. Corporate law has evolved under
charter competition to block shareholder access to the determination
of reincorporation decisions. 78 Existing market disciplines offer no
way around that barrier because they create no incentives to
encourage the development of a shareholder-favorable jurisdiction. 79
Successful control contests, whether by takeover or proxy fight ,
displace one group of managers with another. The new management,
unless it has taken the firm private, remains in an agency relationship
with the firm 's shareholders and thus has no reason to look for a
jurisdiction favorable to the shareholder interest. 80 In addition, due

78. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
79. Cf Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Raceto-the-Bottom" Rarionale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1249 (1992) (arguing that the charter competition process is not defective in itself, but that
the unresolved principal-agent problem respecting the selection of the state of incorporation makes locational decisions defective).
80. The displacing group that plans to make further acquisitions with the target has
an interest in the removal of state law antitakeover barriers. However, reincorporation
to a hypothetical shareholder-favorable jurisdiction would not help with this problem, since
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to the peculiarities of A merica 's co nstitutional structure, the competing jurisdictions- which lack a balancing incentive-have national
lawmak in g power over the sha re holders of domiciliary corporations.
In this variant of regulat ory competition, th en, exit from one
jurisd iction provides no remedy for th e dissatisfactions of the
disadvantaged in terest group.

1. Caoture
Th eories of R e£ulation
'
Tr)P
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petitio n story in terms of bo th the economic and governmental politics
of int erest groups and orga niza tions. In this story, charter competition becom es the mainspring of a uniquely stable arrangement of
regul atory ca pture.
Under ca pture theories of regulation, interest groups and political
decisionmakers enter int o jointl y maxim izing relationsh ips. The
simp le de m and model of capture asserts that lawmaking fo llows the
lawmakers ' responses to de mand patterns.R1 Particular responses
depend on interactions be tween the lawm ake rs' risk profiles and the
proj ected benefits of legisla tive action.82 The lawmaker, being risk
averse, tries to avoid co nfli cts- given no demand for legislation ,
nothing is done; given organized demand, the lawmaker attempts to
satisfy the interest group making the demand with beneficial legislation.83 In addition, inte rest groups desiring to influence legislation
encounter collective action pro blems. 8"'
Differ e nt groups have
~
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the law of the ta rge t jurisd icti on applies in a take over. T he onl y solution to the acquiring
firm·s probl em. th e n, is interes r grou p press ure to wo rk agains t antitak eove r legisla tion
nationwide . Ye t, at thi s point , co nflicting int ere sts amon g acquiring firms enter into th e
pict ure. To day" s acquirer may be tomorrow·s ta rge t: the manage rs of la rge acquirers can
afford to be pat ient and work a rou nd state barri e rs in ma king host il e acquisitions,
meanwhile enj oyin g th e prerogat ive s of the state law regim e.
81. See Robe rt D. Tollison. Public Ch o ice and Legisiation, 74 VA . L. RE V. 339, 343-44
( 1988) ; see also Richard A. Posn er, Econ om ics, Politics, and rlz e Reading of Statutes and
rh e Cons ritwion, 49 U. CHr. L. REV . 263, 265 -68 (1 982) (d iscussing th e interest-gro up
theory).
82. Sam Peltzman , Toward a More Gen eral Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211 ,2 14 (1 976) . Benefits can come in the form of resources or fa vo rab le consequences
for reelec ti on. Geo rge J. Stigler. Th e Th eo ry of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& ~v!G MT . SCI. 3, 10-13 (1971). With corporate law, the benefit tends to be rents from
corpo rate bus iness.
83. See Gary S. Becker, A Th eory of Co mpetition Among Pressure Groups fo r Political
Influen ce , 1983 Q.J . ECON. 37 1, 394-96 (di sc ussing th e impa ct on the political redistrib uti on
of income resu ltin g from compet iti on among po litica l pressure groups vyi ng for political
favors).
84. O lson's fundam en tal ins ight is th at in a la rge, he terogeneo us communi ty,
individuals will prefer not to pay th e full cost of the prov ision of nonexclud abl e public
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different abilities to overcome them-the smaller the group and the
higher the per capita stake of its members, the greater the likelihood
that the members will work out a collective arrangement and enjoy
the benefits of governmental inftuence. 85
This activity results,
according to the theorists of the Virginia School, in a social loss from
rent-seeking.~ 6 Legislators create rents for the benefit of successful
interest groups, distributing th e m based on a self-seeking vote
caic ul us.s7
An additional body of capture theory sup plcm cn ts this demand
mod e l with a supply-side story. Exclusively demand-based models of
law production tend to treat the political process as a black box and,
as a result, do not attempt to describe how legislative trades are
accomplished and enforced. 88 This is a problem, since legislative

goods and that, as a result, they will be unde rsuppli ed . A free-rider probl em must be
overcome if public goods are to be supplied, and voluntary compliance can be secured only
by introd ucing se lective incentives (such as fees) or sanctions. OLSON, supra note 48, at
50-51, 133-34. The result is that rational individuals are motivated to join interest groups
based on individu alized selective incentives . !d. at 60-65. Given the free-rider problem,
large groups will have difficulty achi eving their goals. !d. at 35-36.
85 . It seems to follow that, in a case in which more than one interest group manages
to compete to achieve influe nce, the risk-averse le gislator will delegate ultimate regulatory
authority to an agency. Once that occurs, the agency becomes the venue of interest group
activities. See JAMES WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 388-89 (1980).
86. The Virginia School concentrates on the economic theory of legislation. The id ea
is simpl e: Governmen t creates rent that is captured by interest gro ups. Politicians pass
legisl at ion that benefits the interest groups that are better organized, and rents are
distributee! based on the welfare maximization of the political decisionmakers. The cost
of supp lying rents to well-organized groups is passed on to poorly organized groups.
The upshot is a waste of consumer surplu s. Governments create rents and can
appropriate them , and th ey are lik ely to squander the rents they capture; as a result,
eve ryone is worse off. Under this view, the political process is justified only if lawmak e rs
produce legislation obtained without influence. The task of politics, then, is to crea te
legislati on based on the exogenous preferences of individuals. See RichardS. Higgins et
a!., Free Emry and Efficiem Rem-Seeking, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF R ENT-SEEKING
127, 128 (Charles K. Rowl ey et al. eds., 1988); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Cosls of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, in TOWARD A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 39, 46-47 (James
Buchanan et al. eds. , 1980).
87. Policies are evaluated in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits based on
the assumption of a level of votes for each dollar expended. See William C. Mitchell ,
!nteresr Gro ups: Economic Perspectives and Conrribwiorzs, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 85, 9899 (1990); Tollison, supra note 81, at 339-50; Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional
Buremtcratic Sysrem: A Principal-Agem Perspecrive (Wirh Applications 10 rhe SEC) , 44
PUB. CHOICE 147, 147-48 (1984).
88. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Irzdusrrial Orga nization of Congress;
or, Why Legislarures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markers, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132,
133 (1988); see also Tollison , supra note 81, at 347-66 (summarizing supply-side research).
Such mode ls also leave unexplained such phenomena as simultaneous provision of policy
benefits to multiple diverse interests. See Daniel A. Farber, Polirics and Procedure in
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trades, unlike well-drafted private contracts, can be undone at th e
subsequen t behest of a competing group. For example, an interest
group deal, ob tain ed in the legislature through logrolling and o ther
trad ing mechanisms an d then embodied in a legislative directive, can
be und ercut later by an administrative age ncy responding to a
cornpetmg inte rest group. In th e alternative, represe ntatives can
amend or repe al a piece of legis lation la te r at the requ est of a
compt.:ting group.
Supply-sid e ex planation s of interest -group
dealmaking confr on t th is probl em of po litical ins ec urity by drmving on
organiza tiona l economics to show that inst ituti onal arrangem ents have
a n impact on outcomes. This body of work disaggregates th e
governmen t into a complex of principal-agent re lation s hip s. ~ 9 In
these stori es, legis latures develop process and structure m achinery to
control the opportunistic conduct of both career bureaucrats and
legislators.90 These devices include the legisl ative committee system,
which helps to overcome problems of asymmetric inform ation
between legislative principals and bureaucratic agents through ex post
m onitoring, and process requirements for rulemaking, which provide
advance notice of noncomplying conduct. 91 The process es of the

Environmenra/ Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGS . 59. 65 (1992) (concluding that the speci al
in te rest model fail s to explain environmental legislati on).
89. Matth ew D. McCubbins et al., Adminis1ra1ive Procedures as fn suu mems of Polilical
Contro l. 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 243, 243 -44 (1987); We in gast. supra note 87, at 148.
90. Matth ew D. McCubbins et al., Stru cture and Process, Po litics and Policy: Adminislralive Arrangem ents and !he Polilical Comrol of Agencies. 75 VA. L. R EV. 431, 441
(1989 ). A related, and mo re abstract, line of discourse conside rs the effects of given
modes of vot ing process on the o rdering of preferences among elected represe ntatives,
refuting the chaos schol ars predicted under eari y soci al ch oice theory. S ee, e.g., PETE R C.
0RDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITI CAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTI ON 266-30 1
(1986) (d iscuss in g age nda control and outcom e); David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn,
Bargaining in Legislaw res , 83 AM. POL. SCI. RE V. 11 81, 11 89-98 (J 989) (consi der ing closed
and open rul es of legislative amendment) ; Jules Coleman & Jo hn Fe rej ohn , Democracy
and Social Choice, 97 ETHI CS 6, 8-9 (1986) (finding th at th e pa rti cu lar conte nt and contour
of institutions determines the ex tent to which e lectora l ou tcomes retlect pop ular
prefe rences).
91. For a formal agency model of infonnati on asymmetries and capture re lat ion ships
between le gislatures and agencies, and bet ween prod ucer groups and public interest
groups, se e J EAN-JACQU ES LAFFONT & JEAN TIRO LE, A TH EO RY OF INC ENTIVES IN
PROCUREMENT AND R EGULATION 480-500 (1993). SUI cf An dre i Sh leifer & Rob e rt W.
Vishny. Poli1icians and Firms (1994) (Harvard In stitute of Economic Resea rch Discussion
Paper No. 1686) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (cl ai ming th at approach
turnin g on a compl e te infonnation model is not plausible in cases where the problem of
inefficiency is essential to th e politici ans' perfonnance, such as in sta te-run enterprises;
therefore, corruption is central to the operation of the firm).
For an app lica tion of this approach keyed to lega l policymaking, see Jonatha n R.
Macey, Organiza1ional Design and 1he Poli1ical Comro l of Adminislrative Agencies, 8 J.L.
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legislature also contribute to transactional stability: Legislative
procedures and committee jurisdictions give the congressional
gatekeeper th e ability to resist short-term intern al pressuresY 2
2.

Charter Competition as a Form of Ca pture

Th ese capture th eories of legislation and admi nistration provide
a us eful basis for explaining the success of the charter comp e tition
system ;:md th e rree rninence of D elaware. Ex it through rein corporati on pr ovid es a po tent ex post enforcement device to the
managers who purchase legisla tion from the target state, particu larly
a small state de pendent on charter revenues. Ex ante, th e code the
managers purchase provid es them with control of the enforcing exit
decision by bl ock ing shareholder access to the charte r."} The state's
incentive to co ll ect rents from new incorporations ass ures that the
process legisl a tion securing the exit route will not be amended in the
future to m ake exit more difficult. Thus the state's rent incentive
joins the deterren t of possible reincorporation to assure the m a nagers
that the deal will stick. The combination does more than that ,
It also mitigates any collective action problems the
however.
managers might e ncounter in getting the future legislation. Should
desired legislation not be obtained, exit can be effected unil aterally,
and there will remain up to for ty-nine states from which to choose.
Furthermore, the chartering state 's rent flow includes fee s to
practicing lawyers in addition to franchise taxes. This assures an
identity of interests between management and key actors on the
sup ply side. In this scheme, the organized bar in the charterin g sta te
can be expected to act as an effective advocate for the man age ment
interest, with out forc ing management to organize a trade association
to enter into a fo rmal lobbying relationship. Delaware practice
confirms this pre di ct ion .l)-1 Delaware delegates to its bar association

ECON. & ORGS. 93. 99 -103 (1992). Macey contends that legislators are abl e to cap ture
highe r re nts only if they can sum10unt the agency problem. !d. at 100. In Macey's view,
ex posr monitorin g and punishm ents may not be sufficient to solve th e age ncy prob lem.
Ex anre structuring or " hard -wiring" of the agency works better, and the inte res t groups
that pay fo r the legis lation can be ex pected to at tempt to secure it. !d. at 100-03.
92 . Ke nneth A . Sheps le. Congress is a "They, " Not an "It ": Legislarive lnrent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT' L REv. L. & ECON. 239, 245 (1992). Moe, supra note 42, a t 122-23.
criticizes this litera ture for its adherence to a model of motivation grounded in strateg ic
rationalit y, asserting that a thick description of th e moti va tions of diffe rent types of actors
provid es knowl ed ge about a uth ority th a t the princip al-agent mode ls do not offe r.
93. See infra notes 259-74 and accompanying tex t.
94. It should be noted that the interests of the bar and manageme nt di verge on the
matte r of litigat ion incentives. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 126-37.
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both agenda control and drafting responsibility for any amendments
to its corporate code. Th e bar and legislature have a long-standing
"understanding"-amendments to the corporations code must first be
drafted and approved by the bar association 's corporate law sectio n
and the bar association itself. 95
Capture by cha rt er co mpetiti on exacerbates the shareholders'
coll ect ive ac ti on pro blem eve n as it re duces that of management.
Sta te law not onl y blocks shareholde r access to the charter, it provid es
onl y management with routine comp ensat ion for expenses incurred in
voting contests. 90 Meanwhile, the bar emerges as the only interest
grou p wit hin the ch artering state with an incentive to advance th e
shareholders ' interest in lawmaking processes. Litigating lawyers
promote shareholder welfare as an inci dent to making a living as
enforcers of the fiduciary deterrent. Unfortunately, this confluence
of interests results in a strictly limited set of shareholder benefits.
The lawyers have an incentive to promote lawmaking that strengthens
the market deterrent only if the change would lead to additional
litigable dispu tes. The same applies to lawmaking that enhances the
possibilities for shareholder-enforced self-regulation. Such incentives
seem unlikely to arise in practice. Fiduciary breaches that bring rents
to lawyers stem from excess management influence; any market or
self-regulatory governance strategy that has a cognizable chance of
working well in practice ultimately threatens to diminish those rents
by reducing the num.bers of unproductive influence activities. In
addition , the bar's interest diverges from the shareholders' even
within the sph ere of fiduci ary enfo rcement, with the bar favoring a

95. See Andrew G.T. Moore !1, Slate Competilion: Pan el Response, 8 CARDO ZO L.
REV. 779, 780-81 ( 1987). A ctive dr a fting and discussion is limited large ly to the corporate
law section. See C urtis Alva , Delaware and rhe Market f or Co rporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 D EL. J. CORP. L. 885. 888-92 (1990). The section itself performs the
legislative function of sifting the comments of inte rested parties. Each of the three largest
corporate servicing firms have representatives to the section. !d. at 888-92, 910.
The legislature rubber stamps the bar's recommendations; the executive branch's role
is limited to representation a t bar association me e tings on invitation. !d. at 888-92; see also
David S. Schaffer, Jr., Delaware 's Limir on Direcror Liabiliry: How the Market for Incorp orarion Shap es Corporare Law, 10 HARV. J .L. & P UB. POL'Y 665, 682-84 (1987)
(discussing th e 1967 re vision of Delaware corporate law).
96. It compensates only shareholder winners in board control contests and provid es
no compensation at all to shareholders who oppose management positions in issu e
contests. See Rosenfeld v Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.
1955). For discussion, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Ma rcel Kahan, A Framework f or
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Comesrs , 78 C AL. L. REV. 1071 passim (1990).
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system that trades substantial money judgments to shareholders for
substantial attorneys' fees.97
In short, no interest group in the chartering state has a rent
incentive linked to the shareholders' interest in minimizi ng influence
costs within the finn. The shareholders, then , must se lf-organize 98
to advance an agenda in state lawmaking processes. Unfo rtunately,
th e charter competition svstem structu ra lly limits orosp ec ts for pavoffs
that wo uld justify the costs of organization. Fur thermore, any
sustained shareholder effort would have to be pursu ed in multiple
jurisdictions. By default, then , federal law emerges as the preferred
venue for organized shareholder efforts to alter legal structures to
make firms operate more effectively. 99 Federal lawmakers, unlike
their counterparts in th e states, have no t been captured by the
management side pursuant to a deal with sticking power. ]nis is, of
course, only a negative qualification that by no means implies
probable success for a shareholder influence campaign. Process costs
still loom large at the federal level, and management retains both
organizational advantages and well-worn paths of influence. But the
turf at least is open. There are no rent incentives tied to chartering
decisions, and a large number of players, each making complex and
political calculations in a dynamic environment, makes it easier to
contest management influence. 100
-'

C.

-'

l

-'

Conflicting Demands on the Captured State

\Ve draw no race to the bottom conclusions from this capture
model of corporate lawmaking. Rather, th e model serves to explicate
th e theore tical implications of the middle ground framework, putting
a different gloss on the same pra ctices purveyed as productive
relational contracting in the race to the top story. Since many areas

97 . For discussion of th e rol e that the lawyers' interest plays in shap ing De laware law,
se e infra text accompanying notes 131-37.
98. Shareholders also may rely on ind e pen de nt allies such as academics.
99. This conclusion obtains eve n thou gh Delaware's compact and re latively informal
lawmakin g processes, see sup ra note 95 and accom pa nyin g text , hold out significan t process
cost advant ages. For a discussion of the relati ve adva ntages and disadvantages of the
fed eral venue, compare ROMANO, GENIUS OF COR PORATE LAW , supra note 28, at 75-81,
with Bratton, supra note 77, at 430-33.
100. The SEC embodies this possibility: Historicall y, its acto rs tend to sa ti sfy the
demands of neither the shareholder nor th e management side. In addition, th ey bring an
inherited, albeit limited ideology of shareholder protec tion to their ongoing medi a tive
actiVIties. Recent amendment s to the proxy rules promul ga ted at the in stance of
institution al shareholder activists, see infra not e 180, con cretely demonst rate this agency's
continuing receptiveness to shareholder age nda items.
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of sta te corporate law find shareholder and management interests in
alignm e nt , it complica tes, but does not displace, the relati on al contract
reading.
Th e ca pture model d oes suggest exp loration of stra tegies of
federa l interve ntion designed to diminish sta te law's imb ala nced
sup ply-side incentives and imbalanced opport unities to make
de ma nds. Hmvever, it d oes not therebv imol v tha t fed e ra l fid uciary
st;:,n cl ;m l s ~L· e th e mos t d es irable mod e of intervention . Federal
tl. duciary standa rds would ameli o ra te bo th the supply a nd demandside pro ble ms by imposing shareholder-favo rable norms. They also
would entail a difficult trade off, because process infi rmiti es coul d
follow fr om the appointment of the fed era l judicial sys tem to the
sha re ho lder guardian role. The infirmities lie in the possibility that
a preemptive change in the venue of corporate common la wmaking
from the Delaware courts to the federal courts would so materially
alter the composition of the product sold in the charter market as to
de nud e D elaware of significant relational cap ital. The loss of the
first-mover role in common lawmaking would leave D elaware
m arketing a product of diminished value and weaken its relational tie
with fi rms. The ren ts that support Delaware as a center of inform ation on corporate governance disputes could dissipate, possibly
leading to corpora te lawmaking on a level of diminished sophistication.
~l11us, one assertion of regulatory compe tition theory--that
nati ona l lawmaki ng procedures carry process infirmities that are
avoided when the subject matter is left to the comp e ting
sta tes-continues to bear o n the deba te. Th e captured state system
can e nhance economic welfare to the exten t that its competitive
elemen t causes the lawmaker to weigh th e regu lati ons ' be nefit and
harm to the firm as a whole. 101 Argu a bly, then , the preferred
so lution to the corporate agency problem leaves the subject matter
with the states but finds a means to interpose the shareholder int erest
J

l

•

101. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE , supra note 13, at 63-66 (pr ovidin g a pri soners '
di lemma model of agency capture).

1892

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

into state lawmakers' demand picture. 102 This would render the
capture benign. 103
Past practice provides a base point from which to begin this
reordering of incentives. Shareholder demands have, in fact , figured
into the existing competitive regime in a secondary posture, influencing the shape of Delaware's fiduciary case law. This result appears
surprising if we view state law und er the pure product competition
model. To account for it, the model must be expande d to encompass
the political instability th at results from the national attention that
Delaware lawmaking attracts because of its dominant market position.
1.

Delaware Lawmaking and the Threat of Federal Intervention

The deal struck between the chartering state and management
can never be entirely secure because the possibility of removal of
corporate lawmaking to the federal level inheres in the constitutional
structure of the United States. Delaware, as the entity most
dependent on corporate law revenues, is the contracting state most
prone to view that possibility as a threat. This structural constant
suggests that Delaware lawmakers may have secondary incentives to
respond to shareholder in terests. 104
It can be plausibly hypothesized that Delaware actors remain
averse to possible destructive exercises of federal preemptive power
and have incentives to avoid exciting its application. 105 Federal law

102. This point can be expanded by ana logy to the lit e rat ure o n legislative control o f
agencies, under which the question of political contro l has been addresse d in terms of the
economic principal -age nt pro blem. See generally, e.g., McCubbins et a!., supra note 89.
A fede rally imposed fiduciary regime would restrict opportuniti es for this beneficial
e ngage ment because it would remove the lawm ake r from an imm ed iate agency rel a tionship
with the firm.
103. Restating this point , the charter compe titio n problem ste ms from the same
incentive problems and barri ers to collective ac ti on that create th e corporate age ncy
problem in the first place.
104. A numb er of commentators have recogni zed this possibility. See Bebchuk, supra
note 36, at 1455 ; Cary, supra note 10, at 688 ; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1512.
105. This dual de mand mod e l's plausibility depends on three ass umption s. First, actors
in Delaware must perceive that th eir activities have the potenti a l to excite political action
at th e na tional level. Second, Delaware actors must percei ve that th e shareholder interest
finds a voice among the actors and groups that influ ence fed e ral law. Third, th e projected
fed era l political action must have a negative im pact either on the charter competition
system as a whole o r on the rela ti ve place of Delaware in th e system to reduce Delawa re 's
rent flo w.
As to the first ass umption, periodic calls for fede ral inte rventio n have, ove r the years,
given D elaware reasons for conce rn. Although federal interve ntion has not been a present
prospect since th e late 1970s, see infra note 114, the subj ect has remained a staple of
corporate law disco urse. Anecdotal e vidence shows that Delaware lawmakers keep it in

1995]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1893

reform discussions of the past two decades have given Delaware
actors cause for concern because the often-proposed remedy of
federal fiduciary standards would have an adverse impact on their
interests. This vulnerability stems from the competitive evolution of
corporate statutory law. Competition has caused state corporate
codes to converge in their broad outlines. As a result, Delaware's
case law, judges, and speedy process figure prominently in its line of
legal products. 106 Federal intervention might deprive Delaware of

mind when they take po litically sensitive steps. Th e Delaware bar's concern abo ut fede ra l
response s is confirmed in accounts of its de libera tions on new legislation. When the bar
first considered (and rejected) an antitakeover statute, it received comment letters from
Martin Lipton and Josep h Flom warning that enactment might excite federal interve ntion.
Such worries were expressed at the committee mee ting on th e proposal. See Alva , supra
note 95, at 906-08.
The second assumption has been the subject of debate. Professor Romano argues that
management replicates its dominant influence in the sta tes a t the federal level. She
inspected the federal corporate law reform politics of the 1980s to show that man age me nt
voices were heard th e most often. Romano surveyed th e content of both federal takeover
legis lation proposed during the pe riod 1969-87 and of interest group representation in the
accompanying legis lative processes. She found that th e overwhelming majority of bills had
a n a ntibidder aspect and that m a nagem e nt voices appeared much more frequently than
s hareholder or labor voices. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at
76-8 1. Romano also showed, however , that bureaucratic, po litical , and academ ic voices
were heard in quantity during the 1980s. !d. at 77. In any event , to the ex tent that large
stakes in th e status quo make Delaware's lawmakers risk averse, any act ive federal politics
with possible adverse consequences might prompt them to make a preemptive resp onse.
Regarding the third ass umption , the gravity of a federal threat will vary with the
pa rticular form of federal intervention propose d. A discrete provision might impair
Delaware 's position only incidentally, blocking a particular management accommoda tion ,
but applying the block to a liSO states. As examples, consider (1) the all holders rule , Rule
14cl-10 under section 14( d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C. F. R. 240.14d-10
(1994), providing that any tender offer must be open to all holders of th e subject class of
secu riti es, preempting the d efe nsive tactic sustained in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); and (2) the special tax on greenma il profits, l.R.C. § 5881
(1991), e nacted in 1987, which imposes a 50% excise tax on profit realized in a greenmail
transact ion. In e ither case, Delaware no longer can take a competitive lead on the subject
matter regulated , but neither can any other state. The overall field of subject matter for
compe tition shrinks slightly , but not enough cognizab ly to impair Delaware's position.
Furthermore , a fed e ral provision might even result in a short-term e nhancem en t of
Delaware 's position. Consider, as an example, the proposals for national antitakeover
legislation made during the mid-1980s. At that time , worries about federal responses
con tributed to Delaware's hesitancy to initiate takeover defense legislation. Fed era l
intervention o n either side would have settled the matter , re moving a threat of comp e tition
from o ther states.
106. In addition to a large collection of past decisions, Delaware se lls a unique ,
technically qualified judiciary and speedy determination of new disputes. Bayless Manning
identified Delaware's judiciary as its prime attraction, comparing D e laware to the medi eva l
law m erc hant. Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. R EV.
779. 784-85 (1987). For confirmation of this point from a game theory perspective, see Ian
Ayres , Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59
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the principal justification for its premium price, resulL1g in an
outbreak of price competition in the market and the erosion of
Delaware's position as an informational center. Recognition of a
perceived federal threat implies a model in which Delaware faces
conflicting demands, each threatening potential negative consequences. First, the management interest must be satisfied to prevent
corporate migration out of the state and entry into competition by
competing states.
Second, federal actors, as proxies for the
shareholders, must be satisfied to avoid destructive intervention. The
conflicting demands complicate the business of response: Professor
Eisenberg has suggested that the conflict leaves Delaware with an
incentive to avoid taking the lead in adopting rules favoring managers
at the shareholders' expense. Other states have a different incentive.
If they offer innovative management-side payments, they may siphon
business from Delaware; if the federal government intervenes to stop
them , they lose little. So long as a given state has a small market
share, its actions attract little attention. Delaware, in contrast, cannot
take any significant steps without close scrutiny nationwide. 107 It
remains under pressure to follow new developments elsewhere, but
emerges in a mediative role.
A question arises as to how Delaware, alone in this competing
demand situation, can structure a mediative response without losing
business, given a market still keyed to management preferences. 108
Two factors make this picture plausible. First, no full-service
alternative domicile exists, and only a handful of other jurisdictions
have strong incentives to incur the start-up costs to market a fullservice operation. But a potential competitor has no assurance that
a third jurisdiction will not duplicate its efforts, 109 and given the low

U. CHL L. REV. 1391 , 1414-15 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOM IC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
107. Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1512-13; see also Bebchuk, supra note 36. at 1455
(pointing out that th ere remains a range within which states can maneuver without fear
of federal interventi on).
108. Delaware's med iative output can be explained in term s of the interests of
managers as a group. Well-timed interventions to protect shareholders se rve to defuse the
federal threat and to make Delaware a buffer state that protects corporations from federal
intervention. However, the benefits of a mediative jurisprudence are more questi onable
from th e point of vi ew of individual managers seeking an optimal environment. They have
an apparent incentive to cause their firms to migrate to states adopting less equivoca l
antitakeover polici es, free riding on the firms that stay. Of course, if a large number of
firms su rmounted this collective action barrier and successfully shopped for a more
responsive jurisdiction, federal intervention would become more likely. The sam e might
occur if a large numb er of firms left Delaware, starting a new race to the bottom.
109. See Daniels, sup ra note 52, at 182.
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cost of reincorporation, 110 no assurance that its new customers will
remain. Second, the shareholders' newly discovered capability of selfprotective collective action may effectively deter management
reincorporation propos als. Beginning in the late 1980s, incidents of
shareholder resistance caused managers to drop the assumption of
automatic shareholder approval of antitakeover proposals requiring
charter ame ndment. 11 1 Thus, departure fro m Delaware may not be
the open option it used to be.
Evidence of the dual demand model 's robustness can be found
in the recent pattern of Delaware lawmaking. Given statutory
convergence among the states and the dominance of the management
interest, the problems of conflicting demand rarely show up in
corporate legislative process. Antitakeover legislation is the principal
recent instance, and Delaware's corporate bar moved late and with
caution in putting an antitakeover statute before its legislature. 11 2
The conflict becomes more apparent in the adjudication of fiduciary
cases, particularly those dealing with corporate control transfers. 11 3
Here the shareholder interest has found Delaware intermittentlY
responsive. The Delaware judiciary abruptly changed a long-standing
habit of monolithic fidelity to management interests in 1977, 114 and
.I

110. See Black, supra note 28, at 551, 574, 586-90.
111. See infra notes 162·80 a nd accompanying text. Romano contributed some evidence
of this ph e nom enon with a report o n th e behavior of public corporations subj ect to the
1990 Pennsylvania ta ke over stat ute . Th e Pennsylvan ia s tatute , like most tak eover statut es.
included a default rul e that applied th e statut e to a ll corporations that fa il ed to take
affirmative ac tion to opt out. See PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2571-75 (1994). Despite this.
press ure from institution a l investors resulted in opting out by the boards of 127 firms; only
72 firms stayed in. ROM ANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 68-69.
Pres umably, opportunistic re incorporation proposals would ex cit e similar share hold er
attention.
112. See Alva, supra note 95, at 906-08.
113. This is analogous to the allocation of respo nsibility between legislatu re s and
agencies. Legislato rs faced with a conflicting demand problem can avoid confrontation
with the competing interest groups and resort to the expedient of delegating lawmaking
authority to an age ncy; with state corporate law, the judiciary tends to assume thi s
function. Delaware, as it res ponded to sensitive developments in the corporate control
market of the 1980s, ke pt open its options by employing equivocal judicia l rules in
preference to clear cut legislation.
114. See Singer v. Mag navox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-80 (Del. 1977) (imposing st ri ct
fiduciary standards on parent firms in cash-out mergers). The Singer rule was in turn
rejected for a looser, process-based approach in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. , 457 A.2d 701,
704, 715 (Del. 1983). Oddly , Singer was d ecid ed a fter the imm e diate threat of federa l
preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules of the securities laws had
been removed by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 , 479-80
(1977). The story told at th e time was that the brush with preemption at the hands of the
federal judiciary and th e wider critical atmosphere provoked by Cary and others had
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Cary's 1975 article has been accorded a role in the break. 115 The
fed eral threat, thus crystallized, impressed upon the Delaware courts
the practical importance of solicitude to shareholder interests. 11 6
This post-Cary behavior pattern has persisted and still yie lds headlines
as highly publicized cases articulate surprising new shareholderprotective applications of basic fi duciary rules. 117 Tne pattern has
been v o latile, 11 ~ however, and shareholder protective interventio n
has not been a constant theme. The De laware courts ' indulgence in
this back-and-forth at apparent cost to a reputation for certainty,
predictability, a nd management responsiveness confirms the presence
of competing demands.
Two caveats must be noted. First, the federal threat does not
play an exclusive causative role in this conflicting demand model.
Courts and judges sell reputations for speed, dependability, and
predictability, but they also stake reputational capital in their working
prompted the D e laware Supreme Court to reve rse its direction and become more
accommodating to the int e rests of investors to d iminish the threat of intervention.
115. The federal threat, and Cary's associatio n with it, appears in accou nts of these
events. See, e.g., Coffee, sup ra note 28, at 764-66; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1511-13.
116. Prior to Santa Fe Indus. v. Gre e n , 430 U.S. 462 (1977), there was a cognizable
chance that much conduct cov ered by state fiduciary law would be found to be
"manip ul ative" or "fraudulent" con duct violative of se ction lO(b) of the Securities
Exchange Ac t of 1934 and rule IOb-5 there und e r. The an timan agcrial political climate of
th e time also resulte d in the introduction of pre emptive legislation in Congress . See S.
2567. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
117. See Paramo unt Comms., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A .2d 34, 46-48 (De l. 1993)
(holding that man agement has an ob ligati on to achieve the best value reasonab ly available
for sha reholders) ; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A .2d 345, 366-7 1 (Del. 1993)
(applying a heightened duty of care scrutiny of boa rdroom merger decision and sugges ting
an expanded remedial concep t inclusive of post-m e rger gain); Re vlon, lnc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. , 506 A.2d 173 , 182 (Del 1986) (inventing a dut y of m anage ment
that changed from defending again st a tende r offer to a uctioning the company in limited
circumstances); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)
(applying an expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics under a proportionality
test); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-81 (D el. 1985) (suddenly expanding the
duty of care to cover board approval of arm's le ngth merger).
118. Equally famous cases often a ppear to restrict the applica tion of the new rules. See
Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Tim e Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54 (Del. 1989) (limiting
application of Unocal and Rev/on) ; Moran v. H ousehold lnt 'l, Inc. , 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57
(Del. 1985) (sustaining "poison pill defense" under Unocaf); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983 ) (overruling Singer in favor of a less restrictive process
scrutiny of cash-out mergers).
The legis lature , prompted by the corporate committee of the Delaware sta te bar,
entered in on man agement's side in one famous instance. Aft e r Smilh v. Van Gorkom's
application of the duty of care caused nervousness in boardrooms and a substantial
incre ase in insurance premiums, th e legislature ame nded the code to permit firms to op t
out of the duty of care by charter amendmen t. S ee DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(1991) (permitting opting out of personal liabilit y of directors for duty of care violations).
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roles. This gives the judges an independent incentive to protect the
legitimacy of the system 119 by balancing the satisfaction of interest
group demands with public-regarding results. Delaware judges,
responding to Cary's well-publicized allegations of corruption, 120
have declared a commitment to this role integrity. 121 They describe
themselves
as mediators betw een managem e n t and
sharehold ers-protectors of market risk-taking who nevertheless
imp ose eth ica l constraints.122
Second, the identification of comp e ting demands should not be
taken to predict a pattern of even-hand ed mediation. Although the
fede ral threat holds out the potential of substantial injury, it remains
an unlikely event. Potential impairment of competitive position and
loss of incorporations is a more immediate problem for Delaware, and
also amounts to a competing reputational concern for Delaware
judges, given limitations on their tenure. 123 If we look at the pattern
the Delaware courts took during the 1980s in charting a course
between competing demands on sensitive corporate control matters,
we can infer that the Delaware courts took advantage of an informational slack 124 to develop a body of case law that gave an ap-

119. See Eric Rasmusen , Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORGS. 63, 72-74, 78-80 (1994) (offering a repeat-ga m e model of judicial moti va tion with

infinite time horizons). As occurs with re peat games, the mod e l res ults in a multiplicity
of equilibria in which the outcome depends on the players' ex pectations . !d. a t 74. In
Rasmussen's model , judges follow prece dent if there is a se lf-enforcing system based less
o n compulsion th an on the need to uphold systemic legi tim acy . !d. at 72-74. In th e case
of Delaware, of course, systemic legitimacy has pointed in th e opposite direction. See also
Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosge l, Repwation and Judicial Decision -ma king, 23 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG . 31,42-49 (1994) (modelling the preferences of judges on a utilit y
func tion th a t includes both a private and a reputa ti ona l component, with th e decision as
to whether to follow precedent turning on a trade -o ff between th e two components, and
th e equilibrium rate of adherence to preced e nt depending on th e distribution of
preferences across the population).
120. Cary, supra note 10, at 684 , 696-98.
12 1. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 764-65.
122. See Moore, supra note 95, at 779-800 (wri tt e n while Moore was a D e lawa re
Supreme Court Justice). They also have acknowledged th e federal threat. See William
T. Quill e n, The Federal-State Corporace Law Relalionship-A Response ro Professor
Seligman 's Call for Federal Preemplion of Swre Corporwe Fidu ciary Law, 59 B ROOK. L.
REv. 107, 129 (1993) (author is former Delaware Chancellor and Suprem e Court Justice).
123. The recent re fusal of Delaware's judicia l nominations committee to recomm end
the reappointment of Justice Andrew Moore, a ju dge with a reputation for solicitude for
th e shareholder interest, arguably confirms this po int. See Richard B. Schmitt, D elaware
Judge Is Seen as Investors' Friend , WALL ST. 1. , July 7, 1994, at B2.
124. Slack results from monitoring costs that prevent interested parties from observing
a ll actions taken by a regulator . To the extent slack is present, a regulato r is more lik e ly
to be captured by an interest group; a self-interested reg ulawr pursues public regard ing
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pearance of greater weight to shareholder interests than was justified
by the actu al payoffs. In highly publicized cases, the D elaware courts
announced vague standards that held out the prospec t of enhancing
sh arehold er value. But in the less well-publicized cases that fo llowed,
they took the opp ort unity held out by complex facts to refrain fro m
ap plyin g the standards in man age ment-constr aining '," Ztys.125 The
fu ll se:: of res ults ta llied by the lawyers who make re incorporation
decisions signall ed considerably more room for rnana gement
man euve r than did the public profile sign alled by the leading cases.
2.

The Litigation Anomaly

F ull description of the complex of incentives that sh ape Delaware
law requires furth er consideration of conflicting interests on the
supply side. 'vVe have already suggested that managers implicitly rely
on the De laware bar to represent their interests in the sta te.
However, the bar's interests are far from perfectly aligned with
m anagement's, since litigation against managers also provides a source
of income. Delaware has a unique collection of process rules that
advance this local interest. These encourage derivative litigation, 126
making sure that the local bar gets a share of the action by re quiring
De laware lawyers to make appearances and filings. m Competing
demands also result in some systemic concessions to managers, 128
bu t the concessions hardly counter Delaware's re putation as a fee generatin g ce nter fo r corporate lawyers. The litigation rules th us
stand as the great anoma ly in the charter competition discussion,

poli ci es only wh en littl e or no sl ack is pre sen t. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at
183.
125. For a rea ding of th e post- Unocal cases along th ese lines, see ViCTOR BRUDNE Y
& WiLLIAM W. BRAfTON , BR UDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S CA5ES AND iVL\TER!ALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE 1087 -95 , 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993).
126. Delawa re diffe rs from ma ny jurisdictions in not req uiring plaintiffs in share ho ld er
derivat ive actions to pos t security for expenses. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. De laware
facilit ates se rvi ce of process on nonresid ent directors with a broad co nse nt to service
statute. Se e DEL. COD E ANN . ti t. 10, § 3114 (1993). It also is li beral in its fee awards to
de ri va ti ve plain tiffs ' lawye rs: Und e r its nonpecuniary settl ement pract ice , defe nding
man age rs can trade a hi gh fee for a small overall recove ry. Coffee, sup ra note 28, at 763.
127. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 12(a) (1); DEL. CH. CT. R. 170.
128. Delawa re am eli orates the litiga ti on rules' imm ediat e im pact on managers by
all owin g for liberal ind em nifica ti on. Its courts also have been inventi ve in rece nt yea rs in
pl acing procedural barri ers in the way of a trial on th e merits of derivative claims. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 ,813-14 (D el. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Mal donad o, 430 A.2d
779, 78 1-86 (De l. 1981). For criticism of these and subsequent cases, see Sel igm an, Ne w
Corporare Law, supra no te 68, at 23-26. These defendant-fri endly proced ures do discourage liti ga ti on.

l
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synchronizing with neither the race to the top 129 nor the race to the
bottom.130
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Milier have explained the
litigatio n rules with a supply-side account that highlights the impact
of internal inte rest group politics on the production of Delaware
law. 131 ln th eir acco unt, all groups within the state have a common
interest in prod ucing a mark e table legal regime, but the groups diffe r
on the re la tive pr opo rti o ns of costs imp os ed and revenu es earn ed.
The taxpayers ha ve an int e rest in higher direct costs (franchise tax
revenues) and lowe r indirect costs (legal fees). The lawyers ' in terest
in fe es would be served by lower direct costs leading to a grea ter
number o f incorporations, and by higher indirect legal costs even
sacrificing some incorporations when the legal fees paid exceed those
lost. M acey and Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state acting as
a pure profit maximizer would limit indirect costs to maximize direct
costs. 132 Delaware fails to conform to the product model's prediction s
because the bar acts as a small, cohesive interest group that extracts
special concessions from the legislature at the expense of the general
public. 133
Macey and Miller rightly emphasize the organized bar's political
power. Yet two factors that align the interests of the bar with those
of the rest of the state need to be added to their description. First,
the fede ral threat may temper the incentive of Delaware's lawyers to
lobby for a reduction in direct charges to customers. Increasing
D elaware 's market share substantially above the level of one-half of
public incorporations 1 3 ~ would make Delaware even more of a
"national" lawmaking center, enhancing its visibility and vulnerability

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------ -·
129. Cary , who favore d stric t fiduciary-law control of manage ment conduct. e xplai ne d
th e rul es as a spec ia l exception keyed to the interests of the D e laware bar. Ca ry, su pra
note 10, at 68 7.
130. Since th e rul es expand the zon e of legal control of corporate actors for the ben e fit
of lawyers. the y arguabl y derogat e from shareholder interests, viewed from the mark et
deterrent point o f vi e w. Se e Macey & Miller, mpra note 71, at 510-11.
131. !d. a t 472.
132. !d. at 498, 502 -04.
133. !d. at 506-09. Macey and Miller add an asymm e tric information compon e nt to this
ma rket imp erfection story. Th ey draw on Romano 's finding that lawye rs (a nd to a lesse r
extent investm e nt ba nkers) pl ay ke y rol es in re incorporation decisions and favor De la ware .
!d. at 486-87 (citing Roman o, Law as Produ ct, supra note 43, at 273, 275 n.72) . They no te
that information problems on the cli e nts' part may present a barrier to comp e tition am o ng
the lawye rs. !d. If the cli ents have an information problem, then we can account for
D e laware' s litigation rul es as a shrewd marketing move-a boon to those respo nsible for
making reinco rporati on decision s. !d. at 487.
134. S ee supra no te 43.
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to challenge at the national level. Given a state with a monopoly
position, traditional federalism objections to intervention carry less
weight. Second , rules that encourage litigation in Delaware play a
secondary role in production. Delaware's case law and judges figure
prominently in its substantive law product line. 135 Its code's advantages are iess distinct th an those of its cases, given statutory
convergence among the states, but Delaware does not complete ly
control the production of case law. The first option on the choice of
the forum for new disputes tends to lie with the plaintiff, and in many
instances Dela ware law questions can be litigated in other states or in
federal courts. This gives Delaware a reason to offer incentives to
plaintiffs. Their cooperation gives Delaware the opportunity to apply
its own law, preserving the first-mover advantage and generating a
flow of cases. These, in turn, are products sold in the charter market.
The need to satisfy the demands of the national plaintiff's bar
reinforces the internal bargaining position of Delaware 's bar, further
explaining the state's delegation to the bar of the corporate legislative
function. 136 However, the delegation to the bar also helps to
stabilize the capture arrangement with management. 137

D. From
Threatened Federal Intervention to Shareholder
Intervention-The Strategy of Countervailing Interest Empowerm ent
The foregoing survey of the charter competition system
highlights three points. First, although the system can be described
as one of voluntary exchanges, that description does not by itself
justify the system because these exchanges entail the capture of public
authority. The states here effectively sell the coercive exercise of
their authority on behalf of a purchasing group. 138 The system
thereby lacks not only the exit possibilities presupposed by regulatory
competition theory, but also the exit possibilities present when actors
freely make contracts. Although the system affords relational
benefits, it also channels distributions within the firms that enter into
contracts with the states, making losers of the principals and winners
of the agents. Second, the relative stability of the charter market
cannot be completely accounted for with a relational contract model

135. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
137. Thus, it m ay be th at the conflict between Delaware's taxpayers and attorneys is
eit her more nascent than ac tu a l or more se ttled than active.
138. See Moe, supra note 42 , at 123.
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that recognizes only one possible route of defection by the
state-defection to anticorporate interests opposed to the interests of
both shareholders and managers. Contracts in the charter market are
also structured to guard agains t state defection to the shareholder
interest. In addition , in a fede ral system, state public authority, once
captured , can be recaptured by 2 competing interest that ma nages to
invoke federal aut hor i ty. 1~" Po tenti al federal int ervention ma kes
t his recapture a constant po:~s ibil i ty in corporate law. Third, federalstate po litical instability can ha ve we al th-en hancing properties. U nder
the conflicting demand model of De laware law, the federal threat
reinfor ces the shareholder voice, moving D elaware in the directi on of
shareholder value enhanceme nt . The stronger the threat, th e more
pronounced the move.
Taken alone, however, the federal threat does not provide a
workable basis for solving the corporate agency problem. Substantial
political barriers to shareholder capture of federal authority keep the
threat distant and make it possible for Delaware to . defuse it with
minimal concessions to the shareholders, while providing management
with maximum feasible protection of its own prerogatives. Nor does
this threat lend itself to institutionalization as a component of a
federal intervention strategy designed to intensify the conflicting
demands on the states. Institutionalization implies the congressional
mandate of a prospective and graduated scheme that ripens into
preemptive mandates only to the extent that some background
normative standard remains unsatisfied. 140 Such a carrot-and-stick
approach also implies a ful ly articulated fed eral corporate law policy.
lt is hard to imagine how such <1 scheme, once im plemented on a
national basis, would amount to anything short of blanket preemp tion
that sacrifices the relational benefits of t he state system.
Federal intervention nonetheles s could help to place a stronger
quantum of shareholder dema nd before state lawmak ers.
In
regulatory theory, one expedient for the problem of agency capture
by a producer group is consumer empowerment through the gra nt of
standing in regulatory processes to public interest groups. 141 This

139. See id. at 124.
140. Under this " big stick " th eo ry of regul ation, the regulatory authorit y mak es selfregulation generally availabl e, but hold s out a graduated threat of command and control
regul a tion and punishment for uncoopera tive parties, th ere by building in an incentive to
comply. See AYR ES & BRAITHWAITE. supra note 13 , at 39-40 (discussing the th eory in the
admini strative law context).
141. In Ayres and Braithwaite 's model of •·tripartitism," the public interest group
receives the same information as th e regulator, a seat at the negoti ating ta ble, and equal
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tripartite 142 strategy follows from the insight that the structuring of
conflicts be tween agents, including third parties, can assist in the
coll ection of information and the reordering of incentives in a desired
di rection. 1-u
E mpowerment brings th e representatives of the
co unte rvai ling interest inside the system. Once inside, they assis t
iegisla ti ve pri ncipals in overcoming the problem of asymmetric
information in agency control. The countervailing int erest gene rates
information a bout the agency, supplementing the costly p rocess of
direct supervision. 144 Empowerment also reorders the ince ntives of
the agents of th e countervailing interest. ~Their inside position holds
o ut an incentive to abandon obstructionist strat egies and develop
cooperative rel ationships with both regulat ors and producers. Ideally,
they assist th e evolution of win-win outcomes in th e ongoing
r egulatory bargaining game.145 Finally, since these public interest
figures attain their status as agents in th e world of grassroots politics,
they are relatively unsusceptible to capture. Since their guardianship
positions are contestable, reputational incentives make defection to
competing interests unlikely. 146
The strategy of countervailing interest empowerment shares
objectives with the strategy of regulatory competition. Both seek
regulatory flexibility and balanced control of regulatory structures that
de ter the capture of regulators. 147 The choice between the two may
depend in part on the situation. Regulatory competition theory
assumes that comp etition provoked by exit frees the regulator from
interest group control. Interest group empowerment addresses the
capture problem where competition eith er has been blocked by
regulatory coordination, or, as has occurred in the case of corporate
law, has served as a mechanism to enforce the capture arrangemen t.

sta ndin g. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra no te 13 , at 57-58.
142. "Tripa rtite'" is used id. at 57-60.
143. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 91, at 611.
144. Mathew D . McCubbins & Thom as Sch wartz, Police Pa1rols v. Fire Alarms, 28 AM .
J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1 984 ), distinguished between "po lice patrol " ove rsight, direct
monitoring of the age nt by .the principal, and "fire ala rm"' protection, a passive fonn of
o ve rsig ht in which third parti es bear the bulk of th e cost of providing information. This
mode l was ex tende d in Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubb ins, Learn ing from Oversigh1.·
Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. E CO N. & ORGS. 96, 105 (1 994) , with
a model of a multistage, single-s hot two-person game in vo lvin g a principal and an agent,
showing how th e principal learns fr om fire-alarm ove rsi ght.
145. AYRES & B RA ITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 71-73.
146. !d. at 73.
147 . See id. at 59, 71.
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Tne often-suggested corporate law reform that we rev1Ve
here-shareholder initiative to amend the charter and effect reincorporation-is the corporate law equivalent of an interest group
empowerment strategy. The avenue of shareho lder initiative makes
it possible for the shareholders to make competing demands on the
states themse lves, and thereby gain a seat at the table when sta t£-:: L;v;s
are formul ated. The prob lem wi th this strategy, of course, is the
pro bl em of shareholder collective action. However, as th e next DZ\rt
shows, the gravity of that problem has diminished.
•

l

II I.

S TRATEGIES FO R EN FO RC ED S ELF-REG ULATION THROUG H
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION

Concentrated in stitutional ownership holds out the poss ibil ity th at
shareho lders can surmount collective action barriers keeping them
from governance participation. Shareholder participation, in turn ,
holds out the possibility of a transition from voluntary to enforced
self-regulation as shareholders use their votes to revise the process
terms of corporate contracts or to place capable and ind ependent
monitors on the board. Enforced self-regulation, in turn , holds out
the possibility of cooperative gain through rel ational engagement.
The short-term, arm's length engagement of the shareholder under a
deterrent regime evolves into the long-term, patient commitment of
an equity partner.t 48 In theory, this resolves govern ance conflicts of
the 1980s: Effective monitoring reduces the gap between mark et and
intrinsic value that triggers hostile intervention by mark et means.t49
T his relationa l model's realization depends in part on the
alignment between governance benefits and th e ince ntives of
institutional agents. This part describes these incentive pro blems and
identifies the strategies for their solution. In theory, financia l benefits
thems elves provide sufficient incentives, given the removal of legal
barriers to group action. In practice, shareholder intervention has
been effected by a group of political entrepreneurs, th e agents of
public pension funds, who appear to be pursuing reputationai gain.

148. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1038; Jeffre y N. Gordon, insliilllions as
Re!alional Inves10rs: A New Loo k a£ Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. R EV. 124, 129
(1994) [he reinafter Gordon , Cumulati ve Voting].
149. See R onald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Inveslment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L.
R Ev. 985, 1006-09 (1993) [hereinafter Gi lson & Kraakman, lnvestmen £ Compan ies].
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The Collective Action Problem, the Cost-Benefit Solution, and the
Counter Story

Historica ll y, shareh olders of public comp anies are an Olsonian
latent grou p. 150 That is, a collective good-active monitoring of
managemen t- v;ould make them better off given proport iona te
distribution of its costs. but th e law provides no cost-sharing
m echanism, ~mel th e free--rider problem prevents the emergence of a
volunteer or gr oup of volunteers with an incenti ve to provide the
good.151 Given dispersed sh areholdings, th e nontrivial costs of
active monitori ng, and th e alternative of exit through sale, the
benefits obtainab le wi thout investment in monitoring exceed the
benefits obtainable from investment. 152 In addition, rational apathy
prevails wh en the system mandates that matters be presented for
shareholder approva l. The rational small shareholder does not inves t
in information about governance matters, given the likelihood that the
collective action problem inhibits an effective group response. 153
Collective action theory allows for the possibility that a subgroup
of a latent group will organize and provide the public good if the
benefits fr om action to each member of the subgroup exceed the costs
The increased concentration of shareholdings in
incurred. 154
institutional hands makes it conceivable that institutional subgroups
might find investment in monitoring cost beneficial. 155
Concentration of shares also promises to mitigate the rational apathy
prob lem. Th e shareholders' decision of whether to seek information
about the governa nce issue depends on the costs and expecte d
benefits of the effort an d the initiative's probabilities of success. The
cost is independe nt of the number of shares held. \Vith individu al
shareholders holding larger proportionate stakes in the firm , the

150. See Edward B. Rock , Th e Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. LJ. 445, 455-59 ( 1991) [here in a fter Rock , Sh areh older
Activism] (wo rkin g th e m ode ls o f Olson a nd Hardin through the corporate fact pattern).
151. Each me m be r of the group rati o nally prefers that o thers in the group incur the
costs of providing the pu b lic goocl.
152. Roc k, Sh areho lder Acrivism. supra no te 150, at 455-56.
153. See Grundfes t, supra no te 32, at 91 0.
154. Rock, Sh areho ld er A ctivism, supra no te 150, at 457-59 (citing RUSS ELL HAR DIN ,
COLLECfiVE ACT ION 4 1 (1982)) 155. !d. at 45 9. As Bl ac k argues, shareholder passivity m ay be historically continge nt ,
the res ult of a com bin a tio n of lega l obstacles a nd past dispersed ownership patte rns. See
Bernard S. B lack, Shareh older Passivity Reexamin ed, 89 MI CH. L REV. 520, 525 (1990)
[h e re inafte r Black, Shareho lder Passivity ].
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expected returns from a given information investment go up, as does
the proponent's chance of success. 151i
Subgroup formation depends on the size of the group, the cost of
action, and the magni tude of th e ben efit the subgroup seeks.
Proponents of law reform des igned to facilitate shareholder participation direct most of their att ention to the firs t two factors. Since
the num ber of members neede d to form a subgroup declines as
ownership concentrati on goes up , the proponents argue for a
relaxation of the regulatory barriers that imp ede the accumu lation of
large holdings in given firms by single investors or organized groups
of investors. 157 The proponents also circulate blueprints for cheap
strategies, since, as the costs of a given initiative go down, subgroup
formation can go forward with a lower level of concentration and a
lower projected probability of success. 158
In sum, the propon ents assert that, given certain legal adjustments, prospects for fin ancial gain by themselves will induce
governance initiatives by institutional investors. Yet there is a
counter story.
This asserts that , even with legal adjustments,
governance initiatives realizing the full promise of cooperative gain
through enforced self-regulation cannot be expected. Two points are
emphasized. First, agency relationships within investment institutions
create disincentives that prevent subgroup formation, even assuming
a projection of a positive return to the subgroup from an investment
in governance.
Since the individual manager's performance is
measured against the performance of the market as a whole and
subgroup investment benefits the market as a whole, successful
governance investments do not necessarily improve the individual
manager's performance profile. 15Y Second, the benefits of costintensive relational investment remain und erspecified. In theory,

156. According to Black, the in cent ive to become inform ed increases as th e ho ld e r's
share ownership level is squared. !d. at 585-89.
157. !d. at 578.
158. See Grundfest, supra note 32, a t 908-13 (exa mining the minimum cost s tra tegy of
the "just vote no " campaign). Proponen ts of refo rm also stress that scale economies li e
in the application of a single go vern a nce dev ice to multiple companies, Black, Shareholder
Passivity, supra note 155, at 584 , and a rgue for rules that transfer th e cost of shareholder
initi atives to the firm , see id. a t 579-80.
159. Rock, Shareholder ACiivism. supra note 150, a t 473-74 ; see also Jill E. Fisch,
Relationship Investing: Will it Ha ppen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J . 1009, 1020-25
( 1994) (arguing that competitive pressure s on instituti o na l performance must be accounted
for in cost-benefit mod e ls of institutional monitoring); H e len G a rten, Institutional In vestors
and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 585 , 630-32 (1 992) (arguing th a t it is
difficult to incre ase inst ituti onal activism).
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these lie in informational access and ongoing constructive criticism by
the institutional monitor. 160 In practice, underperforming companies
are publicly identified in the ordinary course, and standard remedies
res pecting investment policies, incentive schemes, and governance
structures are part of the conventional wisdom. To the extent that
instituti o ns can cheapl y tie the communicati on of these points to
credib ie threats against target managers, t hey can ::.ecure the available
set of governance benefits through a discrete engagement, Ince ntives
for more substantial investments in ongoing 1-elationships remain
speculative, absent a special technical capability on the part of the
particular monitor. As a result, risks of perverse ince ntives an d
commitment problems come to the forefront of the relational picture.
A strategically placed institutional holder could opt for side payments
from management in preference to public-regarding informational
develo pment, or, given a hostile tender offer, the institutions in the
subgroup could defect from an implicit undertaking by management
to be patient 161
The practice has tended to fulfill the counter story's predictions.
Relational engagements have been discrete, cheap, and focus ed on the
short term. In contrast to the proponents ' prediction that financial
incentives by themselves will induce subgroup formation, the selective
incentive of reputation seems to drive the practice. This implies that
contractual renegotiation of governance terms will dominate over
direct monitoring of investment decision-making as the means to
enhance value through shareholder participation.
B.

Selective Incentives and the Pauern of Shareholder Participation

L

The Pattern of Discrete Intervention

Institutional investor activism is the successfu l grassroots political
movement of American big business. It bega~ during the late 1980s
vvhen institutions became dissatisfied with expanding legal constraints
on takeover activity. Tne access route was the precatory shareholder

160. See infra not e 217. It comes as no surprise that the results of empirical st udi es of
returns on monitoring activities are inconclusive. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 1035 (citing
L ILLI A. GORDON AND JOHN POUND , ACTIVE INVESTING IN THE U.S. EQUITY MARKET:
PAST PERFORJ'v!ANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS , REPORT FOR THE CALIFORNIA PUB LI C
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM 44 (Jan. 11. 1993)).
161. For exp loration of the se problems, see Ayres & Cramton. supra note 19, at 103639: Edward B. Rock, Comrolling th e Dark Side of Relarionallnvesting, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV . 987 , 989-99 (1994) (herein after Rock, Dark Side].
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pr o posal, 162 a medium for nonbinding, shareholder-initiated voting
propos als made availab le by preemptive mandate v.nder rh e fede r?,l
proxy rules. 163 The first generation of proposals concern ed poison
pilts, and urged management to exercise its priviiege of redeeming
ti1ern or to submit them to share holder approval. 164 ~t~'1e first
sus tai.ned assault o n the pills came in 1987, wh en a group of ;:n tbli ':
T -::::. pc 1r ~-i
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-i .•~ :3. . . cu-·vp
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l votes cast-s1gn1
. 'fi cant returns g1ven
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------··- --162. Ma nageme nt must includ e in th e annual proxy statem•: nt preca tory shareholJer
proposa ls that meet Rule 14a-8 process and su ita bility guid elines. Proxy Soli ci tation Rules,
17 CF.R. 240. 14a-8 (1994).
Th e process guid elin es , se t out in Rule 14a-8(a)(2) to (4), arc st rict-t he propone nt
is allowed only on e proposal , submiss ion must occur months before the mee ting. and the
supporting statement is limited to 500 words. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14(a)-8(a)2 to 3 (1993). T he
suita bility guid elin es are strict er. They were drafted at a tim e when shareholder proposa ls
were e nvisioned as a medium for exp ress ion of concern on social issues rel a ted to
corpo rations, and exclud e many busin ess topics of prime concern to governance activists .
To wit, unde r Rule 14a-8(c) , matters of "ordinary business operations ," "election[s] to
offi ce," proposa ls counter to management proposals, and "s pec ific amounts of cas h . ..
dividen ds" are unsuit able; at the same time, a social proposa l "not
signi fican tl y
rel ated" to th e business also is unsuitable. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)5 , 7-9 & 13 (1 994).
Th e SEC alters its int erpretations of these rules from time to time , opening th e door
to iss ues concerning the operation of the business if it de termin es that the particular topic
has take n on substantial po licy import. The Commiss ion has not been notab ly consiste nt
in these determi na tions. Compare Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, lnc. , SEC I\l oAction Lett e r, [1992-1 993 T ransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'fi 76,418. at 77.284-87
(Oc t. 13 , 1992) (findin g un suitable a proposa l recomm endin g policy of nondi sc rimin at ion
respecting sex ual preference in hirin g), with Eli Lilly & Co .. SE C No-Ac ti on Le tt er [1 993
T rans fer Bind er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ~ 76,629, at 77,682 (Feb. 25 , 1993) (fin ding
:; uit abl e a proposal recomme ndin g adoption of price restraint policy by drug com pany
:, uita bi e) and AT&T, 1990 SEC No-Act LEX IS 20, *2-3 (J an. 5, 1990) (findin g proposa l
for elimination of affinnative acti on programs suitable). Thi s sort of nonsense has gotten
the agen cy into difficulties with certain courts. See New York City Employe es ' Retirement
Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (e njoining the agency from act ing
inconsisten tly with its own stated po li cy in respec t to th e Cracker Barrel proposa l), rev'd,
Fed. Sec . L. R ep. (CCH) ~ 98,493 (2d Ci r. Jan. 3, 1995).
Observers tend to se e th ese suitability rul es as manifestly unsa ti sfactory. See, e.g.,
Blac k. Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 541 ; Jill E. Fisch , From Legitimacy ro
Logic: .Reconstrucring Proxy Regulation , 46 YAND. L. REV. 1129, 1155-62 (1993) .
163. Under Rule 14a-8, the propon ent bears th e expense of mak ing the proposa l,
including legal expe nses in th e event of a manage ment cha ll enge to its suitab ility, but the
corporation bears the expe nse of including the pro posal in th e proxy stateme nt. Proxy
Solicitation Rules, 17 C.F. R. § 240.14a-8 (1994).
\64. Gilson & Kraakman, lnstilutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 867-68.
165. Rock, supra note 150, a t 402. The playe rs we re the College Retirement Equit ie5
f und . the Ca li fornia Public Employe es Retirement System, and the Wisconsi n In vestme nt
Board, loosel y organized through the Council of Institution al Inve stors. Jayne W.

s
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The activists thereafter broadened the range of their proposals to
cover other takeover defenses 166 and, with proposals fo r confidential
voting, the voting process itself. 167 By 1990, the voting pattern had
changed. In that year, 160 shareholder proposals received more than
twenty percent of the votes, and nineteen received more than fifty
percent 1f> s_th e iargest number of successful proposals in the en ti:<·~
history of the dev ice.169 'Ir.e voting pattern re specting man2gemen t
proposals also had changed. 170 Although the overv,helmi ng majority
management submitted in 1990 were approved, ten were d efeated and
two were withdrawn to avoid defeat. 171
Antit akeover charter
amendm ents, overwhelmingly approved in the early 1980s, now passed
with only fifty to sixty percent of the votes. 172
Institutional activists ha d arrived, led by agents of the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and other public
pension funds. After 1990, the subject matter of their proposals
broadened again, to include process and structure proposals designed
to make boards more effective in monitoring and designing incentive

Barnard, fnslirwi onal Investors and rhe New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. R EV. 1135 ,
1153 (1991).
M a rk R. Wingerson & C hristopher H. Dorn, lnsritwionallrzvestors in th e U.S. and th e
Repeal of Poison Pills: A Pracririoner 's Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL I NV ESTORS AND
CORPORATE GO VER NANCE, supra note 11 , at 201-02 , makes a co unter suggestion. Given
the prese nt control mark e t in which takeovers tend to be strategic moves made by larger
playe rs in a gi ven industr y, th e y argue th a t th e shareh o lde rs' interest li es in lea vi ng t he
pills in pl ace to fa cilit a te lowe r-cost fri e ndly transactions. !d. at 212. They thus ascribe
institutional pressure for pill redemption entirely to sel ective incentives. !d. a t 211-22.
166. Th e pro posals suggested prohibition (or requirement of share hold e r approval ) of
gre e nmail pa ym e nts, opting out of antitakeover statutes, and requiring shareholder
appro va l of pl ace me nts of large blocks of stock with managem ent-friendl y ho lders. See
Gilson & Kr aa kman, lnstirwional Agenda , supra note 32, at 868.
167. See Black , A gews , supra note 30, at 825-26. Confide ntial voting assi sts shareholder
participation in two ways. First , confidentiality prevents management from punishing
private in ves tm e n t institutions that vote against it in the product market. !d. Second ,
under the usual procedures, managem e nt's proxy solicitors are free to count the proxies
as the y co me in , id e ntify no-voting shareholders, and resolicit their votes . If the vote
seems des tined to go against management , management can withdraw its proposal.
Sharehol de r pro ponents do not ha ve this privilege. !d.
168. Rock, Shareholder Activism , supra note 150, at 483.
169. Barnard, supra note 165 , at 1156. Poison pill proposals received an average vote
of 42 % . Black , Agenrs , supra note 30, at 828.
170. Manage ment must submit charter amendments and fundamental co r porate
changes, including liquidation, substantial asset sales, and some mergers for a sh a reholder
vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251, 271 , 275 (1994). Executive compensation
plans mu st be submitted to the shareholders pursuant to exchange listing rul es.
171. R ock, Sh areh o lder Acrivism , supra note 150, at 484.
172. Black. Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 571.
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.
1y, success caused the se t of cheap
arrangements. I T-· More tmportant
strategies to expand. It turned out that managers, once confron ted
with majority or near majority votes for the institutions' non binding
proposals, or confronted wi th even the prospect of such a vote,
proved willing to open negoti ations and make concessions, 174 eithe r
by voluntarily adopting responsive m easures or by accep ting ot her
policy changes in exchan ge for th e withdrawal of a proposal. 17-'
Proponents took this advantage and gaine d negotiating access by
gen e rating bad publicity without making specific proposals. They
publicized lists of underperforming companies 176 with the suggestion
that shareholders "just vote no '· in that year's board el e::tion . 177

173. Suggested improvem e nts included th e separation of th e function s o f bo ard
chairman and chie f executive office r and outside director m embership for the compensation committe e . Propos a ls respec ting executive pa y also appeared , after th e SE C
reversed a position in 1992 and d ecl a red th e subj ect matter to be prope r und e r its rul e .
See Staff Advises Shareholder Proposals on Pay Includible in Proxy Materials , 24 S EC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 8, at 250 (Feb. 21, 1992). Sharehold er inte rventi o n has
resulted in change s in compensation practices a t liT, IBM, Cincinnati Bell, and A vo n.
Grundfest, supra note 32, at 931.
Institutional shareholder proposals continue to increase in number. See 9 CORP.
COUNS. WKLY (BNA) , No. 22, at 4 (Jun e 22, 1994) (reporting a slight increase in 1993 and
1994). In the 1994 a nnu a l m e eting se ason (according to Georgeson & C o.), institution:;
sponsored 69 proposals, up from 65 in 1993. !d. Of the 1994 proposals, 11 sought to
repeal classified boards, 10 conce rn ed executive compensation, 7 sought poison pill
redemption, and 14 ad vocate d confid e ntial voting. '93-'94 Proxy Seasons Said 10 Show
Slight Increase in Shareholder A ctivism . 9 CO RP. COUNS. WKLY (BNA) , No. 24, at 4 (June
22 , 1994) (he reinaft e r '93- '94 Proxy Seasons ]. The re has be en a change in the sponsorshi p
pattern. howe ve r. La bor unions have appea re d as spon sors. backing 32 proposals in 1994
versus 9 in 1993. john C. Wilcox , chaim1an of Georgeson & C o., ch a racte ri zes the union s
as "gadflies, " becau se they repeat th eir proposals and do not see k to negoti a te with
management be fore submitting them. !d. In anothe r recent d e ve lopment , C a iPE RS , ci ting
an independent consultant's stock price study, has indica te d a n interes t in e nco uraging
managem e nt to adopt " high pe rformance" workpl ace strategies that accord wo rk e rs mo re
rights and feedback. See id. at 1.
174. See Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 483. For example , K-Ma rt
accepted two proposals in 1990 and se ve n firms institute d confidential voting in e xch a nge
for withdrawal of proposals . /d.
175. Grundfest , supra note 32, at 932 (stating that in 1992 , 31 firms confronted with
shareholder proposals negotiated their withdrawal). Institutional successes al so have had
a noticeable dete rre nt e ffect on manage ment proposals for self-protective charte r
amendments. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 828-29.
176. See Ca/PERS Lists 12 Companies in Effort to Focus Atrention on Corpo ra te
Reform, 24 SEC. R EG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 13, at 420 (Mar. 27 , 1992).
177. Grundfest, supra note 32, at 933. The New York State Common Retirem e nt Fund ,
the Public Employees R e tirement Fund of Colorado , the New York State L oca l
Retirement Funds, th e New York City Retirement Systems , and CRE F ha ve joine d
CalPERS in these campaigns. !d. at 867 & n.37.
Grundfest notes the cost advantages of these dialogic campa igns. T he anal ys ts collect
the basic information on performance and the costs of drafting and co mpliance costs of
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Proponents then would meet with management to voice their
criticisms and concerns. Results follmved m - chief executives were
terminated at two of CalPERS ' 1992 targets, IBM and Westinghouse;
another target, Sears, took the institutions' advice about concentrating
on the core busi ness and dismembered itself. 179 A change in the
SEC proxy rul es, promulgated in 1992 as a resu lt of institutional
pressures, facilit ated the new approach by pr.:.:rrnitti ng shareholders to
pubiish their views in the media without prior agency ap proval. 180
2.

Explaining and Evaluating the Pattern

The institutional shareholders' record, thus outlined, confirms
that concentrated shareholders are not passive and can coordinate
votes to achieve results. Specifically, th e ra tional apathy problem has
diminished substantially, reputational threats against managers have

14a -8 proposals are avoided. CaiPERS es timates th at a 14a-8 prop osal can cost up to
$500,000, where a "just vote no " campaign costs $100,000. !d. at 911-12. Howeve r, the
device is not necessa rily more effective than the a lternat ive of a precatory shareholder
proposa l directed to a matter of process and structure; the latter gained stronger support
than the former at th e 1995 annual m ee ting of Philip Morris, a current institutional target.
See infra note 296.
178. !d. at 933. Heads also ha ve rolled at Good year, Allied Signal, Tenneco, Shearson,
and Kodak. !d. at 882-94.
179. This sort of institutional pressure continu ed to be exerted through 1994, with
differe nt results in diffe re nt finm. K-Mart and Philip Morris were two leading institutional
targets. A t K-Mart, institution s press uring for the separation o f non-core re tailing
divisions ca use d th e defeat of a company proposal (prese nted for app roval at th e annual
mee ting) deemed no t to go far e nough. Months later, the board remo ved the e mbattled
C.E.O. from the chairmanship, but it retained him as pres ident. See Joann S. Lublin &
Christina Duff, Managemenr: Ho w Do You Fire a CEO? Very, Very Slowly, WALL. ST.
J., Jan. 20. 1995, at B1. Philip Morris expe rienced simil a r instituti ona l pressure for division
of th e compa ny, but the internal politics worked differently. See infra note 296 .
180. See Pro xy Solicita tion Rul es, 17 C.F. R. ~ 240.14a-2(b)(l) (1994). The ea rlier rules
prohibite d solicitation of more th a n 10 o th e r share ho ld e rs wi thout adva nce clearance. The
revised rul es also cut back on man ageme nt agenda co ntrol in the proxy solicitation itself
by (1) permitting share holders to vote in board elections for a combination of management
nominees and outsid e challengers, and (2) allowing shareholders to oppose a single
man agemen t proposa l without being req uired to vote for or against an entire slate of
proposa ls. 17 C.F,R. § 240.14(a)-4(b) (1994). The former change facilitates the possibility
of campaigns for se lect numbers o f institutionally nominated directors. See Ronald J.
Gilson et a!., How th e Proxy Rules Discourage Cons rructive Engagemenr: Regu latory
Barriers 10 £leering a Minoriry of Direcrors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 33-42 (1991). The latter
chan ge preve nts th e bundling of a propos ai to which sharehold ers might object with an
advantageous proposa l. It does not, howeve r, prevent management from conditioning the
approval of a proposal on the approval of one or more other proposa ls. See Fisch , supra
note 162, a t 1169-70.
The revised rul es have had some effect on th e pattern of proxy contests. Institutions
now so licit proxies from one anoth e r when opposin g mergers or corporate restructurings.
See '93-'94 Proxy Seasons, supra not e 173, at 2.
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proved effective, and capture of institutional proponents has not been
a problem. Diverse incentives among the institutions, however, make
the wider attack on the collective action barrier a tentative one.
a.

The Rational Apathy Problem

The rational ap athy ca iculation bro ke du ring the 1980s when
newly concentrated holders enco untered takeover-related voting iss ues
with substantial fin ancial implications. 18 1 Ins ti tutions thereafter
made at least mini mal investments in information on governa nce
issues and showed some discrimination in their voting. 182 The
network of activist institutions also became a point of information
exchange. Their public suggestions that votes in selected firms be tied
to performance entail the sorting of financial information for
rechannelling into the voting arena. This ameliorates a problem of
informational slack 183 in addition to securing leverage for
negotiations. Finally, the activists' success at extracting governance
concessions provided the wider institutional community with ongoing
incentives to stay informed, even as takeover-related incentives
declined in importance after 1989.
b.

The Reputational Threat

The record also suggests a revision of the standard list of
corporate governance deterrents. As yet, most shareholder initiatives
have not employed threats of direct intervention in the form of
mandatory proposals 184 or opposing slates of directors. 185 Instead,

181. On this point, then, Black's " critical mass " has been re ached. See Black,
Shareholder Passivicy, supra note 155, at 588-89.
182. The institutions articul a te voting polici es in advance by type of proposal. See
Roberta Romano , Public Pension Fund A ctivism in Corporate Go vernance Reconsidered ,
93 COLUM . L. REV. 795, 831-39 (1993) [hereinafte r Romano, Pension Fund A ctivism J
(comparing public and private fund voting polici es). Bw cf Louis Lowenstein, Why
Managements Should (And Should Nor) Have Respecc f or Th eir Shareholders , 17 J. CORP.
L. 1, 19-20 (1991) (surveying the guidelines of one bank and finding that they crudely fail
to discriminate between well and badly run companies to avoid an appearance of
favoritism to bank customers).
183. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 185-91. CalPERS 's list of underperforming finns amounts to a " fire al ann'" mode of ove rsight that supplements the "police
patrolling " of the indepe nd ent directors. See McCubbins et al. , supra note 89, at 273-74.
The fire alarm realigns the outside directors' incentives to make them more inclined to
challenge the managers. !d.
184. These are prohibitively costly under state law, and th e extent to which the proxy
rules allow for th em under Rule 14a-8 is uncle a r. See infra note 274 and accompanying
text.
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action is communicative. The shareholders as a group are invited to
join in a nonbinding request and their cooperation indicates dissatisfaction with performance. 186 In the alternative, th e pro po nent
anno un ces performance dissatisfaction directly and invites oth ers to
concur. None of these initiatives entails a takeove r threa t in the
prese nt cl imate. Nevertheless, they res ul t in preempt ive n egot iati ons
;:md concessions by managers, 1s7 and . in some cases, prom pt the
U'TT11 ina tio n of th e chief ex ec utive by the outside dire cto rs.
These shareholder threats appe ar credible because th ey impact
on th e reputational interests of chief executives an d in dep ende nt
board mem bers. The campaign declares that the target ex ec utives
possess undesirable characteristics, 18 ~ detracting from their standing
in the business community 189 and , in some cas es, from th eir
marketability. It can be expected that managers will be extraordinarily risk-averse to such reputational impairment if, as seems
reasonable, we can assume that employment contracts are incomplete
and do not fully compensate for tenure insecurity and the costs of
changing jobs. 190 Preemption by negotiation serves the managers '
interest by defusing the threat and providing them with some control
over the settlement process. 19 1
More broadly, the appearance of a vocal shareholder interest
gro up changes the manager's institutional environment.
The
institutio ns articulate a normative challenge to the manager's conduct
of the business. 192 Their challenge has a more destabilizing effect

185. Diss ident in ves tors ha ve successful ly condu ct ed prox y co ntests for board scats in
a handful of cases. See John Pound , The Rise of rh e Polirica / Model of Corpo rare
Governan ce and Corp orare Comrol, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1047-50 (1993) .
186. It is not cle ar how discriminating the in stituti onal voters are in this rega rd .
Confid enti al voting, once placed as a yes vote in a guideli ne presum abl y results in ye s
votes in both well and badly managed compani es. See Lowenstein , supra note 182 , at 1920. T he va lue of th e signal depends on th e discrimin at ion or th e ac ti vist gateke e pe r. A t
least one writer has assured managers that shareh olde r initiatives can be avoided through
good fin a ncial performance over the long run and direct explanation of any short-t erm
probl ems to the institutions. Robert C. Pozen , lnsrirurional lnvesrors: The Relucranr
Acrivisis , H A RV. Bus. REV. 141, 147-49 (J a n.-Fe b. 1994) .
187 . Pound, supra note 185, at 1057-61.
188. G rundfest , supra note 32, at 927-28.
189. See James G. March & Zur Shapira, Mana gerial Perspecrives on Risk and Risk
Takin g, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1413 (1987) (stating that managers are conce rned about th eir
re put ati ons for risk-taking and are eager to discuss th e deficienci es of others).
190. See fvlilgrom & Roberts, supra note 2, at 158-62.
191. See G ilson e t a!. , supra note 180, at 45 .
192. Firms are, from a sociological perspective , norm a tive environm e nts. Institutional
norms are rationalized prescriptions th a t identify soci al purposes as technical ones and
specify rul e-like mean s to pursue these technical rati onalities. John W. Meyer & Brian
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than ordinary external criticism, due to their equity investments, long
term presence, and ability to marshal votes respecting both present
and future matters for shareholder action. They represent an unstable
sector in the larger domain of institutional relationships with which
the manager deals. 193 By negotiating, the ris k-ave rse m anager 194
see ks to stabilize and influence the relationshi o.
'
The shareholder threat can also destabilize tile re lat ionsh ips of
i.ns id e manage rs a nd outside directors by reorienti ng the c utsiders'
incentives. O rdin arily. the outside directors, be ing corporate players
themselves, 195 see that their interests lie in coope ration with
man agement. However, shareholder intervemi on gives rise to a
pu blic question about the outsiders' effectiveness, creating a dual
demand that has an impact on different components of the same
reputation. If the conflict becomes severe, the outsiders resolve it by
forming a coalition and exercising their board voting power to oust
the chief executive.
Thus, publicity and reputational interests
combine to effect a transfer of control.
The occurrence of a number of such transfers in practice bolsters
the activists' credibility. These cases also represent an important
achievement: Since managers become psychologically invested in
their past strategies, chief executive turnover plays a crucial role in
prompting disinvestment m those strategies. 196
Furthermore,

Rowan, !n stinuional Organization: Formal Struclllre as M_w h and Ceremony, 83 AM. J.

soc.

340, 343-44 (1977).
193. See WALTER W. POW ELL & PAUL J. DIMAGGIO. THE NEW INSTITUTI ONA LISM
IN ORG ANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 30 (1991) (looking to ext ra-institution al sources of

institutional change as a complement to the internal interes t group story of the firm).
194. See March & Shapira, supra note 189, at 1410-14 (suggesting that extreme risk
aversion can be expected). March and Shapira survey empirical studi es on attitud es to risk
and conclude (1) that the managers do not see unce rtainty about positive outcom es as an
important part of risk, and rather understand risk in terms of negative outcomes; and (2)
that managers do not understand risk as a probability concept, instead understanding risk
in te m1s of how much they might lose rather than the probability of loss. !d. at 1407. See
generally KE NN ETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE
MANAGEME NT OF UNCERTAINTY 77-274 (1986) (reporting on a comprehensive survey of
senior business executives and studying their willingness to take risk s).
195. See supra text accompanying note 15.
196. See Theresa K. Lant et al., The Role of Managerial Learning and Interpretation in
S trategic Persisten ce and Reorienlation: An Empirical Ex ploration , l3 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 585, 588, 603 (1992) (stressing that heterogeneity of top management induces strategic
change and that managers in environments with constant change are more lik ely to change
than others in less complex circumstances); see also Paul C. Nystrom & William H.
Starbuck , To A void Organizational Crises; Unlearn, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAM ICS, Spring
1984. at 53-60 (explaining that faulty cognitive structures developed by top manage rs
contribute to an organization's inability to deal with crisis, often requiring a n infusion of
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organizational tenure has been accorded a principal role in exp laining
the informational diversity, risk , and status quo pr eferenc~::::; of the
teams of managers that run corporations. Long-term executives tend
to employ unchan ging strategies and rely on customary inform a.tion
sources. Teams with short tenures are more incline d to adoot diverse
stra tegi es, look for new sou rces of information, and deveicp nevi
pla ns. 1n
!

c.

Financial and Selective In centives

Shareholder engagements have fo llowed a drscrete, sins l e ·· s ho ~:
pa ttern. Agen ts of public and not-for- profit funds tak e the initi ative,
select targets, and make investments in communication and legal
compliance. Private sector agents of mutual funds, private pensior;
funds, management firms, banks and insurance companies follow the
le aders, 19H taking a selective, cost-sensitive approach. L arger private
players join in the dialogue when prominent underperforming
companies become successful targets. Otherwise, they discrimin<J.te
among specific issues according to projected short-term fi nancial
consequences. A proposition with significant bearing on short-term
returns, such as a management proposal for a merger with a low
payout, might prompt an initiative. Other issues will not, with the
extent of participation in the initiatives diminishing with the payoff:
Poison pills rank above compensa tion plans, which in turn ra nk above
more general process and structure improvements. 19Y
This division of functio ns between public and private institutions
foilows fr om differences in the agen ts ' financial incentives 8 !1d th e
institutions' product mark et vulnerabilities. Public pension funds tend
to be internally managed by civil servants who have relative irnrn unity
to threats by managers. Thes e agents ' bureaucratic positio ns a lso lead
them to pursu e risk averse financial strategies, since the public sector
- - - -- - - - - - -- - - -- -- · - - - - -- -· - - - --- new id eas in the form of new managers).
197. See Sydn ey Finkelst ein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top Managem enl· Team Te n ure
and Organizarional Owcomes: Th e Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADi'vl i N .
SCI. Q. 484, 486-88 (1990); see also Jeffrey Pfeffer , Organizational D em ography . in 5
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 299, 320-26 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M.
Staw eds., 1983) (examining th e effects of organizational demography on innovat ion.
adaptation and performance). Bw see Andrew M. Pettigrew, On Sw dyin g tHanagerial
£/ires, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163 passim (1992) (providing a methodological cri tique of
this literature).
198. In 1990 pub lic pension funds owned 8.3% of the equit y market ; priva te pensi on
funds owned 19.9 % ; mutual funds owned 7.2%. All of these percentages had inc reased by
1992. See Coffee , Half-Tim e Reporr, supra note 32, at 848-49.
199. Pozen sets out this pa tt ern of response. Poze n, supra note 186, at 145-<!6.

1995]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1915.

provides no special rewards for exceptional financial performance,
while financ ia l fa ilure can lead to punishment. 200 These funds, as a
result, are heavily indexed .201 Private sector agents, in contrast, run
the risk of management punishment for uncooperative conduct. 202
They also have stronger incentives to pursue upsid e gain , which leads
them to trade more act ive ly and worry about liquidity.203 Some also
work under ti ght cost constrai nts th at stem from fee arrangements
structured on th e assumptio n of governa nce passivity. 2D-1
T he different be havior pa tterns of public and private institutions
reverse the assertion of the fi nan cia l incentive th eory of shareholder
participation . I n theory financial gain provides the incentive, while in
practice the less inte nse the fin a ncial pressures on th e agent , the
greater the lik elihood that the agent will take the governance
initiative. 205 Tnis odd res ult dovetails with the more general point
that inevitable sharing of governance gains with free rid ers makes
governance investment irrational in a world in which the agent's
individual performance evaluation proceeds against the performance
of the market as a whole. 206 Together these points confirm the
prediction that sh are holder initiative will follow from selective
incentives. Public sector actors, as civil servants, are unimpeded by
the private actors' cost, product market, and reputational disincen-

200 . See Lowe nste in. SllfHa no te 182, at 17-18 .
201. See Coffe e. Half- Tim e Report, supra not e 32, at 860.
202 . See, e.g, Grundfe st. supra note 32. a t 9 13-24. Corporati o ns, parti cu larl y corpora te
pe nsion fund s, are a s ign ific::m t sou rce of bu sin ess fo r private manage rs . A we ll-publicize d
confrontation with o ne mana ge me nt grou p ca n chill a b us in ess re lation ship with a simil a rl y
situate d group. !d .
203. Private pen sion fund s te nd to be ·'defin ed bene fit '' plan s, giv in g t he corpora te
sponso r a n in centi ve to max imi ze plan re turn to minimize th e need for corpora te
contributions. P ublic p lans some tim es follow a "defin ed contribution" patt ern, with no
connection be tween perform an ce and cont ri bution. Coffe e, Ha lf- Tim e Rep ort, supra no te
32, at 859. Roman o suggests th a t possi biliti es fo r ex tern a l political pressures on public
pension fund agents wo ui d diminish if a ll took th e d e fin ed contribution form . Romano ,
Pension Fund Activism, supra no te 182 , at 844-51.
204. Pozen cit es 70 basis points per yea r plus a m a ximum pe rform ance fee of 10 to 20
basis points fo r externa l manage rs, and notes that all costs o f dealing with the proxy
p ro cess come out of thi s com pensa ti o n poo l. Poze n , supra note 186, a t 144.
205. There is a counter sto ry to th e effect th a t the ind exed investor must invest in
sys temic governance improveme n ts du e to th e absence of the a lte rnative of e xit throu gh
sale. See Barnard. supra no te 165 , at 1151-52; Gil son & Kr aakman, lnstinaional A genda,
supra note 32, at 866-67. T he p ro bl em with this incentive sto ry is that it neither accounts
for the be havior different ial between the public a nd private secto rs nor recogni zes tha t
inacti vity might neve rth e less be a mo re rat ional a lte rnative fr om th e point o f view o f a
particular privat e secto r age nt.
206. See supra text accom panyin g notes 151-52.
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tives. At the same time, governance activity seems to suit them as a
mode of reputation enhancement. Given this phenomenon of reward
for power exercised over business actors rather than for financial
performance, 207 they are political entrepreneurs in both the tra ditional and O !sonian senses.208
d.

Cred ibility and Poss ibilities for Cap ture

A number of factors make public pension fund agents suitable for
The credi bil ity of a
this "public-regarding" entreprene urship.
sharehold er who proposes a cooperative engagement with
managem ent is enhan ce d by a concrete commitment to a long-term
investment in the firm. The public agents' indexed portfolios give
them a long-term posture as a structural proposition. Their interve ntions, accordingly, hold out no possibility of a hidden defection
strategy keyed to exploiting the management vulnerability that follows
from public targeting.M Nor, given indexing and the multiplicity of
institutional holders, is it likely that a proponent or group of
proponents could use voting power or the opportunity of access to
management to defect from the wider shareholder interest in
exchange for rents from the target. A particular pension fund agent
has reputational concerns that limit such a possibility to an end
period. 210 The agent's ability to exercise a reputational threat

207. lf the care e r patte rns of the most promin ent actors are any guide, job shifts over
to the privat e sector also se em to be a possible reward.
208. A second type of po litica l en tre pre neur also has appeared. This is a professional
inte rm ed iary who makes th e good governance case to management from an inside
position. The intermediary a rgues that voluntary acceptance of a program of internal
monitoring procedures minimizes th e possibility of becom ing an institutional target. Two
prominent lawyers, Martin Lipton and Ira Milstein, take the promin e nt roles in this
capacity. See Martin Lipton & J ay W. Lorsch , A 1\l!odest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 67-75 (1992) (recommending the separation of the chief
executive and board chairman functions, longer and more frequent board meetings, smaller
boards , use of outside consult a nt s, periodic evalu a tion of the C.E.O. 's performa nce , a nd
an annual m eet ing with the company's largest shareholders); see also Jay W. Lorsch,
Empowering th e Board , H A RV. Bus. REV. 107 (Ja n.-Feb . 1995) (describing activist board
strategies).
The General Motors Board adop ted a se t of "guidelines" in 1994, drafted by Milstein.
These provide for annual evaluation of the C.E.O. but little else. See Th e GM Board
Guidelin es, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Summer 1994, at 5.
209. Conflicts o ve r short term gain and long term strategy are entailed in th ese
engagements. These contlicts are discussed publicly, particularly where the issue is the
unbundling of a conglomerate .
210. That is, when termination of a particular relationship is co nte mplated.
Pres umably, an e nd period res ults only when a given agent has decided to le ave th e fi e ld
of money management. Cf Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 851 (observing that
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against management depends ultimately on the agent's ability to rally
vo tes from the wider institutional community.2li Since votes against
management remain the excep tion rather than the rule, the proponent
must husband its reputation to continue to play, selecting targets
carefully and representing th e interests of the entire group of
shareholders in the engagement with manage ment. Informational
slack seems un likely to open up any roo m for self-seeking man ev;e c-s.
Tne institutions operate in a n informal ne twork, and the man agers
themselves re main ready to p ublicize any misconduct. 212 In short,
guardianship here is easily contes ted.
C ompeting demands on, and the possible capture of, agents of
public pension funds can more plausibly be hypothesized from a
different direction. The bureaucratic positions of public pension fun d
agents make them vulnerable to pressure from constituency interests
frequently opposed to shareholder interests. Management is one of
those constituencies. These actors are, after all, agents of the same
governments that managers already have captured, at least within the
production of corporate law. Accordingly, political contestab ility
makes it imprud ent to predict that this form of entrepreneurship will
remain vital indefinitely.
Roberta Romano has suggested that state-based concerns, such
as political pressure to support local firms and engage in other forms
of locally directed social investing, could limit the freedom of action
of pension fund agents. 213 Ce rtainly a cl ose tie between a state and
a particular firm would crea te a conflict for that fund agent. As
Romano also suggested , however, th ese conflicting demand situations
are geographically specific rather than systemic. They therefore differ
from the more general threat of management pressure that still
controls private actors. G iven a multiplicity of players, the confl icts
can be worked out within the network: The agent disabled by the
dual demand employs the professional 's device of recusal , and the
other agents go forward. Romano points to a more systemic threat
to the leadership of the public pension funds when she recounts promanagement politicai maneuvers to place pension fund control in the

shareho lde r engagem ent is a repeated game, re taliation against chea ters ca n be ex pected,
and money managers will ra re ly be in an end period with respect to o ne anoth er) .
211. Rom ano conducted a compara ti ve survey of the voting policies of pub li c and
private funds and found no sta ti stica ll y significant differe nces in voting pa tterns on process
and structure issues, a nd a common patte rn o n most soci a l issues . Romano, Pension Fund
Acrivism, supra not e 182, at 83 1-39.
212. See Black , Agenrs, supra note 30, at 817.
213. Roman o, Pension Fund ACiivism, supra note 182, at 814-20.
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governors' offices in New York and California. 214 These maneuvers
did not succeed, but they underscore the important point that
managers know how to organize themselves and make state
governments responsive to their wider agenda. Increased fund
activism, predicts Romano, will cause a concomitant increase in
political pressure on the fund s' governance decis ions. 2 15
It is hard to gauge the likelih ood and prospects of a management
Dolitical initiative to break the oattern of oublic fund leadership.
Such a campaign would face several barriers. Here, unlike charter
competition, the employee beneficiaries provide a countervailing
interest. In addition, the funds with the most active postures come
from states, such as California, New York, and ·wisconsin, with longstanding antimanagerial political traditions. 216 Finally, an initiative
would have to succeed on a multistate basis. On the other hand, since
the number of key states is small, it would be possible to knock out
the core players that provide essential resources to the network with
an initiative pointed to the leading jurisdictions. The likelihood of
such an attack would increase if takeovers returned as an issue in a
political posture replicating that of the 1980s.
1

C.

•

1

Relational Modes of Shareholder Participation

1.

Institutional Coalitions and Board Membership

Discrete engagements led by public pension funds only begin to
realize the benefits projected by th e proponents of shareholder
participation. More significant res ults would follow if the institutions
formed coalitions and engaged with management to influence the
selection of board candidates, or, if necessa ry, proposed and elected
their own minority slates. TI1is strategy's objective is not the
acquisition of board control, but the placement of clusters of monitors
whose reputational interests are tied to meeting the demands of the
shareholder interest. These insid e shareholder representatives would
work to include performance incentives in compensation schemes,
develop additional sources of information and analysis, bring

214. !d. The governors presumably also had an inte res t in controlling the funds to be
able to draw on them in closing budget deficits. See Garten, supra note 159, at 639.
215. Romano, Pension Fund Acrivism, supra note 182, at 852. She concludes that
pension fund activities cannot replace an active control market as a disciplining force. !d.
216. Ca!PERS enlisted the press in fightin g off th e attack against it, charging that the
state was attempting to silence the funds' attacks on management. See Garten, supra note
159, at 639.
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heterogeneity of opinion to board deliberations, watch the managers
closely, and , in cases of persiste nt failure, build boardroom coalitions
to re place the m anagers. 217
TI1is strategy could be implemented in either of two ways. First,
the instituti ons could voluntarily subscribe to a cle aring hous e that
would seiect candidates and solicit proxies fo r th em.~iK Second, the
concentration of instituti onal holdin gs could increase to a leve l tha t
\Voul d make the formation of informal institutional votin g coalitions
more feasib le.219
Unfortunately, no movement toward the
realization of either strategy seems to exist in practice. No volunteers
have come forward to organize a governance associa tion, nor have the
pro portionate holdings of individual instituti ons risen to a point that
smail subgro ups have a stronger voting influence.220 The present
disposition of institutional incentives heralds no change. A ll the cost

217. See G ordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 133-42. Gord on does not think
that these institutional monitors should be se lected with a vie w to competing with
managem ent in the crea tion of investm ent and man agem ent policy. The hypothesized
monitors do not possess company specific expe rtise: aggress ive intervention fo r structural
change s lik e downsizing could lead to adverse politi cal consequ ences. !d. at 134-42; see
also Barnard , supra note 165 , at 1165-68 (explaining that insti tu tion al in vestors and
sha re hold ers lack necessary exp ertise to play an effective role in corporate governa nce);
Gil son & Kraak man , !nstilll tion al Agenda, supra note 32 , at 880 (argu in g th a t since
institutional investors lack the expertise for monitorin g manageme nt , th ey must delegate
this functi on to outside directors).
218. Gi lso n an d Kraa km an propose an in stitutional cl ea ringh ouse th a t would deve lop
21 pool of ca ndidates. See Gil son & Kra ak man. lnsrirwional Agenda. supra note 32. at 88388. T he ame ndm ent of the proxy rul es pe rmittin g shareho lders to split the ir votes be twee n
the ma na gemen t slat e and an opposing slate. see supra note 180, fa cilitate s thi s strategy by
making it poss ible to run a sla te for a small numbe r of seats.
219. An intermedi a te strategy , the perman ent sharehold er advisory comm ittee. has not
me t with enthusiasm from eithe r the commentato rs. see Barnard . supra not e 165, at 11 65 68; G ilson & Kraakman, !n stitwional Agenda , supra note 32, at 87 1-72. or th e shar eholders
themse lves. A proposa l for an advisory committee made by Mr. Ro bert Monks at Exxon
rece ived on ly 8% of the vote. See Charles F. Ri cha rds, Jr. & Ann e C. Fos te r, Exxon
Revisited: The SEC Allows Pennzoil to Exclu de Both Man da tory and Precato ry Prop osals
Seeking to Create a Shareho lder Advisory Commiuee, 48 Bus. LAW . 1509, 1511 (1993).
220. T he top 20 in stituti ons hold 21 % of American equities. and conce ntra tion falls off
thereafter. See Coffee, Half- Time Report, supra note 32, at 852. The hold e rs of th e 2 1%
hold sole voting authority as to only three -qu arte rs of th eir bloc ks. !d. at 854.
Furtherm ore, the num ber of mutu al fun ds continu es to increase. /d. at 855.
A helpful contrast may be Britain, where the largest 25 institutions hold an absolute
majority of th e shares. !d. at 854. A som ewhat more ac ti ve pattern of share hold er
participation follows from the higher level of concentration. In the case of a ser io usly
und erperfo rming compan y, the four or five largest institutional hold ers of British firm s
consult informally. Th e largest hold er ta kes the organizing lead and ta kes th e group 's
conce rns to the managers in the case of poor performance. See Be rn ard S. Black & John
C. Coffee, Jr. , Hail Britannia?: instirwional Investor Behavior Under Limiled Regulation ,
92 MICH. L. REV. 199 7.2046-53 (1994).
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and reputational disincentives that leave the public institutions in a
secondary role in discrete engagements also deter special inves tmen t
in monitoring. Additional disincentives deter the taking of larger
pos1t10ns: Instit uti o ns continue to value liquidity,221 and performance pressures deter risky long-term commitments. 222 The same
financi a l concerns deter the extension of public pension fun d
entrepreneurship to the board membership politics.
Given the
nonspecific. lon g-term fin ancial gains of effective m onitoring, the
d isincen tive~ make it unlikely that institutions will invest in board
election campa igns in the foreseeable future.
2.

Monitoring by Block Holders

Recognition of the difficulties with the coalition strategy has led
proponents of shareholder participation to reconsider the possibilities
of an historica ll y tes ted mode of relational investing, large block
ownership. 223 The model block owner is the legendary Warren
Buffett, a fundamental value investor who takes large, underdiversified, long-term positions; monitors carefully; but does not attempt
to interfere with the formulation or implementation of the business
plan, except in a crisis. 224 This model actor's large equity investment plainly provides an incentive for active monitoring. It is less
clear, however, whether there are any incentives that might induce
existing investm ent institutions to make these large block investments.
Re lational in vestors of this type appear only rarely in America n
capitalism. 225
\Vhen they do, they are either individual
entrepreneurs; specialized, privately held venture capital firms; or
other large corporations. 226 Gilson and Kraakman, drawing on the
venture capit al model and a Swedish precedent, sugges ted a vehicle
for expanding the set of these players. They proposed that closed-end
investment compan ies be formed to take ten to thirty-five percent
positions in a number of salvageable companies. These firms would

221. Coffee. Ha~f-Time Repon, supra note 32 , at 851.
222. See id. at 867.
223. Black cites st udi es showing a positive relationship between Tobin 's Q (the ra tio
of asse t replacem e nt va lue and m arke t value of equity) and th e size of owne rs hi p blocks
where the blocks are between 5 % and 20%. BernardS. Black, The Value of lnstinaional
Jnv esror Monitoring: Th e Empirica l Evidence, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 918 (1992).
224. See Gordo n, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148 , at 129-30. Note that the
monitoring st rategy duplicates that envisioned with coalition-based bo ard voting.
225. See Louis Lowenstein, Opening Remarks, Columbia University !nstitlllional!nvestor
Project Conference on Relational Investing New York, N.Y., May 6, 1993: "More Like
Wh om?," 18 J. CORP. L. 697, 704 (1993).
226. For examples, see Rock, Dark Side, supra note 16 1, at 990-99.
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monitor actively and hold for long periods but eventually would turn
over their positio ns to cash in on the gains of effective influence. 227
This proposal arouses standard institutional skepticism about the
projected financial returns: Absent any firm-specific expertise on Ihe
part of the investor, competitive ga ins seem unlikely as a systematic
n·ronosl'tinn
£-' . . ' y ·
""-'·. 22S
3.

Cre dibility and Possi bilities for Capture

Poss ibil ities of capture and defection raise questions about block
ownership 's ordinary course suitability as a mode of share holder
participation. Coalition- based board voting, in contrast, suggests
neither problem.
With coaliti on-b ased board voting, as with public pe nsion fund
activism, the combination of cross-monitoring, reputational interests,
and con testability of guardianship provides a circumstantial guarantee
that participants will remain faithful to the shareholder interest.22Y
Yet circumstantial guarantees of fidelity to the relational ideal of
patience and cooperation are less clear cut. It seems unlikely that
members of such coalitions could, or would, bond themselves to longterm cooperation by committing, implicitly or explicitly, to reject a
tender offer. Their legal duties and reputational interests lie in value
maximization for ben eficiaries, with no fine distinctions being made
about short or long-term mea ns to the end. Even with an implicit
commitment to the firm and institutional internalization of a norm of
patience, the incenti ve to defect from the coalition and acce pt an
attractive tender offer wo uld be powerful. 230
This element of short- versus long-term instability does not
completely undercut the cooperative possibilities of the boa rd voting

227 . See Gilson & Kra a kman , lnvesrmenr Companies, supra note 149, at 995-96. Th ey
hope for a 50'Yo increase in the st ock price ove r th e holding peri o d. T he cl ose d- e nd form
is necessary to secure a long-te m1 commitm e nt; th e gain must , of co urse, be ne t o f the
close d-end discount. !d. at 1005-06.
228. See Poze n, supra note 186, at 148.
229. See Black, A genrs, supra note 30, at 8 17, 851 , 855; Gordon, Cumulative Voring,
supra note 148, at 171.
230. Lowenstein reports that during the 1980s majo r British funds res ponde d to tender
offers by holdin g collegial inquirie s int o the integrity and effici ency of targe t m a nage rs,
and, in fact, rejecte d a few te nder o ffers as a result. American fund manage rs, presse d by
competitio n and fiduciary duty, always te nd e re d. Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 10-11.
A noth e r possible route of d e fection should be mentioned. The holder can threaten
a tender offe r himself. as Mr. Kirk Kerk orian recently did with Chrysler. See Steven Lipin
& Dave Ka nas, Offer f or Chrysler May Signal Rerum of rhe Corporate Raider , WALL ST.
J., A pril 13, 1995 , at C 1.
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strategy, however. The coalition, by hyp othesis, has the votes to
insert its monitors whether or not management consents in advance.
Thereafter, the structural possibility of a hostile attack gives
management an incentive to cooperate to the extent that doing so
decreases the likelihood of attack.
The block-owning monitor has a sirniiar incentive to ab andon
management when faced with a tender offer. but th e monitor is also
more susceptible to capture by management. In this situa t ion,
management can compete with the offeror by offering the holder a
side deal , exchanging additional return s on invested capital for a
binding commitment not to tenderY' The holders' substantial
equity commitment creates an incentive to defect to the management
side, and at the same time it undercuts any reputational concerns
about serving the wider shareholder interest. G iven financial rather
than political entrepreneurship, the incentives would appear to lie in
the opposite direction.
In the proponents' story, the block owner charts a course
between these alternative defections. It makes an implicit commitment to management to rej ect an offer that lacks a basis in fundamental value analysis. 232
Thereafter, it plays a tit-for-tat
cooperative game, holding to its commitment to the extent
management performs, but standing ready to defect to an outside
offeror if management fails to deliver. m Meanwhile, a successful
cooperative relationship makes a hostile offer unlikely. Since the
block owner plays this cooperative game vvith multiple firms as a
going business, it develops a reputational interest fo r exercising its
judgment in a discriminating way when faced with a tender offer. 23 ~
It becomes a gatekeeper for good and bad tender offers.
The problem with this story lies in th e complicated mix of
elements that figure into economic acco unts of the sources of merger
gain. Tender offer pre miums of the 1980s had multiple sources.
U nder Kraakman's "j oint gains " explanation, the offeror pays a

231. In th e standard deal, the bl ock holder rece ives preferred stock in exchange fo r a
sta nd-still , or gives manageme nt a call option. Indirect payments can come from
investm ent banking fees, other product contracts, or access to inside informati on. Rock,
Dark Side, sup ra note 161, at 1004-06.
232. See Ay re s & Cramton , supra note 19, at 1041.
233. Cf AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra not e 13 , at 26-38 (hyp othesizing a tit-for-tat
cooperative game between government agency and regulated firm ).
234. Ayres & Cramton, supra not e 19, at 1060-61 ; cf Gilson & Kraakman, !nves£menl
Companies, supra note 149, at 1005 (concluding th at the block inves tor tha t becomes too
activist loses friendly access and cannot sustain the business) .
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premium to make up a discount between the equity's market value
and the intrinsic value of the going concern. Given a competitive
market , the offeror must make up the discount. Its profit comes after
the acqui sition , from either (or a combination of) synergistic gains,
better management, or the resa le of parts of the target in the market
for going co ncern assets.235 Le t us assume th a t all tend er offers
correc tly are typed as motiva ted by the pursuit of gains throu gh one
of the t hree strategies, and consider the pos ition of the block holding
ga te kee per as to each.
The tend er offer motivated by synergistic possibilities does not
se em well suited to the block holder's business judgment, absent
particular expertise in the given production function. This leads the
bl ock holder to a difficult reputational choice:
Its relational
monitoring role, narrowly defined, does not require it to forego a
share of the synergy-motivated premium. Unfortunately, management
might view a commitment to patience and cooperation more broadly.
A side payment in exchange for refusal to tender would provide a
neat resolution of the holder's conflict, so long as the holders'
reputational interest lies more with cooperation with managers rather
than with a public-regarding appearance in the wider institutional
community. 236
The block holder's gatekeeper role would seem better suited to
tender offers motivated by gain through better management or resale
of going concern assets. In this case, the holder's superior information about company practices enables it to appraise prospects for
management improvement; chances for gain through dismemberment
presumably will have been explored in the course of the relationship.
Even here, the holder's loyalty to the cooperative strategy will be

235. See Reini er Kraakm an, Taking Discounrs Seriously:
The fmpli carions of
" Disco unted " Share Prices as an A cquisition Motive, 88 C OLUM. L. REV. 891, 925-30
(1988). Kra akman followed financi al economic th eory in accounting for the discounts,
attributing them to eith er management misinvestm ent of free cash flows or systematic
imperfections in market pricing. !d. at 907-11. Other comm enta tors abandon th e limiting
assumpti ons of finance theory and cite downward-sloping demand in stock ma rk e t pricin g.
See R ichard A. Booth, Discounts and Oth er Mysteries of Co rp orate Finance, 79 C AL. L.
REV. 1053, 1095-97 (1991) ; Lynn A. Stout. Are Takeo ver Premiums R eally Premiz1ms?
Market Price, Fair Valu e, and Corp orate Law, 99 Y A L E L.J. 1235, 1259-75 (1990).
236. We note that hopes for synergistic gains and other management-driven objectives
figure prominently in the recent revival of merger and acquisition activity. A few
transactions have entail ed hostile bids, but most have be en fri endly. See Randall Smith
& Greg Steinmetz, Mergers Surge as Firms Find a Rising Economy and Cheap Finan cing,
WALL ST. J. , Mar. 16, 1994, at AI; Mergers in America: Som ething in th e Wav es, THE
E CONO MI ST . Nov. 16, 1993 , at 89.
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tested if, as Kraakman asserts, most of the premium comes from the
making up of the discount. 237 If we open up the valuation theory to
admit a likelihood of overbidding by th e offeror, 238 the conflict
becomes even more severe. The overbidding offeror leaves the block
hold er with a choice between (a) coopera tion an d a payoff through
specu
lati;; e ..........governance gains that canno t. in anv
event.' mak e uof the
._
"'
discount between intrinsic valu e and the mark et price of the stock,
and (b) a sin gle-shot payoff th at not on ly m<<.k es up tl:te discou nt but,
given overb id ding, clearly offers a grea ter retu rn than that held out
by patient monitoring. Even given a reputa tional interest in integrity
in the gate keeper role, the blockholder 's tem ptation to defect and
take end period gains would be strong, particularly if a trend of
stepped -up tender offer activity held out possibilities of short-term
gain in similar investment positions. This scenario invites a restatement of the two choices above: (1) defect, abandon cooperation,
and go into an end period; 239 or (2) adhere to the cooperative
commitment and take a side payment. 240
D. Summary

The foregoing discussion of capture risk respecting block holders
dovetails with the discussion of capture risk respecting agents of
public pension funds: The availability or effec tiveness of either mode
of participation may be limited by historical contingencies, with the
likelihood of hostile takeover activity being a salien t one. It is hardly
a coincidence that relational investing models found their way into
circulation after the lapse of hostile takeover activity in 1989. The
disappearance of the market deterrent both ensured an absence of
counterva iling interest group demands tha t might have impaired the
public pe nsion funds' freedom to take a lea dership role in discrete
participation and made plausible the projections of long-term
cooperative particip ation by private institutions. The new cycle of
---·

---~----

237. Kr aa km an, supra note 235, at 925-27.
238. Kraakman discounts this possibility. !d. a t 893-905 . Others take the opposite vi ew.
See Be rn ardS . Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 ST AN . L REV. 597, 614-15
( 1989).
239. Th e mid-1980s expe rience of bondholders holdin g portfolios of cove nantl ess paper
in re li ance o n m a nagement's reputational interest in ca pit a l ma rket access provid es a good
example of this risk.
240. Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1059-61. recogn ize these prob lem s in
suggestin g that rela tion a l investing might he lp to fo resta ll bad tende r offe rs. We are less
san guine than they about the possibility that the problems can be resolved for the ben efit
of the shareho ld ers as a group.
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acquisition activity that commenced in 1993 could, but need not,
materially change this favorable climate. 241 Another salient contingency is th e relative level of concentration of institutional equity
holdings. Absent a marked increase of concentration in the industry,
we may not see the emergence of circumstances condu cive to the
app earance of coalition-based relational participatio n.

IV.

FEDERALLY MANDATED SHAREHOLDER lNlT !ATJV E

The law reform agenda surrounding the institutio nal investor
movement tends to look in the federal direction. This is part ly
because the proxy process is heavily federally regula ted . Refo rm
initiatives already have prompted the SEC to remo ve barrie rs to
shareholder initiative. 242 However, the reformers would like to see
additional changes that would shift more of the costs of shareholder
initiatives from the proponents to the firms. The primary agenda item
here is mandatory inclusion of shareholder board no m ine es in the
firm 's proxy statement.w

241. So far, the new cycle is management-driven and friendly in most cases; see sources
cited supra note 236, indicating no sign ificant change.
242. See supra note 180.
243. Without such a reform , the proponent must invest in its own proxy solicitation , a
prohibiti ve ly expensive process absent a control acq uisition objectiv e. For a recent
sugges tion that this reform be undertaken by SEC rulemaking, see Coffee . Half- Time
Rep orr, supra note 32, at 900-02. Coffee argued that multiple slates are un li kely, given the
instabilit y of instituti ona l vot ing coalitions, and noted that a minimum support threshold
could be im posed to deter ove rutilization . He also suggested th at acc ess be ope ned for
proposa ls counter to management proposals. !d.
Access proposals such as this have a long history . Se e, e.g., Secu riti es and Exchange
Commission Proxy Rul es. He a rings Before House Comm. on Inte rstat e and Foreign
Comm e rce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 & H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19,34-43 (1943)
(proposal for share hold e r nomination in issu er proxy statement); Proposed T end er Offer
Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, !OOth Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (1987) (ho lders of 3% or
$500,000 worth of eq uity to have right to include own proxy mate ri als and board
candidates): see also E ISENBERG , supra note 14, at 11 7-21 (proposing th at sh a re holders
holding 5% have the power to nominate directors in proxy sta teme nt); LOU IS
LOWENSTEI N, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM G AIN AND THE
ABSENTEE SH AREHOLD ER 209-11 (1988) (proposing th at shareholde rs have right to
nominate one-fifth to one-fourth of entire board); George W. Dent, Jr. , T o ward Unifying
Own ership and Comrol in th e Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 88 1, 907-08
(proposing that a committee of 10 or 20 largest holders have exclusive access to proxy
machin ery).
"Access" implie s cos t sh ifting. Cost shifting, however, could be direct ed without
access, on the assumption tha t the su bsidized proponent proceeds with it s own so licitation.
Bebchuk and Kahan recomme nd compensation for challengers both in board voting
contes ts and issue contests, with compensation for both board incumbe nts and chal le nge rs
made contingent on receipt of a thres hold percentage of votes, and more gene rou s
compensa ti on for cha llengers in issue contests. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra not e 96, at
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A broader federal law reform agenda also follows from the
financial theory of shareholder participation. This asserts that present
levels of institutional concentration could give rise to financial
incentives sufficient to induce subgroup formation if the federal
government removed ancillary legal constraints that increase the cos ts
and risks of co llective action. 2-+-' \Ve h:we no basis for controverting
this prediction , but, looking to the co unter story and the practice, we
note a substanti al possibility that the pres ent economic structure of
the industry may, by its elf, deter the appearance of the requisite
financial incentives. In the latter event, institutional shareholder
participation can be expected to persist only in a discrete form , with
reputational incentives figuring in significantly as inducements. The
possibility that the futur e framework for action will be thus limited
implies expansion for the law reform agenda-to increase the benefits
attainable through discrete action in addition to reducing the costs of
relational shareholder participation. Toward this end, we present the
following case for an incremental levelling of the field that state law
provides for shareholder initiative.
We propose a federally mandated privilege of direct shareholder
access to amend the corporate charter at the annual meeting of
shareholders, with cost-shifting to be effectuated through access to the
proxy statement for the making of proposals. 245 We would limit this

1077.
244. Th e targets are: (1) disclosure req uireme nts impose d on hold e rs of m ore than 5 %
of a class of sec urities und er section l 3(d) of th e Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. ~ 78m(d) (1988);
(2) liability of controlling person s for securities law violations of controlled persons under
section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988), and section 20(a) of th e Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7S t (1988): (3) short-swing li ab ility for trading profits of 10% holders
under section 16(b) of th e Exchange Act , 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); (4) restrictions on
capital structures a nd ince ntive compensation for advisors of investment companies und er
sections 18( d) and 23 of th e Inves tment Company Act, see 15 U.S.C.
80a-l8(d) , 8023(a)-(b) (1988) ; a nd (5) portfolio dive rs ification requirements under ERISA. See Roe,
supra note 34. at 26-27.
245. There will be ancillary probl c: ms respecting the proposal's preemptive re ach.
States could nullify a narrow access mandate in numerous ways. For example , a code's
system of process and structure default rules could be reconstituted as a system of
mandates. Or a stat e could a mend the process provision governing charter amendments
to differentiate am en dm ents by source and require a supermajority for s har ~ hold e r·
initiated proposals. We think th at the proposal's inclusion of access for reincorporation
decisions provides a circumstantial guarantee against the former possibility. As to th e
latter possibility, two dr afting solutions suggest th emse lves. The preempting legis la tion
could either provide that a simple majority always suffices or provide that the required
percentage for a shareholder initiated proposal be no lower than that provided in respect
of a management proposal. Th e latter, less intrusive, approach should suffice, on the
assumption that no state would respo nd by amending its code to re quire supcrm ajor ities

§s
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access privilege to matters of process and structure and exclu de most
busin ess m8tters allocated to the board by state cod es . n~ The
boundary dividing process and business would have to be drawn in
the preem pting legis lation. 2 ~ 7 In drawing it, we woul d place contract
terms relating to m an age ment 's incentives on the " process" side.
Thus, whatever the state law sta tus, the feder al law would grant access
fo r poison pili redemp tion a nd opting out of any state legislati on with
a n o pt out provision , in addition to traditional process m a tters such
as the structure an d composition of boa rds an d committees. More
tentatively, we also propose access fo r substa ntive proposa ls respecting executive com pensation. 248 However, cogniza nt of Professor
Jeffrey Gordon 's ap praisal of shareholder initiative, we wou ld exclude
access to formulation of the busin ess plan , in particular matters of
investment and disinvestment. 249
Gordon has warn ed tha t

across th e board.
246. See DEL. CO D E A NN . tit. 8, § 14l(a) (1991) (req uiring business of corporation to
be managed by or und e r direction of boa rd).
247. State law draws a working but vague su bj ect matter line between board a uthority
and sha re hold e r authority that accord s the sharehold ers a privilege of in iti ative respec ting
by-laws. to the ex tent consistent with the charter a nd state law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 109 (1991). Given the statutory all oca ti on of power over business dec isi ons to the
board , see DEL. CO D E ANN. tit. 8. § 141(a) (1991), th e scheme implies a dis ti nction
between busin ess decisions and contract terms respect ing process. However, th e preci se
co urse of thi s implicit bo undary has neve r been defin ed. The problem is compoundt:d by
th e state codes' designat ion . see id. , of defa ult status to th e allocation of busi ness decisi onmaking auth or ity to th e board-th e allocation ma y be constrained or red irected by charter
amen dm ent. As a result , an open-e nd ed mandate of sharehold e r initiative wo ul d hold out
th e possib il ity of shareholder direction of all business mat ters.
248. Th ese proposals carry a deterren t impact th at co ul d give the propon e nt useful
maneuverin g roo m in the right case. See infra note 298. Yet th ey also crea te speci:li ri sks
of ab use . Th e ve ry maneuvering room th ey co uld create increases the risk that a
pro ponent might exc hange th e withdr awal of the proposal for private re nts. In addition.
substantive compensati on proposals would be pa rti cul arl y attractive to actors with po liticai
agendas unrelated to shareholde r value. Such a hostile , politically motivated proposal , if
directed to an ex traord inaril y we ll -com pensated but effective manager, could destab ili ze
a valuable workin g relationship; that deleterious effect need not depend on a high
probability of passage.
We put thi s component of our proposal on th e table for discussion based on an
appraisal th at a bi g st ick, placed in the hands of serious proponents, has a va lu e th at
outweighs th e risks. Shareholders are habi tually suspic ious of both politicall y motivated
proposals and intervention against board busin ess judgments; se rious proponents,
accordingly. wo uld employ thi s bi g stick on ly in extraordinary sit uations.
249. Th e combinati on of a gree n light for poison pill red emptions. compensation
matters . and optin g ou t and a red light for other business ma tt ers could not be ach ieved
as a drafting propositi on simpl y by excl uding from access any amendment th at removes
authority delega ted to the board under th e state code's general delega tion. The pe rmitt ed
subjects would have to be specified . One candi da te for specific exclusion would be the
co rpora te purpose sectio n of the charter. An amendme nt of th e charter to exclud e a line
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shareholder initiatives could have two perverse effects. First, given
diverse preferences, sharehold er access could lead to economic losses
due to inconsistent choices ; second, access co uld be manipu lated by
sha rehold ers pursuin g private gain.250 We arg ue that our propose d
bou nd ary minimizes these problems.25 1 Any problems of confusion
(or inconsistency) resu lt in g fr om multi ple pro posals ca n be avoided
with simp le process rules an d a share ownership qualification . The
latter shou ld be low enough to permit a small n umber of players in
the act ivist network to quali fy a proposal and high enou gh to exclude
the gadfl ies.
On the technical point as to whether this proposal requires new
congressional legisl ation or could be promulgated as a rule by the
SEC, we look to legislation as a practical matter. The legislative
history of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act provides a basis for a
strong argument that the SEC does have the authority to impose
shareholder initiative on th e sta tes by rul e.252 That result depends,
however, on the theory of statutory interpretation the o bserver brin gs
to bear, 253 and a recent , nota bly restrictive judicial ruling254 of

of business presently conducted by a finn would mak e a ll of its contracts ultra vires,
presumably necessitating th e sa le of th e lin e of busin ess.
250. See Gordon, Sha reholder Inilialive, supra not e 29, a t 361.
251. See infra notes 310-27 and acco mpanying tex t.
252. See Fisch, supra note 162. at 11 70-74 (marshalling the legislative history in argu ing
fo r shareho ld er access by rule): Patrick J. Ryan , Rule /4a-8, ln stitlllional Shareho lder
Proposals, and Corp o rate Democracy . 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 146 (1988) (co nducting a
legis lat ive histor y of § 14 and conclud in g that Congress sup po rted "strong and ac tive
shareholde r participation in corp o rate ente rprise within the genera l framework of
man age men t-shareh old e r re lation s es tablished by th e genera l common and s t:.~tut ory law") .
For oth er expansive inte rpretations, sec LO UIS LOSS , FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITI ES
REGULA TJON 453 (2d ed. 1988); Ro berta S. Karmel, Qualita/ive Swndards for "Qualified
Securities ": SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATI-1. U. L. R EV. 809, 824 (1987).
253. For a differen t read ing, sec Step he n M. Ba in brid ge, Redirecting Sta te Takeover
La ws at Proxy Contests, 1992 Wrs. L. REV . 1071 , 1112. Ba inbridge read the legislative
history to limit § 14(a) to matters of disclosure and leave substantive voting rights
unaffected. See also ROBERT C. CLARK , CO RPOR ATE LAW 366 (1986) (not ing that§ 14(a)
concerns disclosure and process and does not preemp t or add to state law on existence,
distribution , o r content of voting power).
254. Compare SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517-1 8 (3d C ir. 1947) (holdi ng
that a corporation could not apply a by-l aw in such a way as to block a sharehold er by-law
amendment proposal and implying a fede rally guaranteed right of access, albeit vaguely),
cerr. denied, 382 U.S . 847 (1948) wi1h Busin ess Ro undtab le v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,411-15
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating the "one share, one vo te" provision in Rul e 19c-4, placing
a limit ed reading on § 14(a), and distinguishing be twee n procedural and disclosure
regulations th at facilit a te rights to vote gra nted by state law, deemed to be within § 14(a),
and SEC de terminati ons as to when a vote is required, deemed to be o utside the scope of
the rule).
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section 14(a) has left the SEC with cause to be reluctant to experiment with new rules. 255 This uncertainty leaves us expecting
that any significant alteration of the federal-state balance regarding
shareholder voting will come through legislation. 256

A. lvfanagemerzt Agenda Comrol and State Corpora te Codes

1.

Description of th e Sys tem

Political theory tells us that legislative outcomes in electoral
democracies depend on the collective choice rule utilized by the
legislature-different process rules lead to different outcomes given
the same set of electoral preferences. 257 It follows that the actor
who sets the agenda can control the outcome, and that a particular
process institution's constraints on agenda formation have systematic
implications for outcomes. 258
The agenda-setting procedures for shareholder voting in public
corporations have easily-described outcome implications. Control of
the proxy machinery gives management working control over the
mandatory shareholder board vote. 259 Shareholder votes also are
mandated for fundamental changes----charter amendments, dissolution,
certain mergers, and significant asset sales. Under the process rules
of most state codes,260 however, these matters may not be put

255. Cf Coffee, Half- Time Report, supra not e 32, at 876 (noting that th e SEC vacillates
on the role of institutional investors).
256. We note that part of what our proposa l seeks to ach ieve could be achieved by rule
on a rela tively secure statutory basis. Specifically, the SEC could (and we think should)
amend rule 14a-8 to include by-law amendments.
In an y event, we would recommend that any bill be drafted with specificity to reduce
the chance of ex p ost nullification in administrative proceedings. One grey area wo uld of
necessity have to be left for case by case determination by the SEC. No complete, selfexecuting definition of " process and structure" could be drafted as a practica l matter.
While a concrete list of subject matter can be culled from the existing institutional agenda
and the state codes, novel proposals would occur over time, necess itating reliance on
agency administration .
257. See WILLIAM K. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 37 (1982).
258. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weinga st, Uncovered Sets and Sophis ricared
Vo ring Ozacomes with Implications for Agenda lnsrirurions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 64-67
(1985).
259. As the foregoing discussion of barriers to shareholder voting coalitions impli es,
managem ent 's practical control is vulnerabl e only to a challenger willing to in vest in a
takeover or full-blown proxy contest.
260. For a survey, see infra notes 281-83 and accomp anyin g text.
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before the shareholders until the board first approves a resolution. 201
Ti'1e condition of board approval amounts to a management veto- to
control the agenda one must control the board. T'ne shareh olders
have a veto in turn, but no access to the agenda. T.<1is a bsolute
control 262 over the corporation's contractual agenda is subje:::t to two
exce ptions. One is the sect ion 14(a) precatory shareh old er pr o posa i,
pursuant to which a shareholder who rneets suitabi lity requ ire ments
~an se t <i n agenda item. but only for a nonbinding vo ~e. ~ 63 The
oth er is a state lav1 shareholder access privilege respect:n g by-law
amendments?>-~ the utility of which is limited. By-laws may contain
any provision relating to the business or its conduct, not inconsistent
with the rest of state law or the charter. 265 This means that
coverage of subject matter in the charter preempts contrary treatment
in the by-laws, opening possibilities for strategic tiering of provisions.
Ma nagement-protective exploitation of this possibility is a basic
corporate lawyering skill, extensively put to use in the drafting of the
antitakeover charter provisions of the 1980s. Some of the items from
the checklist of shark repellent provisions, such as poison pills 200 and
provisions barring shareholder action without a meeting, 267 had to
be placed in the charter as a matter of statutory mandate. Others,
such as staggered boards 268 and supermajority voting requirements,269 might be in the charter or by-laws at the firm's
option. Management chose the charter, blocking am endment or
repeal at the instance of a shareholder challenger not ye t in control
of the board but holding a majority of the stock or a majority of the

26i. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 242(b)( 1) (charter ame ndm e nts). 25 1 (b)-(c)
(m e rgers), 27.1 (a) (sales of subst an tially all assets), 275(a) (dissolution) (1991 ).
262. Man agement"s process advantage in the event of a challenge, whether by proxy
fight or sha re holde r proposa l, al so remains substantial. It has wide d isc retion to invest
corpo rate funds on the d efens ive side, and with the help of proxy solicitors, m a intain s a
substan tial informational advantage. See Black, Agenrs, supra note 30, at 825-26: Black,
Shareholder Passiviry, supra note 155, at 593-94. Despite amendm ents to the rules under
§ 14 , manage ment still has some room to manipulate shareholder preferences by b undling
proposals. See supra note 180.
263 . See supra note 162. There is an exception to the rul e of no nbindingness for
proposals for new by-laws . See infra note 274.
264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991).
265. See id. § 109(b).
266. See id. § 151(a) (providing that preferred stock contract terms go into the charter;
charte r can provide in advance for " blank check" delegation to manage me nt of power to
auth o rize pre ferred stock and fill in terms).
267. See id. § 228(a).
268. See id. § 141 (d), (k) (charter, initi a l by-law, or sharehold e r by-law; stagge red board
has effe ct of barring action for removal of directors witho ut cause).
269. See id. § 216.
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proxies. 270
Meanwhile, shareholder preferences respecting suc h
provisiOns underwent a change between the early and late
1980s-defe nsi ve charter amendments were routinely ratified during
the early pe riod and resisted later on. 271 H owever, the resistance
carne too late. Defensive cha rter provisions we re widespread by the
end of the deca de. Tne new shareholder activists can beg for th ei r
removal under R ule 14a-8, but, given the board veto on access to the
cha rter , c:::nnot corn pe! it.
Th e charte r preem pts th e by-laws only to the extent that it
actually covers the subject matter in question. Technical possi bilities
for shareholder-initiated contracting arise as a result. The charters of
public corporations, contrary to the vision of the contractual theorists,
did not con tain many contract terms befor e the proli ferat ion of
antitakeove r provisions. The historic public corporation charter was
kept spare to provide man agement with maximum fr eedom of action
in formulating process rules. 272 The charter contained the m inimum
terms mandated by the code and terms covering any senior equity
securities iss ued by the firm; by-laws contained standardized process
provisions; managers relied on state codes to fill in the rest. Firm
contracting evolved during the 1980s mostly to load charters with
defensive provisions. The shareholder agenda of the 1990s includes
new areas of concern, such as compensation schemes, confidential
voting, and board and committee structure. As to these, the charter
may provide not hing, leaving open a field for shareholder-initia ted bylaw amendments. R ead literally, the suitability rules under Rule 14a8 permi t by-l aw proposals, making an initiative cos t-effective.m
Some by-l aw initiatives have gone forw ard und er Rule 14a-8, but ,
unfortunately, this federal route to contractual access has not proved
use ful to proponents.
Technical questions of federal -state
synchronization have arisen as th e SEC has dealt with m anageme nt

- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- --·--- -··270. At som e po int , proced ural mane uvering by management to frustrate exerc ise of
the share holder franchise violates a nom1 of Delaware law. That point is ex treme.
Compare Stahl v. App le Banco rp , Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121-22 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding
th a t board action frustratin g exercise of shareholder franchise requ ires a compell in g
justification) H'ith Blasius In dus. , Inc. v A tl as Corp ., 564 A.2d 651 , 662-63 (De l. Ch. 1988)
(retreating from requi rement of a compelling justification for such boa rd ac tion).
271. See supra note 17 1 and accompanying tex t.
272. This is because chart er am endments must by ratified by th e shareholders, wh il e
by-l aws may be promulga ted by the boa rd . In an environ ment in which shareholder
initi atives res pe ctin g contract terms were rare events, it mad e cost se nse to leave the
contracting to the boa rd.
273. See Rule 14a-S(c)(1), whi ch excludes matters that are not a prope r subject for
share hol de r act ion unde r state law.
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objections to by-law proposals. State law provides little guidance on
these questions, and , at least up to now, management effectively has
blown doctrinal dust into the eyes of the SEC. 274
2.

Ex planation of the System

The rule of absolute delegation came into corporate lcl\v ">Vith the
turn-of-th e- century sh ift toward an entity conception of the corporation-a shift that had the inci dental effect of affording freedom
of action to the managers of new, mass-producing firms. 275
Previously, an agency theory of board authority had prevailed and

274. Th e sui tability rul es are built on three principles. First, the subjec t matter must
be proper under state law under Rule 14a-8(c)(l) . Second, the subject matte r must not
trave rse a long list of specific excl us ions devised by the SEC over the years. See Rule 14a8(c)(2)-(13). Third, following Auer v. Dresse l. 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954), a proposal on
a subject m a tter reserved to the discretion of the board under the state law de legation of
authority is nevertheless proper if phrased as a request. The three principles do not
synchronize well. There are two problems. First, a by-law proper under state law might
nevertheless traverse the SEC list of unsuitable topics. Second, state lawmakers ha ve
never had occasion to draw a clea r line between board management authority and
shareholder by-law promulgation authority. As a result, the extent to which a by-law may
constrain the board management authority is not clear. Nor is it clear whether the board
of directors, which also has power to promulgate by-laws, can subsequently repeal a by-law
approved by the shareholders. The no-action letters play out these problems with
conflicting results. Compare Exxon Corp., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 281, at *1 (Feb. 28 ,
1992) (allowing the shareholder proposal to establish a committee to oversee the board
of directors to be exclud ed) with Pennzoil Company, 1993 WL 52187 (S.E.C.) at *82-84
(Feb. 24, 1993) (original proposal) and Pennzoil Company, 1993 WL87871 (S.E.C.) at *4042 (Mar. 22, 1993) (revised proposal) (suggesting that the shareholder proposal that bylaws were to be am e nded only by sharehol ders was not proper under sta te law). F or a
summary of the Pennzoil correspond ence , see Charles F. Richards & . Anne C. Fos te r,
Exxon Revisited: The SEC Allows Penn zoil to Exclude Both Mandatory and Precawry
Proposals Seeking £O Create a Shareholder Advisory Commillee, 48 Bus. LAw. 1509, l 51318 (1993). In the former case. the SEC took a no-action position respecting a proposal for
a by-law mandating a permanent shareholder advisory committee, even though the
proposa l required funding for th e committee, arguably traversing the state law delegation
of authority to management. The SEC retreated from the position in the latter case, which
also concerned a by-law proposing a shareholder advisory committee. Upon res ubmission
of the proposa l on a precatory basis, th e SEC still sanctioned the proposal's omission
because it contained a bl ock against repea l by a subsequent board by-l aw. This, said the
agency, created a question as to state law validity.
The SEC's trea tment of the Pennzoil no-action lette r is somewhat counterintuitive as
a state law proposition. The state codes , read literally, imply that charter terms trump bylaws , and that share hold er by-laws trump board by-laws, but the point is not clear. The
SEC's no- action lette rs thus have a perverse effect. They invite state courts to detennine
the issue in management's favor s hould it come up at the state level. Given the charter
competition system, the states have every incentive to decide against the shareholders. For
further discu ss ion, see Coffee, Half- Time Report, supra note 32, at 883-89.
275. See William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of th e Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489 (1989).
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access had been the rule. 276 New Jersey, the early leader in the
charterin g of large firms,277 conditioned amendment on board
approval before 1895. 278 Delaware foll owed in its corporations code
of 1899, 279 a piece of legisla tion that manifested its determination to
enter into charter competition with neighb oring New Jersey. 280
Access limitation prov isions diffused into th e codes of o ther st ates
during the subsequen t decJ.des. By 1960. twe nty-five state codes
condit ion ed chart er amendment on board a pprova l: 2s 1 by 1970,
twenty-ei ght state codes did so; 2s2 by 1993. forty state codes did
so. 283 Today, on ly ten state codes leave a door open to shareholder
access.
This historica l sequence can be rea d as furth er confirmation of
the capture of state codes by th e management interest: It is no
accident that this component of management agenda control dates to
the first ins tances of the purchase and sale of corporate codes.
A nother plausible story has been offer ed, however. Jeffrey Gordon
has set out a functional explanation for absolute delegation, tied to his
observations that an open agenda could lead to costly shareholder
voting cycles and self-dealing by proponents of initiatives directed to
the firm 's business? 84 The tie led him to a three-part argument that

276. See Go rdon , Shareholder fnir/(1[/v e, supra note 29, at 349 n.7 (citing J OSEPH K.
A NG EL L & SAM UEL AMES. A TR EATIS E 0 1'-l TH E L '\ \V Of' PRI VATE CO RPORATIONS,
A GGR EG ATE ** 297-99 (9th ed. 1871 ); 1 VI CTOR MORA WETZ, TREATISE ON TH E LA \V OF
PRIV ATE CORPO RATIONS §§ 243-44 (2d ed. 1886)).
277. New Jersey began to liberali ze its code aft er 1890, with considera ble fina nci al
success . See C HRI STO PHER GRAN DY, NEW J ERSEY AN D TH E f iSCAL O RI GINS OF
MOD ER N AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 43-45 ( 1993).
278. JAMES B . D ILL, THE STATUTORY AN D CASE LAW APPLICABLE TO PR IVATE
COM PANIES UNDER TH E G EN ERA L CORPORATIO N ACT OF NEW JERSE Y AND CORPORATION PR ECED ENTS 42-43 (1899) (reproducing Ne w Je rse y General Corporation Act
§ 27).
279. See Act of 1899, 21 De l. Laws ch. 273, § 135.
280. See RUSS ELL CARPENTER LARCOM, TilE DELAWAR E COR PO RATI ON 11-1 3 (1937).
281. See 2 MODEL BUSI NESS CORP. ACT. ANN . 230-3 1 ( 1960).
282. See 2 MO DEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. A NN . (SECOND) 260-6 1 (1971 ).
283. See 2 MOD EL BUSINESS CORP. A CT. AN N. (THI RD) 1172-73 (Supp. 1993). The
MBCA count is 38. We di sagree as to two omissions: N.Y . Bus. CORP. L. §§ 803 , 804
(McKinney 1986), and UTAH CODE A N N.~ 16-lOa-1003 (Cumulative Supp. 1994). O f th e
10 states th at omit th e board veto , four a ll ow a stated pe rcent age of sharehold ers to
propose amendments (Idaho, Minnesota , No rth Dakota , and Pennsy lvani a); five have no
process provisions respecting amendment prop osal s (Louisiana, Massachu se tts, Michigan,
O hio and Wisconsin) ; California, somewh at ambiguously, requires a board reso lution
before or after the share hold er vote. CA L. CO RP. CODE §§ 902, 904 (Wes t 1990).
284. See Gordon, Shareholder Iniriariv e, supra note 29 , at 357-61. For our di scussion
of th e cyclin g prob lem, see infra notes 313-27 and accompanying tex t.
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ex plained the statutory pattern as a result of evolutionary efficiency.285 First, if the absolute delegation rule had a signifi cantly
n egative effect on value, some states would offer an al tern ative.
Second , al tho ugh many st ates do permit corporations to contract
around the delegation of business decisi onmaking power to the
bo ard, ~~h public cor po rati ons have not offered charter terrns that
ra ke up this o ption. 1l1ird, unl ik e antitak eove r resolutio ns. wh ich
have a nega tive impact on share prices, the absolute del eg;:Hion rule
has a long historical standing that share prices alrea dy re t1 ect. Citing
Jense n and Meckling's famous article on agency costs, 2 ~ 7 G o rdon
concluded th at if the rule injures shareholders, managers bear the
agen cy costs when they initially sell stock to the public.
In response to the first argument , we note that a number of
alternative codes do exist, but we think that inattention by local b ar
associations and other management representatives is the best
explanation for the isolated persistence of shareholder access
provisions. Given management agenda control over reincorporation
decisions, 2 ~ 8 no actively competing jurisdiction would include
sharehold er access in its product package, even if access were thought
to have a positive impact on shareholder value.
\Ve also question the probative value of the second argument's
point that public corporations have not exploited opportunities to opt
o ut of the absolute delegation of ordinary business decisionmaking
a uthority to the board.
Agenda control follows from process
provisions that appear to be mandatory and is analytically di stinct
fr om the st atutory delegation of business decisionmaking
a uthority. ~~<~ O pting out of the board authority delega tion came into
the codes to facilitate shareholder-level contracting as a means to
police opportunism in closely held firms. Th e charter amendment
that makes use of this permission removes decisionm ak ing authority
fr om th e board to the shareholder level. Such a broad-brush removal
is neither feas ible nor desirable in a publicly held firm. A pubiic

285. See Gordon , Shareholder Initiati ve, supra note 29, at 357-59.
286. See, e.g .. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (1991 ).
287. See Gordon, Sh areholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 358 (c iting Michae l C. Jensen
& William H . Me ck ling, Theory of rhe Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Own ersh ip Struclllre , 3 J. FIN. ECON . 305 (1976)).
288. See supra notes 69-72 a nd acco mpanying tex t.
289. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN . tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991) (c harter am e ndments to be
ap pr oved by the bo a rd). This doctrinal distinctio n is long stand ing. See HENRY
W INTH RO P B ALLANTINE , B ALLANTI NE ON CORPORA TIONS § 97, at 320 (1927)
(d istingui shin g betwe e n dire ctor and stockh old e r powers) .
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corporation conceivably could exploit the permission by expanding the
set of transactions that must be submitted for shareholder approval.
H owever, doing so would not open the agenda to shareholder charter
amendm ents; instead, the charter would set the agenda, and
man agemen t woul d retain a degree of control over the initiation and
timing of the tra nsaction eventually submitted to the shareholders.2Y0
Fin ally. we q ues tion the applicability of Jens e n and ~..1eckling 's
h isto rica l e.r onrc pricing model to this case. Th a t mode l presuppos es
a complete contract as to which all risk is priced out whe n the firm
initial ly goes public. \Ve think an incomplete contract model inclusive
of ex p osr re negotiation of terms is more appropri a te here. In
practice, firms go public at an early, entrepreneurial stage of their life
cycles. At that point, uncontrolled management influence over
decisions creates value, and no one worries about independent
directors and other process protections. 291 The shareholder participation movement deals with firms at a later stage of the life
cycle-mature, solvent companies able to pursue failed strategies
because of weak capital market constraints. 292 To have present
contracting processes determined by a risk allocation implied from a
public offering of a quarter or half century earlier seems
counterproductive.
In sum, state law's evolution to block shareholder access to the
corporate contract may raise a presumption of efficiency, but a review
of the history rebuts the presumption. At the turn of the century,
when the agenda control provisions came into th e corporate codes,
corp orate law was changing to facilitate investments of unprecedented
scop e by entrepreneurial managers. Today, the picture is more

290. W e note the poss ibility that a charter could be amend ed to re move to the
s hare ho ld e r le ve l th e dete rmination of the charter amendment age nda. Ce rtainl y this is
the in e vitable res ult in closely held firms that move all business decisionm a king to the
sha rehold e r leve l, as the statute permits. However, again, any blanke t re mova l mak es little
sense for publicly he ld firms.
In the alternative, the charte r could provide that
m a nage m e nt's age nd a power over charter amendments is subject to p ro ramo limitation
in any case in which a shareholder proposes an amendment at a m eeting. On th e theory
that th e grea ter includes the lesser, this provi sion would be va lid. On the other hand , if
th e age nd a contr ol provision we re read as strictly procedural and not on e of the "busin ess"
m a tt e rs und er the basic statutory delegation , it would resist opting out a nd amount to a
mand a te. That reading follows from the structure of the state co de. Since share hold er
a pproval is mandat o ry for charter amendments, they are by hypo th es is no t within the
" business'" in th e exclusive delegation to managem ent.
291. Ind eed, a charter load e d with such terms might se nd a negative signal in a n initi a l
public offe ring.
292. See Black, Agenrs, supra note 30, at 832; Lipton & Lorsch, Sllpra note 208 , at 7476.
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complicated.
Some firms fit the paradigm of the productive
management firm, but many do not. Until the recent occurrence of
successful shareholder initiatives, the shareholder collective action
problem made it pointless to question access barriers. The question
finally comes up today in an economic environment in which we look
to the legal framework to facilitate disinvestment as well as investment.293 Tne implication for the state code 's access barriers is
not efficiency, but obsolescence. 294
B.

Shareholder Access to the Charter for Process Amendments
1.

a.

Benefits

Shareholder Participation

We direct our access proposal to the pattern of discrete
shareholder participation led by agents of public pension funds. We
project beneficial consequences on the following model of
engagement, abstracted from the practice pattern? 95
Let us start with a proponent who publicly selects a corporate
target and either launches a negative voting campaign or makes a
precatory proposal.
Public targeting indicates the proponent's
judgment that the influence costs at the firm are unnecessarily high.
If the proponent's determination has credibility, the targeting injures
the reputations of the firm's managers and makes it more likely that
the shareholders will obstruct future management proposals. The
managers have three choices as to their response. First, they can take
action amounting to a counter-signal showing that the proponent has
selected incorrectly and thereby rehabilitate their reputations. 296

293. See generally Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Indu strial Revolwion, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN . 831, 847 (1993) (arguing that firm s able to
ac hi eve disinvestment will be successful competitors in the coming e ra).
294. Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note i48, at 175-79, indirectly confirms thi s
point. Gordon sensibly suggests that cumulative voting could facilitate implementation of
institutional board membership. His proposal runs up agai nst the access problem at the
implem entation stage: Since cumulative voting must be in the charter, and the proponent's
only vehicle is the precatory proposal, chances for success are speculative at best.
295. See supra notes 181-208 and accompanying text.
296. Recent events at Philip Morris show that this is possibl e. A board coalition (l ed
by th e previous C.E.O ., a tobacco division veteran) form ed to fight a proposal of the
incumb ent C.E.O. (a food division veteran backed by the institutions) to split the firm into
its food and tobacco segments. This led to the incumbent's resignation and the selection
of a new C.E.O. from the tobacco division. The new control group took its strategy to the
mark etplace, promising a more favorable dividend payout , and met a favorable response
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Second, if no such response is available and they are sufficiently risk
averse with respect to reputation and shareholder relations, they can
indicate responsiveness by starting a dialogue with the proponen t.
Third, they can do nothing a nd let the campaign take its course.
Access to the charter gives the proponent more room to
maneuver in the second and third cases. In the second case, the
proponent gets a significant payoff only if the campaign 's reputationa l
effect s are severe enough to cause realignment of the firm's internal
coalitions and termination of the chief executive. Otherwise, dialogue
leads to a payoff in the form of contract concessions. At the
negotiations, the proponent has cost and reputational incentives to
make a quick deal and take home some sort of contract modificati on.
M anagement presumably will want to give up as little as possible in
the way of concrete terms, consistent with an appearance of responsiveness. M anagement, in addition, at all times retains the option of
noncooperation. The proponent, armed only with a precatory
proposal and reputational threats, is not in a particularly strong
position to extract meaningful concessions. 297 If management has a
pending proposal of its own, a credible negative voting campaign
could mean a stronger bargaining position. Charter access lets the
proponent go past the negative, which depends on management's
agenda, and take its own mandatory agenda to the table. A rmed with
a mandate, the proponent with credible vote-getting ability can close
off management's option of noncooperation. Furthermore, the
mandatory stick can be wielded directly against the man agers'
influ ence within the firm as well as against their reputations: The
propon ent, for example, could go to the table with a new incentive

in the stock price-a two percent increase aga inst a market declin e on th e ann ou ncemen t
day. See Eben Sc hap iro, Philip Morris CEO Resigns Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., June
20, 1994, at A3 ; Eben Schapiro , Philip Morris Will Consider Stepping Up Buybacks or
More Aggressive Dividend, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994, at A3.
Thereafter, the institutions continued to pressure the firm , with mixed results . P hilip
Morri s withdrew its poison pill in March 1995, responding to a 40 % affim1ative vot e on
a 1994 sha re ho lder proposal. At the A pril 1995 annual meeting, 25% of the sha re holders
voted in fav or of a proposal recomm ending limitations on benefits to outside directors.
A Just Vo te No Cam paign initiated by CalPERS did less well , howeve r-man agem e nt's
board sla te was el ecte d with a 96% vote. The C.E.O., meanwhile , continued to play the
dividend card , promising a lower level of ea rnings retention. See Suein Hwang , Ar Philip
Morris, 25 % of Holders Vote to Slice Benefits of Outside Directors, WALL ST. J. , April 28,
1995, at B4.
297. G rund fes t, sup ra note 32, a t 932 n.354, noted that the impo rtance of concessio ns
extracted to date can be eas ily exaggerated. Confidential voting, as conceded by
ma nage rs, tends not to app ly in contested e lections; decisions to redeem poison pills do
not bar the boa rd from adopting a new pill if th e occasion arises.
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compensation scheme that reduces the manager's rents. 298 In the
trade-off surrounding the proposal's withdrawal, the proponent can
select from the whole agenda of process reforms. 299
Charter access also could be useful in the case of a completely
unresponsive firm. Precatory proposals have no governance consequences for managers willing to suffer the reputational consequences
of noncooperation and risk the long-term consequences of poor
shareholder relations hip s. Such a refusal to cooperate puts th e
proponent in a repeat play situation . Chart er access lets the
proponent raise the stakes in a second round , propos ing an incentive
compensation scheme, or an amendment that redeems a poison pill
and calls for a shareholder vote as a condition of replacement. Such
a punishment campaign would , we suspect, have to be carefully
targeted/ 00 with th e proponents concentrating resources on a
selected firm for a demonstration of enforcement power. A successful
demonstration would reinforce the importance of shareholder
relations and enhance cooperative incentives among the group of
targets as a whole. 30 1 Charter access also holds out the possibility
of short-term financial gain in some circumstances: Poison pill

298. A negati ve voting ca mpaign a lso co uld have thi s effe ct if a compensation pack age
were up for a vo te.
We note that th e proposal in th e example in th e text is unlik e ly to be m ade in
practice. Information costs would dete r inves tment in a full-blown compensa tion prop osa l.
Even if such an investment we re mad e (o r a simpler pe rcentage cut in base salary were
proposed ), probabilities for passage would a ppear to be low even with respect to a
m a nifestl y und erperfo rmi ng company. S harehold e r imposi ti o n of compensation terms that
materia lly red uce m anagement re nts is tantamount to a no confidence vote, a nd
presumably would be m e t in kind with red uce d manageme nt efforts to reve rse the fortun es
of the firm. The prop onent's purposes wo uld be bette r se rved in th e o rdinary case with
a proposal for a comp e nsa tion committee, th a t is, a proposal packaged in pure process
terms. On the other hand , a share hold e r privilege to make compe nsat io n proposals, eve n
uninvoked, re ta ins a dete rre nt value. In ad dition, a substa nti ·•e compensation proposal
conceivably could be useful to a pro pone nt in a case in which m anage ment has been
recalcitrant, the outsid e directors have bee n passive, th e sharehold ers have beco me
noticeably dissatisfied , and no potential challenger for board control has appe ared . In such
a situation, a proposal might either promote manage me nt responsiveness, prompt a
shakeup, or induce a control challenge.
299. See supra note 208.
300. A problem of info rmation flow should be noted. A negative voting camp a ign
involves minimal inform a ti o na l cost. M and atory proposa ls lifted directly from the existin g
institutional age nda and fittin g standing voting polici es ra ise no signifi can t informati ona l
problems for the propone nt. A more complex proposa l, such as a compe nsa tion sche m e
ta ilored to a p a rticul ar company, would crea te more of a proble m. Presumably, such a
target would have to be se lec ted with care , and the campa ign well- pub licize d.
301. Cf AYRES & BRAITH WAITE, supra note 13, at 45 (suggesting that occasional fi rin g
of big enforce ment gun by a regulator might be more effec tive th an frequent firin g).
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redemption can make the stock price go up if a takeover is a
likelihood. The chance of gain might favorably alter the economics
of subgroup formation, inducing private institutional players into the
game on occasion.302
The utility of a bigger stick that holds out an intermittent
financi al incentive could increase over time. The current oattern of
discret e intervention turns on reputat ionai incentives on both sides.
Reput ational ince ntives can change with circums tances from period to
period. Pens ion fund entrepreneursh ip could diminish in intensity if,
as the roster of players changes, the replacements discover that most
of the available reputational gain has attached to the departed players
of the first generation. Management reputational concerns also could
change over time. The activists already have targeted the largest,
worst-managed firms. New targets will represent less obvious cases
of high influence costs, making noncooperative responses a more
likely possibility. Old targets, meanwhile, become repeat play
situations over time; as dialogue with institutions becomes an ongoing
fact of life for these firms, reputational threats may loom less large
and management's long-term concern about shareholder relations
matter more. A power to expand the mandatory agenda allows the
proponent to be more proactive.

.

b.

State Law

Federally mandated charter access would ride atop the state
system, giving the shareholders access to the corporate contract but
not otherwise interfering with the production of state law. Taken
alone, it would not impair the responsive benefits of the state system.
Nor, taken alone, would it ameliorate the sys tem's management bias.
Accordingly, our definition of appropriate shareholder "process"
amendments would include reincorporation proposals. We would set
up the following two-step process for shareholder-initiated reincorporation. First, the proponent 's resolution would mandate the
convening of a committee of independent directors that would, after
consultation with an outside consultant, 303 recommend a best
alternative domicile. Second, the following year, the shareholders
would vote on a resolution to approve or reject a move to the new
jurisdiction. We employ the independent director intermediary to
solve the problem of selection. Two proponents could suggest

302. See supra notes 198-99 and ::;ccompanying text.
303. Here we note possible income for legal academ ics.
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different states; a given proponent's choice could be uninformed or,
conceivably, could result from a side-deal with actors in the jurisdiction chosen. In any event, public pension fund agents, being state
employees, do not seem we ll-suited to this part icular gatekeeper
function. Of course, there remain possibilities for management
inf1uence over the independent directors. H owever, since we make
this proposal more with a view to deterrent effects in states sensitive
to incorporation business than with exv;cuti ons of frequent
utiiization, we think the compromise workabl e.
The point of the shareholder reincorporation in itiative, as stated
above, 304 is to provide state lawmakers with a long-term incentive
to respond to shareholder interests. We doubt that it would result in
any short-term disruption of today's charter market. 305 No state
prese ntly stands out as a candidate for the role of shareholdersensitive charter monger. Indeed, Delaware's laggard role as an
antitakeover jurisdiction during the 1980s makes it a possible
shareholder-directed destination for firms located elsewhere. As a
practical matter, then, the deterrent of shareholder-directed reincorporation would complement the federal threat, 300 reinforcing
Delaware's moderate legislative pattern and encouraging its judges in
their attempts to mediate between the conflicting interes ts.
The burden to make use of initiative to invigorate the charter
market would be on the shareholder proponents. To make active
competitiOn work here, they would have to expand their
entrepreneurship to locate a jurisdiction, persuade it to go into
compe tition and invest in an informed judiciary, draft an attractive
code for it, and bring it some business. If all of that happened,
Delaware would face a dual demand that could produce difficult
choices. Moves in the direction of the shareholder interest to counter
the threat of exit by established firms could cause the state to lose

304. See supra text accompanying notes 141-47.
305. Had a fed eral re incorporation mandate been on the books in 1980 along with a
pattern of active shareholder participation, anti takeove r legis lati on might not have becom e
so widespread. A few well-timed reincorporations might have deterred management
representatives from lobbying state legislatures because th e shareholder interest would
have garnered a more prominent profile in lawmaking processe s.
306. We would not ex pect this form of federal intervention to defuse the ongoing
threat. Any congress ional move against the state system, howe ve r minimal, would break
a conceptual federalism barrier and imply the possibility of furth e r intervention in the
event of significant state developments attributable to management influ e nce. The shortterm effect, then. probably would be on e of re inforcement.
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new business from entrepreneurial firms on the move to maturity, but
such confl icts are the ordinary incidents of active competition.
2. Unintended Consequences
We ha ve designed our proposal to avoid two poss ibl e uninten ded

effects of shareh older initiative- re nt seeking and vote cycl ing.
Jeff;-ey G ordon. warn ing of both, has conclude d that in itiati ve is not
cos t bcne ncia l. We argu e that th ese conce rns ca n be met through a
subj ect ma tter limita tion and a few ancillary process ru les.
a.

Re nt See king

O n self-dealing, Gordon showed that, given concentrated
shareholding and unlimited access to the charter, there wo uld arise a
risk of logrolling effected through shareholder side agreements that
direct the firm to suboptimal projects benefitting the shareholders '
businesses. G iven dispersed shareholdings, Gordon projected that th e
problem might arise whenever a substantial proportion of the group
of holde rs represe nts a distinct unity of interest-as when union and
public pension funds, or members of some political or economic
interest group, hold a large proportion of the stock.307 This latte r
scenario would be unlikely to arise in the present context, given
prevailing institutional diversification practices and ra ti onal apathy
among small holders. However, Gordon also noted that the advent
of a regime of unlimited access could cause holding pa tterns to
change. A t present, American firms having large block holders tend
to have only one such holder. That holder gains infl uence over
management and deters others from accumulating large blocks. 30s
U n limi ted access opens up possibilities for hostile co alition-building
by latecomer block holders, inviting a change in the shareholdin g
pattern .
We agree that the risks G ordon described are cognizabl e and
have little confi dence that present fiduciary law could effective ly limit
them. Accordin gly, we leave matters of investment and disinvestment
ou t of our access proposal to delimit its utility to actors engaging in
governance activity in pursuit of short-term fina ncial gain. The
practical cost to th e sharehold er participation movement, as presently
directe d, is th e foreclosure of direct action respecting disinvestmen t

307. See Go rdon, Sh areh older lnilialive, sup ra no te 29 . a t 376-79.
308. See id. a t 374 (ci tin g Harold D emsetz & Ke nneth M. Le hn, Th e Srru crure of
Corpora re O wnersh ip: Causes an d Consequ ences, 93 J. POL. ECO N. 1155 ( 1985 )).
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and corporate unbundling. H ere, again with Gordon, we think that
dialogue and process reform work better. 309
It must be no ted that the process and structure limitation
diminishes incentives for side deals without ensurin g their absence.
Return to th e above example of a proponent who threatens
m anagement wit h a ne·w, re nt-reducing, incenti ve compensation
sc heme. Alth o ugh define d as process and structure, the pro posa l
remains susceptible to withdrawa l in exchange for a si de-p aymen t. 31 0
The guara ntee against such a transaction li es not in the subj ect m atte r
limitation but in th e proponent's projected incentive profil e. So long
as the proponent comes to the role seeking reputational rather than
financial capital , trade-offs will be structured with a view to
reputational gain. 1lms, a pension fund en trepreneur concerned with
vote-getting credibility can be expected to structure trades that entail
a concre te sha reholder-beneficial component. 311
Any additional
consideration sought by this actor will more likely take the form of
influence within the firm than the form of rent. Influence within the
firm, unlike mon ey, gives this actor opportunities for further
reputational enhancement and at least holds out a prospect of
shareholder benefit. At the same time, even an undisclosed rent deal
creates a risk of reputational injury for the proponent.312

309. Interplay between un bund ling and proce ss refo rm can be hypothesized . The:
proponent want s the fi rm to divide itself in two or spin off a substan tia l su bs idiary. T he
propon ent is motivated by curren t co nve ntion al wisdom and is ill-informed. Ma nagement
resists. The proponen t threatens management with poison pill red emption or in centive
compensat ion. If management concedes , th e firm is unbundl ed . If manage ment resists,
the proposal goes to a sharehold e r vo te.
We do not vi ew thi s possi bility as probl ema tic. In the latter case, the prop on ent still
has the substantial ta sk or persuading the shareho lde rs of the merits of th e process
proposal. Th e propon ent 's in ade quate informat ion abo ut unbundling does no t bear
directly on that mat ter. In th e former case, managem en t will have had an opportunity to
infor m the finan cia l communit y of its case. ff the case resonates, management has no
reaso n to concede.
310. We thank Jeffrey Gordon for noting this point.
311 . Ce rtainl y, a secret fin anc ial c .~:n po n e nt co uld be a part of such a trade. But the
inclusion of such a compone nt wo uld not necessarily mean that the ove rall trading process
was detrim ental to shareholder interests.
312. And for th e ta rge t ma kin g the offe r: Third parties report that man agers at Phil ip
Morris, a leadin g institutional target, rece ntly offe red a jo b to Richard Koppes, the Dep uty
Executive Director of CaiPE RS . Koppes turned down the offer. See Glenn Co llins, Philip
Morris Meeling Subdues Toba cco Prolesl, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1995 , at D 3.
This calculus mi ght ch ange during an end peri od , but the rep utation al deterrent
should still exercise infl uence . An actor might leave state service for the priva te money
management sector, or leave one sta te office to ass um e or run for another. In eith er case,
later exp os ure of a quest ionabl e trade could prove injuri ous. On the other hand, a pension
fu nd agent looki ng to a ca reer in state poli tics might have a reputational incentive to trade
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Cycling

On the problem of voting cycles, 313 Gordon hypothesized
corporate versions of a standard Arrovian voting cycl e 3 1 ~ under
u nlimited shareholder access. In his base case, we have three
shareholders, each of whom owns t\venty- six perce nt. Tne issue is
unbundling. O ne wants to se ll a divisio n: the second wa nts the status
quo; and the third wants a spin off. ~01e pre fere nces are ord ered , and
a m aj ority voting cycle results. The sa me, of course, could foll ow with
d isp ersed shareholdings.

for a geographically specific benefit, such as th e loca ti o n of a plant in his home state. But
the conflict of interest still bes peaks a need for sec recy, limiting the pot ential for political
reputational enhancement a t home. Only an actor bui lding a personal account for a
projected retirem ent seems to prese nt a stron g risk.
It also must be noted that a process an d st ructure access privilege could provide th e
medium for a threat by a financia lly-m oti va ted ac tor. For exa mpl e, a hostil e large
block hold er could use a man agement compensation proposal (whatever the id entity of th e
proponent) as th e occasion for negotiations keyed to rent extraction. But this possible
abuse, like that of rent extraction by a political entrep rene ur, exists in the present legal
structure. Indeed , the blockholder's opportunities to ex tract re nts follow from th e very
existence of the shareholder vote. An access proposal limited to process and struct ure
does create additional occasions for rent demands, but we doubt th at it would so alt er th e
unde rlying economics as to induce bl oc kholding in th e first instance or provide a
block holde r with a rent extraction opportunit y tha t could not ari se otherwise. Thus, at the
bottom lin e, our proposal's in cremen tal aspec t comes into the appraisal of th e se lf-dealing
ris k tha t attends it. Limited shareholder access se rves mainly to strengthen th e bargaining
posi ti on of one party in an establish ed ba rga ini ng situ ation. The sid e dea l possibility ex ists
already and is, indeed, intrinsic to any sh arehold er em powe rment strategy.
313. Social choice theo ry , which bega n with KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHO lCE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963), asse rts that majority rule can lea d to any eco nomically
a nd technically feasibl e outcome. Even if voters are other-regarding, so long as the ir
preferences differ, voting results will be unstabl e. Furtherm ore, the re will be no basis for
assumi ng tha t voting res ults are connected with the prefe rences of th e electorate. !d. at
22-33, 74-120; see also Richard D . McKelvey, lruransmivilics in Mullidimensional Voting
/'yfod els and Some Implications for Agenda Conrro /, 12 J. ECON. THEO RY 472 , 480 (l976)
(discuss ing global cycling theorem which shows th at when majority rul e breaks down , any
two points in space will belong in a cycle).
314. Gi ve n majority rule , it is poss ible to cycle through different preferences. Assume
that there are three players, A, B, and C, and three altern at ive outcomes, a, b, and c, and
the following preference rankings:
A: abc
B: bca
C: cba
T he result is a classic voting paradox, th at is, a lack of tran sitive social ordering.
Cycling occurs by virtue of th e actors' prefe rences remaining fixed over tin-; e. With
multi ple issues to be resolved simultaneously by a large number of deci sionm akers, social
choice models show that cyclical maj or iti es will occ ur in two-thirds of the decision contexts,
so long as logically ordered preferences are lik ely to emerge.
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However, voting cycles can be contained by process institutions.
Critics of social choice theory point out that its models suffer from
sign ifi can t limitations; cycling becomes a problem only in the simp lest
of majority ruie institutions-without agenda con trols, without
strategic voting, and with an age nda constructed on an ongoing basis;
in p;-actice, age nda-se tting institutions and agent sop hi stication
constrain majority ou tcomes.m
So lo ng as <KWrs in voting
institutions take fuJi advantage of strategic opportun ities :J.vaiia ble to
them under th ose institutional rules, majori ty-rule voting cycles 2re
unlikely. 31 6 Gordon, heeding this literature, acknowledged that the
cycling problem attending charter access could be ameliorated with a
process device that orders the agenda. He considered the possibility
of a rule that lets management set th e agenda, as between the three
shareholder proposals. He rejected that device on the ground that
m anagement ends up controlling the result, effect ively returning us to
absolute delegation. 317 We note in response that the device of th e
independent director committee could be drawn on instead. The
procedure would be the same one we propose for rein corporation.
The shareholder proposes the formation of a committee to consider
the best means of unbundling the firm; the committee reports back
with its best proposal; the shareholders vote yes or no, with no being
a vote for the status quo. Since a choice must be presented ,
management' s agenda control is broken. The special committee

31.5. See She psle & Weingas t, supra note 258. at 69; see also Ke nn e th A. Sh epsle,
Sw dy ing !nsrirwions, Some Lessons from rh e Rational Cho ice Approach, 1 J. T HEO RET ICAL
POL. 131, 135 ( 1989) (arguing that cycling majoriti es a re not a major prob lem).
For a survey of th e anticycling literature containing a use ful raxonomy of exp lan a tions
fo r stab ilit y o r induced equilibrium , see DONA LD P. GREEN & IAN SHAP IRO ,
PATHOLOGI ES OF RATIONAL CHOICE TH EOR Y: A CRITI QUE OF A PPLI CATIONS IN
PO LITICA L SCIE NCE 11 4-20 (1994). Green and Shapiro divide the ex isting accounts into
three groups. Th e first contends that equilibrium results i'rom in fo rm a tion costs and
legisla tive specializa ti on cause d by th e existence of a syste m of perman e nt comm ittees.
Th e secon d sc hool of th ough t holds th at induced stability res ult s fr om a ra nge of speci al
preference fom1a ti ons-for example, a quasi-concave preference distrib utio n in connection
with a supermajority voting requirem ent. The third group , which inclu des Shepsl e and
We ingast, asse rts that stability st ems from institution al arran gem ents. Green and Sh apiro
add a few additiona l factors to the ca talog drawn from o utsid e th e confines of rational
ch oice theory-comp utational difficulty, political infeas ibility. a nd a regime of
me tapreferences th a t works to avoid con fli ct.
316. O le-J o rgen Skog, 'Volante G enerate' and th e Insw bilitv of Spmia/ Voring Games ,
6 RATI ONA LITY & Soc. 27 1, 282-84 (1 994), arg ue that McKe lvey's th eory of global cycling
dep ends on th e assumption that individuals are ab le to di scr iminate be tween altern atives
th a t are very close. In Skog's view, this ass umpti on is unrea li st ic; if it is relaxed the
gen e ral instability of two-dim ensi onal spatial voting ga mes dis ap pe ars .
317. See Gordon, Sha reh older lniria1ive, supra not e 29, at 363-64.
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serves the same cycle-breaking function here as does the legislative
committee. Of course, it would not guarantee the result of effective
shareholder choice. The committee could resort to subterfuge to get
the result management wants, reporting a manifestly unpalatable
alternative to the status quo . However, the initiative is dest abilizing
nonet he less. The initial shareholder vote to conve ne the committee
sig na ls that divisio ns of the firm may be u p fo r sale. If the sign al
-,vere to a ttract a third-p arty offer, supp ression by the sp,:;ci<l !
committee would be substantially constrained.m
G iven the availability of a process rule that restricts shareholder
choice, we are not at all sure that cycling need be a problem with
respect to initiatives on investment and disinvestment. As Gordon
also noted, 3 19 however, consistency over time might be such a
prob lem: Shareholders could decide to invest in one period and
disinvest in the next period, with costly results. Given the problem of
asymmetric information, and the possibility of rent-seeking on the
side, we conclude that the risks attending initiative on matters of
inves tment and disinvestment are prohibitive.
Cycling could in theory occur with process and structure matters,
even though the immediate financial incentives that motivate the
shareholders in G ordon 's examples would be absent. Conceivably,
one proponent could propose a compensation committee, a second
could propose a specific, self-executing investmen t compensation
scheme requiring no committee, and a third could propose a com pensation scheme resembling the sratus quo. H owever, no cycling would
occur here under our proposal, even though it would open the door
to any proponent or group of proponents meeting a threshol d
percentage ownership requirement. We have incl ud ed a process rule
that prevents cycling: 320 Proposals only m ay be considered at the
annual meeting, and under the proxy voting system, proposals are
submitted for a one-round majority vote. The problem stemming
from unlimited access would not be cycling but inconsistency of
result-for example, both the status quo based and the new compensation scheme could be approved. A breaker rule could be included
to deal with this problem. If management deems two proposals to be
inconsistent, it refers the matter to a third-party adjudi ca tor. If the
proposals are then found to be inconsistent, the first in time reaches

31 8.
31 9.
320.
simpl e

See ca ses cited supra note 117.
Gord o n, Shareholder Initiative , supra note 29 , at 364-65.
STEV EN J. BRAMS, THEORY OF MOVES 187-93 (1994) (showing that there a re very
ways to empl o y process rul es to break voting cycles).
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the agenda. 321 Two candidates are available for this adjudica tory
role-th e SEC staff and the independent directors ' committee. We
prefer the latter in theory, but since any disputed matter would find
its way to the SEC staff in any event, the former amounts to the
practical choice. In either case, a result is reached and there is no
cycling. O ne problem remains : the possibility of inconsistency over
time 322 and attend an t costs. 323
We thi nk th e consistency problem is minima! , eve n ab sent a
break er rule. \Ve envis ion a percentage ownership requ irement keyed
to institutional ho lding patterns and set high enough so that two or
thre e in stitutions must coordin ate their efforts in support of the
proposal. The idea is to rely on the practice pattern to ensure process
coherence. The leading pl aye rs in the share h old er participation
mo ve me nt ha ve been motivated by reputational gain. 324 Process
and structure initiatives that lead to conflicts with oth e r institu tiona l
players hold out little prospect of reputational enhancement. 325

321. Here , a possi bi lity fo r management manipula tion opens up. If management hea rs
of a pr oposa l, it arranges with a friendly sha reholder to propose an inconsistent proposa l
first. Assume that manageme nt wants to block a proposa l fo r a compensa ti o n committee.
The man ageme nt nominee would propose that th e charter, which says nothin g about
compe nsa tion committees, be amended to say the corporation shall not have a
compensa tion committe e . The result is the status quo o n e ither a yes or a no vote. To
avoid thi s prob le m, proposa ls that have a status quo effec t would have to be ex cepted from
t he first-in -t ime rul e .
322. Thi s prob lem easily could be treated with a provision that bars, for a period of
years, any subseq ue nt shareholder initia ti ve o n the subjec t matter cove red by a successfu l
initiat ive.
323. An extension of o ur pro posal toward the terr itory of investm en t and dis in vestment
should now be suggested. Access could be granted to ame nd the charte r to broaden the
statut ory li st or transactions th a t must be submitted for sha re holder app rova l. Und er such
an access perm ission , share holders could require vot ing for acquisi tions effected under
triangula r me rgers, large asse t purchases, a nd oth e r signi fica nt transactions that prese ntl y
can be d fect eci in the boa rd room in many states. Such a n ex panded voting reg ime is
e xtensive ly discussed as a mandator y propos ition in Lyn n L. D all as, The Comrol and
Conflict of !meres/ Vo1ing Sys tems, 71 N. C. L. REV. 1, 47-71 (1992); see also Rock, Dark
Side, supra note 161, at 1023 (noting share holder approva l of speci a l iss ue of preferred
stoc k).
Unde r a mo re aggressive form of this ex tension , the sharehold e rs wo uld have a
privilege to le gislate not on ly a veto but a right of initiative. For examp le, a ch a rt e r
provisi on might permit initiation of a m e rger or asset sa le . At this point the line between
process and structure and substance is breached ve ry clea rly.
324. See supra text accompanyin g notes 200-08.
325. Cf BRAMS , supra note 320, a t 118-19. Bra ms notes that reputation a nd moving
power are best un derstood in the sam e lig ht : Where a player establishes a reputation and
the reputation is ac kn owledged by an oppone nt, "it may n o longer be necessa ry for players
physica ll y to cycle to ·prove ' themselves . Me ntal moves will then suffice. a nd a playe r wi th
recogni ze d mov ing powe r may then get its way without sufferin g th e costs of ac tll a ll y

1995]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1947

Furthermore, in a case in which a proposal responds to a barga ining
impasse with a long-t erm target or comple te noncooperation from a
new target, one would anticipate coordination and information sharing
among the institutions involved in the campaign. 326 Finally, since
reputational gain here ultim ately depend s on vote-getting ability, we
would expect proponents to select thei r pro posals and targets wit,l1
327

care.

CONCLUS ION

This A rticle began by comparing the regulatory strategy of
enforced self-regulation with the historic alternatives of market and
fiduciary deterrence, commending self-regulation as a means to
cooperative solutions to corporate agency problems. H aving surveyed
the eme rging self-regulatory field , and after making a proposal for its
ex pansion, we close by noting the mod esty of the benefits we project.
An experiment with process and structure access very well might
result in no significant changes, either due to sporadic utilization of
the access privilege, or a cooperatively based response by the larger
group of shareholders against the forcing of governance terms on
managers, except in extreme, end-period situations. In the alternative, extensive and underinformed utilization could conceivably
cause incentive or other contractual problems in given firms.
However, we think management has sufficient resources and enough
of an informational advantage to protec t firms from this problem. On

cycli ng." !d.
326. Here we draw by analogy on S hepsle & W e ingast, su pra n o te 258, a t 64-69.
She psl e and Weingast a rgue d that legisla tive ou tcomes a re no t in flux, but disp lay
system at ic regularities, due in part to the dispro porti on a te influence on outcomes o f
m embe rs of powerful committe es. Ce rtain membe rs. by virtue of th e control over process
derived from their committee pos itions , are able to transl a te their preferences into
legisla tive ac ti on . Shepsle and We in gast call this "structure -induced equilibrium," whic h
means th at an institution can be mod e ll ed as an ex te nsive form game due to th e
combinati o n of process sequ ence and the identity o f th e individual players . A t th e b ottom
lin e, th e structure-induced eq uili b rium is an al ternati ve th a t is invulnera ble. The earli er
social choice models, in contrast, relied o n an atom isti c stru cture lackin g th e features
essential to un de rstanding th e nat ur e and di stribution of the ac tors' pre fer ences.
327. We m ake this proposal for limited federal int e rven tion without a n ex pectation of
a favorable political clim a te . In fac t, th e proposa l con ta ins a takeover-fri end ly aspect that
wo uld make it politically controversial. Shareholders co uld use it to force poison pill
redemption or to o pt o ut of state ant itakeove r statues co nta ining open-e nd ed opt-out
provisions. See D EL. COD E ANN. tit. 8, § 203( b) (3) (1991).
Since access wo uld fa cilitat e shareholder defection in the eve nt of a tak eo ve r, it also
wou ld do nothing to am e liora te th e problem that takeovers present for re lati on a l
share ho lde r part ici pa ti o n strategies.
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our most sanguine projection, charter access, used responsibly and
occasionally, would bring process rules that lower managementinfluence costs to a small group of mature firms. Our hope is that
competitive evolution would then take its course, so that other firms
voluntarily adopt th e rules that work best. From there, we would
hope that res ponsible and occasional use of charter :J.ccess encourages
ongoing con tractual innovation, with all players contrib uting:
institutional agents, managers, and lawyers.
Some years ago, a corporate law debate over the des ira bility of
m andatory and enabling rules came down to sim ple diffe rence of
opinion. The enabling side emphasized the importance of innovation
and flexibility; the defenders of mandates emphasized process
infirmities. The discussion here goes back to that point of difference.
State law has done an excellent job of assuring that firms can draft
contracts that accord managers freedom of action to invest and
disinvest, but it has not evolved to open up all possibilities for
productive firm contracting. State law remains the best vehicle for
realizing those possibilities, but a demand-side barrier prevents state
law experimentation. An incidental federal intervention taken to
facilitate the experiment will not hurt the state system, and it might
do the system some good.

